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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of military com-
mitment problems and evaluates how they impact military effectiveness.
Military organizations regularly encounter dynamic, heterogenous envi-
ronments in which conditions can change both quickly and substantially
over time, which can give rise to commitment problems. I investigate three
factors necessary for military organizations to be effective in such situa-
tions: resolve—the willpower to continue with a course of action despite
setbacks; adaptation—the ability to learn from and adjust to novel situa-
tions; and flexibility—the ability to respond quickly to different situations.
Each of these factors is related to a different commitment problem that mil-
itary forces often have to confront. First, high signals of resolve within an
army can make the commitment to fight credible, such that commanders
and troops believe fighting in combat is their best option, rather than fleeing
or surrendering. Second, a high level of commitment to a conflict by polit-
ical leaders can create better conditions for the military to adapt to novel
situations and improve their doctrines. Finally, high flexibility through
improved force projection capabilities can make security commitments to
other states credible, as it allows military forces to respond to crises more
quickly and efficiently. I demonstrate that organizational solutions to com-
mitment problems are directly tied to military effectiveness, and along with
other types of commitment solutions, provide a better framework for un-




To try to measure the various
dimensions of the effectiveness
of armed forces involves,
because of the self-generated
momentum of modern war, a
measurement of effectiveness in




impossible when the goals to be
effected are incorrigibly protean.
—Russell Weigley,
Military Effectiveness Vol. III
(Weigley, 1988)
Military organizations regularly encounter dynamic, heterogenous en-
vironments in which conditions can change both quickly and substantially
over time. For example, in the quest for security, states develop military
capabilities and improvements in technology, logistics, organizational man-
agement, force employment, tactics, and other related features of military
power. Alternatively, states can also increase their security by establish-
ing formal alliances (Morrow, 1993) or more limited forms of security co-
operation, such as joint military exercises and intelligence sharing (Kinne,
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2018). Together, these actions contribute to the security dilemma, whereby
one state’s pursuit of security causes another state to respond by making its
own security improvements, thus creating a perpetual and dynamic process
(Jervis, 1978). Likewise, in war, military forces face dynamic situations both
during combat engagements and across the entirety of the conflict, as each
side competes for an advantage through maneuver and engagement. Con-
sequently, over the course of history, war has become increasingly complex
and required more sophisticated force employment against an opponent in
order to ensure military effectiveness (Biddle, 2004).
Rapid changes in power can create commitment problems (Fearon, 1995;
Powell, 2004, 2006), in which a party to an agreement reneges on the terms
of the deal, or chooses not to make a deal because it is unwilling or unable
to commit. In such situations, enforcement mechanisms are either nonex-
istent or weakened due to the changes, which creates uncertainty about an
actor’s intentions in the future (Schelling, 1960; Axelrod, 1984). States and
their military forces often confront a variety of commitment problems in
dynamic situations when conditions shift and changes in power alter the
terms of an agreement. For example, in an evolving security environment,
shifts in capabilities can occur as states innovate and develop new modes
of military power, which can challenge the credibility of an alliance com-
mitment. Alternatively, in a high-intensity conventional conflict, changes
in military advantage through maneuver or combat attrition can challenge
soldiers’ commitment to continue fighting cohesively. Similarly, in a pro-
tracted insurgency conflict, shifts in information necessary to defeat the
insurgents—or the lack thereof—can challenge a state’s commitment to con-
tinue fighting altogether.
Commitment problems are often understood within the context of bar-
gaining in coercive diplomacy, in which military capabilities can sometimes
be used as bargaining power (Schelling, 1966). Military commitment prob-
lems are a special class of this more general phenomenon. Military organi-
zations operate in a hierarchical chain of command that regulates decision-
making for national security under the threat of war (within coercive diplo-
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macy) or during a war (when coercive diplomacy breaks down). Conse-
quently, military commitment problems can arise at different levels in the
chain of command, depending on the context. Scholars and practition-
ers generally identify four levels within the military command and control
structure: political, strategic, operational, and tactical (Millett, Murray, and
Watman, 1988). At the tactical level, commitment problems arise from indi-
vidual soldiers’ decisions about how to conduct themselves in battle. The
credibility of soldiers’ commitment to fighting, rather than surrendering or
fleeing, directly impacts a military’s ability to fight effectively in war. Sepa-
rately, the credibility of states’ commitment to fighting a war depends upon
how well their militaries can adapt doctrine to local conditions, which is
driven by feedback that runs throughout the chain of command, from the
tactical level up to the political, and back down again. Finally, at the po-
litical level, commitment problems arise from political authorities’ grand
strategy decisions with regard to global force posture: the credibility of al-
liance commitments therefore contributes to how effectively states can pur-
sue their security.
This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of military com-
mitment problems in order to answer the following question: in dynamic
environments where conditions can change quickly and substantially over
time, why do military commitment problems arise, how do they impact
states’ ability to deter threats and fight wars, and how can states over-
come them? To answer this question, I investigate three factors that are
necessary for military organizations to be effective in dynamic situations:
resolve—the willpower to continue with a course of action despite setbacks;
adaptation—the ability to learn from and adjust to novel situations; and
flexibility—the ability to respond quickly to different situations. Resolve, or
the willpower to fight despite the temptation to back down (Kertzer, 2017),
is a critical feature of military effectiveness. Without the conviction to con-
tinue fighting among both leaders and troops, a military unit will not op-
erate cohesively, leaving it susceptible to coercion and eventually resulting
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in its defeat.1 Adaptation is equally important because it ensures better fit-
ness with the environment. Without successful adaptation, a military orga-
nization will apply the wrong choices against an opponent and have lower
effectiveness as a result. Finally, flexibility is also essential for military effec-
tiveness because it allows military forces to respond to dynamic situations
both more quickly and more efficiently.
Each of these three factors is related to a different commitment prob-
lem that military forces often have to confront. First, high signals of resolve
within an army can make the commitment to fight credible, such that sol-
diers believe fighting in combat is their best option, rather than fleeing or
surrendering. Second, a high level of commitment to a conflict by polit-
ical leaders can create better conditions for the military to adapt to novel
situations and improve their doctrines. Finally, high flexibility through
improved force projection capabilities can make security commitments to
other states credible, as it allows military forces to respond to crises more
quickly and efficiently.
Many existing studies employing game theory have focused on differ-
ent tools for solving commitment problems. These tools include invoking
the actor’s reputation, creating costly signals, and establishing commitment
devices. The U.S. war in Vietnam is an example where U.S. reputation was
invoked as a way to commit itself to the conflict: Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger explicitly stated that U.S. commitment in Vietnam was motivated
by an effort to signal its credibility to other countries throughout the world
(Kissinger, 1969, p. 218–219). Alternatively, costly signals can be used to
communicate commitment by demonstrating that only a committed actor
would pay the cost of the signal, whereas a less committed actor would not.
For example, a state can pay costs by deploying troops to an ally, or tie its
hands by invoking audience costs through a formal treaty, as a way to make
an alliance commitment credible (Fearon, 1997). Relatedly, commitment de-
vices are a way for an actor to commit itself to a course of action before-
hand by making the costs of reneging too high. For example, if a military
1“Resolve” can also be considered “morale” when judged as the willingness to fight.
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unit in battle is cornered into a position near a bridge, burning the bridge
down so that there is no way to retreat is a way to establish a commitment
device, which ensures for the soldiers in the cornered unit that fighting is
more attractive than fleeing (Schelling, 1966). Some military organizations,
such as the Soviet Red Army during World War II, have employed units as
“blocking detachments” that effectively serve as bridge burners: these units
are placed behind the front lines and ordered to detain—and in some cases
shoot—any deserting or retreating soldiers (Lyall and Zhukov, 2020). Be-
cause actors might employ several different mechanisms to solve commit-
ment problems, some of these other commitment “solutions” will appear
throughout my analysis, though they are not my primary focus.
Instead, I explore three organizational factors related to dynamic com-
mitment challenges—resolve, adaptation, and flexibility—as a way to ex-
plain military effectiveness. Accordingly, the organizational solutions to
commitment problems I consider are directly tied to military effective-
ness, and along with other types of commitment solutions, provide a bet-
ter framework for understanding military effectiveness than existing ap-
proaches.
Previous work on military effectiveness has typically focused on topics
related to organizational efficiency. For example, in the three-volume work
entitled Military Effectiveness—a collection of historical accounts that eval-
uate conventional military effectiveness during the first half of the twenti-
eth century—organizational efficiency is the central theme: effectiveness is
evaluated in terms of how well a military was able to achieve its goals given
its capabilities and constraints. Thus, measuring effectiveness, according to
this work, is a matter of answering various questions about the extent or de-
gree to which military organizations’ actions are consistent with their goals:
“To what extent do military organizations have access to manpower in the
required quantity and quality,” or “To what degree are strategic goals and
courses of action consistent with force size and structure,” or “To what ex-
tent are tactical concepts consistent with operational capabilities,” and so
on (Millett, Murray, and Watman, 1988).
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While evaluating organizational efficiency is one aspect of military ef-
fectiveness, it is not the only dimension. Additionally, if we take such a
context-specific approach to explaining military effectiveness, we do not al-
low for much, if any, generalization across cases. Furthermore, if we assume
military organizations are comprised of rational actors, then any inefficien-
cies that exist are puzzles to be explained, rather than simply ways to de-
scribe ineffectiveness. Therefore, it is not particularly useful for explanatory
purposes to treat efficiency per se as the only, or even most important, ele-
ment of military effectiveness.
Another common approach attempts to quantify military effectiveness
with the loss-exchange ratio (LER), which computes relative combat attri-
tion by dividing the number of opposing troops killed by the number of
friendly troops killed (Biddle, 2004; Cochran and Long, 2017). Thus, if a
military is able to inflict large losses on its opponent relative to the number
of losses it suffers, then the idea is that it must be more effective. However,
the LER is a narrow measure, because it only considers one dimension—the
number of troops killed. Furthermore, it is not a measure that all armies are
inherently responsive to. For example, soldiers typically expect casualties
in war, and therefore often display high resilience despite their units expe-
riencing attrition in combat, making them less responsive to casualties than
the LER would predict. Alternatively, soldiers may have little idea about
the relative casualties of each side in a battle, and may be less responsive to
the LER as a result. Therefore, in either case, the LER is not a very powerful
measure of military effectiveness.
Other common explanations attempt to evaluate military effectiveness
by quantifying battles as decisive, or coding battles according to which side
was victorious (Biddle, 2004; Grauer and Horowitz, 2012; Stam, 1999). Yet
such approaches lack explanatory power due to their subjective and post
hoc nature, as others have also noted (Cochran and Long, 2017). In particu-
lar, scholars employing such explanations use information about battlefield
outcomes to inform the values they choose for the independent variables—
such as by coding a battle as victory or defeat, and then evaluating which
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type of strategy or operational forces were employed—which creates prob-
lems with both selection bias and overall measurement bias.
To assess military effectiveness, I instead investigate the causes and con-
sequences of military commitment problems at different levels of analysis
in the chain of command.
1.1 Plan of the dissertation
In each of the following chapters, I focus on a particular organizational fac-
tor within a given military context. Specifically, these chapters provide a
demonstration of how resolve, adaptation, and flexibility contribute to mil-
itary effectiveness in the context of conventional conflict, unconventional
conflict, and international security, respectively. Below I briefly describe the
approach for each chapter in more detail.
Chapter 2: “Until the Bitter End? The Diffusion of Surrender Across Battles”
Why do some armies fight until the bitter end, but others collapse and sur-
render? Existing research has highlighted the importance of battlefield re-
solve for the onset, conduct, and outcome of war, but has left these life-and-
death decisions mostly unexplained. We know little about why battle-level
surrender occurs, and why it stops.
In this chapter, I argue that surrender emerges from a collective-action
problem: success in battle requires that soldiers choose to fight as a unit
rather than flee, but individual decisions to fight depend on whether sol-
diers expect their comrades to do the same. As a result, surrender becomes
contagious across battles because soldiers take cues from what other sol-
diers did when they were in a similar position. Conversely, where no recent
precedent exists, mass surrender is unlikely.
I find empirical support for the diffusion of surrender using a new data
set of conventional battles in all interstate wars from 1939 to 2011. The find-
ings in this chapter advance our understanding of battlefield resolve, with
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broader implications for the design of political-military institutions and de-
cisions to initiate, continue, and terminate war.
Chapter 3: “Adapting Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the Shadow of the
Future”
Modern insurgencies create significant evolutionary pressures on conven-
tional militaries to improve their doctrines and overall military effective-
ness. Why are some militaries more effective at evolving their counterin-
surgency doctrine than others?
This chapter develops a theory which argues that complex local con-
ditions force militaries to optimize their organizations for the commitment
horizon they possess in a conflict. This optimization drives militaries to take
on particular organizational characteristics, such as the amount of delega-
tion and the tolerance for experimenting with new tactics, which systemat-
ically affects their performance.
Using an agent-based model, I evaluate the theory by simulating differ-
ent organizational characteristics and evaluating how doctrinal effective-
ness changes based on different commitment horizons. Results from the
simulations suggest a typology of counterinsurgent militaries according to
their commitment horizon. Contrary to existing arguments that counterin-
surgency effectiveness is determined by a particular set of strategies or by
a fixed, preexisting military culture, the results also suggest that doctri-
nal effectiveness follows a U-shaped curve as the commitment horizon in-
creases. This emphasis on a spectrum of commitment, rather than a simple
high/low dichotomy, provides more nuance to political and military behav-
ior and counterinsurgency conflicts. Biddle (2021) takes a similar approach
by evaluating the continuum of nonstate actors’ military behavior.
To illustrate the logic of the model, I describe the typology and its im-
plications in several historical counterinsurgency cases: the U.S. in Iraq and
Afghanistan; the British in Malaya and Iraq; and the French in Indochina
and Algeria.
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Chapter 4: “Projecting Credibility: Alliance Commitments and Foreign Pol-
icy Pursuits”
How does the ability to quickly project large-scale military force—such
as with transport aircraft and naval aircraft carriers—affect states’ alliance
commitments and the likelihood of militarized disputes with other states?
In this chapter, I argue that states with greater capacity to project force
can deploy fewer troops to allies for deterrent purposes, instead combin-
ing their capacity to respond swiftly in a crisis with public words and
actions—such as statements by political leaders—to demonstrate their com-
mitment to allies. However, greater force projection capacity is a double-
edged sword: although it helps deter threats against allies, it also increases
a state’s likelihood of initiating militarized disputes in other parts of the
world. Using data on troop deployments and a new index for force pro-
jection capacity from 1985 to 2018, I show that as force projection capacity
increases, states deploy fewer troops, but to more countries. Furthermore,
I show that increased force projection capacity works to effectively deter
militarized disputes against allies, but it also increases the likelihood of ini-
tiating militarized disputes with other states. Together, these results help
explain states’ behavior with respect to alliances and other foreign policy
pursuits in the changing international security environment.
I conclude by summarizing the findings from each of these chapters, and
reevaluate how the factors contributing to dynamic military commitments
relate to overall military effectiveness. Finally, I consider some directions
for future research and the policy implications from my research.
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CHAPTER 2
Until the Bitter End? The Diffusion of
Surrender Across Battles
Once fear strikes, it spreads like
an epidemic, faster than
wildfire. Once the first man
runs, others soon follow.
—WWII American paratrooper,
Seven Roads to Hell (Burgett,
1999)
Note: this chapter was co-authored with Yuri M. Zhukov and was
published in International Organization, Volume 73, Issue 1, Winter 2019.
Across a sequence of battles, surrender and desertion can cascade
through an army, undermining unit resolve and hastening a military’s
disintegration.1 During the Battle of Sailor’s Creek in the U.S. Civil War,
eight Confederate generals and 7,700 troops surrendered to the Union
army, following a string of similar events in the Appomattox Campaign.
Analogous episodes occurred during the Italian campaign of World War
II, Israel’s conquest of the Sinai Peninsula in 1967, and, recently, the fall of
Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul to the Islamic State in Iraq.
Decisions to raise the white flag of surrender have consequences far be-
yond the battlefield. Besides the obvious—loss of territory, shifts in the lo-
1We define resolve as a unit’s ability to continue fighting as an organized, cohesive force.
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cal balance of power—surrender reduces the costs of war for the opponent,
making conquest easier and military action more attractive. It is difficult to
signal resolve, deter aggression, or compel the opponent to stop fighting if
one’s own troops will not fight. Surrender is also individually costly—many
political authorities consider it high treason, and establish political-military
institutions to prevent it. Given the gravity of such decisions, the choice to
lay down one’s arms is not trivial. Why do soldiers surrender en masse in
some battles, but not others?
We argue that battlefield surrender emerges from a collective-action
problem within military organizations. Battlefield success requires that sol-
diers fight as a unit rather than flee, but individual decisions to fight depend
on whether soldiers expect their comrades to do the same. When they re-
ceive information about recent acts of surrender—within the same army,
or in other armies fighting the same opponent—soldiers expect their own
unit’s resolve to be low, and become less likely to fight. These dynamics are
not unlike those driving the diffusion of labor strikes, protests, and insur-
gency: actors learn from the experience of others and update their beliefs
about what others will do in similar situations. Where no recent precedent
exists, surrender is unlikely to occur.
Using a new battle-level data set of all conventional wars from 1939
to 2011, we show that surrender is indeed contagious across battles. Sol-
diers are much more likely to surrender to the enemy if other soldiers have
done so recently. This effect holds after we account for alternative expla-
nations of surrender, like military effectiveness and expectations of high
losses. We also consider the role of principal-agent dynamics in this pro-
cess, and show that low expectations of punishment by commanders make
soldiers’ collective-action problem even worse.
This study advances our understanding of surrender in several ways.
On a theoretical level, existing research has highlighted the importance of
battlefield resolve for the onset, conduct, and outcome of war, but has left
these life-and-death decisions mostly unexplained. International conflict
literature has traditionally treated the military as a unitary actor, and a
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direct, cohesive extension of the state.2 More direct examinations of bat-
tlefield surrender have studied this phenomenon largely in the context of
war termination, investigating how surrender affects higher-order political
decisions, but not why surrender occurs in the first place (Ramsay, 2008;
Weisiger, 2016) (though see Grauer (2014)). Other works have attributed
surrender to macro-level institutional features (Belkin, Clark, Gokcek et al.,
2002; Castillo, 2014; Lyall, 2014; McLauchlin, 2010; Reiter and Stam, 1997),
like regime type, state-society relations, and treaty membership—most of
which are relatively static and cannot explain why units from the same mil-
itary behave differently across battles.
Compounding these theoretical challenges is the reliance of most previ-
ous empirical research on highly aggregated, macro-level data, with entire
conflicts—rather than individual battles—as units of analysis. This macro-
level perspective has conflated the concept of battlefield surrender with war
termination, limiting our understanding of how battle dynamics influence
decisions to capitulate, and why battlefield surrender occurs in the first
place. With a handful of exceptions (Grauer, 2014; Ramsay, 2008; Reiter and
Stam, 1997), political scientists have mostly avoided looking below the ag-
gregate level of war, in large part because of the selection problems and lim-
ited scope of existing battle-level data sets.3 Despite the recent proliferation
of “micro-comparative” studies of civil war, similarly disaggregated data
have been mostly absent from research on conventional war. As a result,
quantitative scholars continue to treat wars as unitary black-box events, and
qualitative approaches continue to dominate research on surrender.4
2Research using Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996)’s militarized interstate disputes (MID)
data set, for example, generally implicitly assumes that state leaders purposefully initiate
all disputes, while the military faithfully carries out its orders. Even civil-military rela-
tions literature, which explicitly questions assumptions of a unitary state, often treats the
military itself as a unified entity. See, for example, Feaver (2003).
3The most common existing battle-level data set is the U.S. Army’s CDB90, otherwise
known as HERO. See Dupuy (1984); Helmbold and Kahn (1986). While CDB90 provides
a useful baseline for disaggregating wars into battles, its selection of battles is an ad hoc
convenience sample: primarily Western front battles in World War II, the Arab-Israeli wars,
and the Vietnam War.
4In a survey of over 100 academic articles on the topic published in leading political
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We build on this previous work by conceptualizing battlefield surren-
der as a collective-action problem, and test the validity of this perspective
with new battle-level data. Our core finding—that surrender can have a
cascade effect—challenges macro-level explanations by showing that infor-
mation about previous battles, rather than the attributes of states fighting
them, drive decisions to surrender (Castillo, 2014; McLauchlin, 2010; Re-
iter and Stam, 1997). To this end, our collective-action approach provides
a more comprehensive understanding of battlefield dynamics than existing
rational choice approaches, which assume soldiers in the same army act in-
dependently from each other (Grauer, 2014; Reiter and Stam, 1997). Finally,
our findings open a new empirical frontier for research on intrawar bargain-
ing (Powell, 2004; Slantchev, 2003), by treating resolve not as an exogenous
cause of war termination, but as an outcome of primary theoretical interest.
2.1 Surrender as a collective-action problem
Existing research on surrender in battle assumes that soldiers want to sur-
vive, and make rational decisions according to the costs and benefits of
fighting versus surrendering (Grauer, 2014; Reiter and Stam, 1997). Previ-
ous theoretical models, however, assume individualistic utility calculations,
and overlook group dynamics that exist in war. From an individual stand-
point, fighting is costly. These costs may be outweighed by the benefits of
battlefield success, but success is impossible if many soldiers abandon the
fight. Surrender, of course, is also not costless. Militaries harshly punish
insubordination and desertion, and opponents often do not treat prisoners
well. Yet in deciding to fight or flee, soldiers also consider what others are
likely to do. If they expect others to flee, they will view success as less likely
and opt to surrender rather than die fighting. As an American paratrooper
in World War II recalled, “Once fear strikes, it spreads like an epidemic,
faster than wildfire. Once the first man runs, others soon follow” (Burgett
science and policy journals in the last twenty-five years, we found that 55 percent used only
qualitative methods like process-tracing, 41 percent used quantitative or mixed methods,
and 4 percent used formal models.
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(1999), quoted in Hamner (2011, p. 79)).
The choices soldiers make on the battlefield are part of a broader class of
collective-action problems that drive participation in conflict, violence, and
other contentious politics. In a typical threshold model of collective action,
a group of individuals decides whether or not to participate in an activity
(e.g., riot, strike, protest), depending on how many others are already par-
ticipating (Granovetter, 1978; Kim and Bearman, 1997; Kuran, 1991; Macy,
1991). Most such models have explored the dynamics of initial mobiliza-
tion, since groups involved in civil conflict and protest often lack extensive
organizational structures initially. These “start-up” challenges are less of a
concern for military units in battle, where the state has already overcome
initial mobilization problems, and is instead seeking to maintain resolve in
the face of outside pressure.
The pre-existence of an organizational structure settles the mobilization
challenge, but also adds a layer of complexity highlighted by principal-
agent models: the soldiers’ collective-action problem unfolds in a hierar-
chical context, where principals seek to maintain control over their agents’
behavior. Yet when agents are part of an organized group and rely on each
other’s coordinated actions to improve their chances of success and sur-
vival, the principal-agent dynamic alone may not fully explain the agents’
choices (Holmstrom, 1982). In addition to the threat of punishment from
above, soldiers face a more proximate and variable danger on the battle-
field, the scope of which depends on whether they expect others to fight or
flee. Each choice implies a safety in numbers. A standard principal-agent
framework overlooks these collective-action dynamics.
Although many studies have considered how social movements expand
and transform, questions of how and why groups decline have traditionally
received less consideration in the literature (Koopmans, 2004).5 Several re-
cent efforts have used global games to model the cohesiveness of a group’s
5However, there are exceptions. Several studies have explored whether repression
(Davenport, 2015; Francisco, 2004; Siegel, 2011), leadership decapitation (Cronin, 2006;
Johnston, 2012), and organizational features (Edwards and Marullo, 1995) contribute to
groups’ decline.
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actions in the face of external coercion.6 These models examine incentives to
manipulate information to either prevent or enable an uprising (Bueno de
Mesquita, 2010; Edmond, 2013), and the effect of information flows on coor-
dination problems facing both dissidents and the regime (Casper and Tyson,
2014).
The central insight of the collective-action literature—that information
about past collective action drives future collective action—implies a diffu-
sion process, where the occurrence of a new event in one context alters the
probability of a similar event happening elsewhere (Brooks, 2007; Simmons
and Elkins, 2004). In the context of decisions by commanders and troops in
war, such processes typically involve the transfer of information from one
battle to another, and the updating of prior beliefs about the wisdom of a
given action. As armed actors consider the choices before them—the most
basic of which is to continue fighting or surrender—they draw lessons from
this previous experience. Initially uncertain about the appropriateness of a
given action to their situation (i.e., surrender), soldiers examine how previ-
ous battles developed, and the decisions people fighting in them made. If
surrender has been widespread, this uncertainty declines because soldiers
come to expect similar dynamics in the current case, and adjust their own
behavior. These information cascades are missing from most existing indi-
vidualistic rationalist accounts of surrender.
Despite an abundance of empirical research on conflict diffusion, no
study has yet examined battlefield surrender as a dynamic, self-reinforcing
process.7 By analyzing these phenomena in a diffusion framework, we can
6Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) introduce the global game formulation in a 2x2 one-
shot setting, where players face a coordination problem with incomplete information and
must choose a strategy based on a noisy signal. Other research extends this approach to
a dynamic setting, with a large number of players interacting over multiple rounds; see
Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007).
7The study of diffusion has a long tradition in conflict research. Since the pioneering
work of Most and Starr (1980), theoretical and empirical models of diffusion have produced
new insights about the onset of interstate and ethnic conflict (Hammarström, 1994; Weid-
mann, 2015), the spread of innovations and military technologies (Goldman and Andres,
1999; Horowitz, 2010a), the proliferation of tactics like suicide terrorist attacks (Horowitz,
2010b), and the effect of coercion on the spread of insurgent violence (Toft and Zhukov,
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potentially account for the endogenous dynamics of learning and updating
of beliefs based on prior experience in battles, explain how such processes
emerge, and predict if a given case of surrender is likely to spark a general
breakdown of war-fighting resolve.
2.1.1 Theoretical expectations
We assume that a military unit’s resolve in battle depends on its ability
to fight effectively as a team toward some predefined objective.8 Soldiers
within the unit can choose either to fight (i.e., contribute an individual ef-
fort to the battle and support other soldiers), or abandon (i.e., surrender,
desert, or defect).9 Each battle can result in one of two states: success, in
which a critical mass of soldiers fights and the military maintains its or-
ganizational resolve and effectiveness, or failure, where organizational re-
solve breaks down and a critical mass of soldiers choose to abandon.10 In
this sense, “success” and “failure” are conceptually distinct from military
“victory” and “defeat,” but are not completely orthogonal.11 Crucially, if
enough battles end in “failure” because a critical mass of soldiers aban-
doned, then political leaders may need to negotiate an end to hostilities
on unfavorable terms.
The payoffs to fighting and abandoning are different under the two
states. If a soldier chooses to fight when a sufficiently large proportion
of others also fight (“success” state), the soldier pays some personal cost
2012).
8For a formal derivation of our theory using the framework of global games (Angeletos,
Hellwig, and Pavan, 2007; Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993), see the appendix.
9Although the relative payoffs between surrendering, deserting, or defecting are likely
different in many battles, we argue that the basic process is not. To reduce the argument to
its core components, we focus on a binary choice set rather than a multinomial one.
10Formally, resolve is the maximum level of abandonment a unit can withstand while still
being able to effectively fight.
11For “success,” the actual battle outcome could be victory, stalemate, or defeat. Conse-
quently, a regime may be forced to negotiate an end to hostilities given a series of “success”
outcomes if these battles did not fully achieve their strategic objectives, such as gaining ter-
ritory. However, because of sustained organizational resolve, the terms of ceasefire should
be more favorable to the regime in this case. In the “failure” case, however, the actual battle
outcome does result in a defeat.
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for fighting, but also receives a positive benefit for maintaining resolve and
contributing to the effort. If instead he chooses to fight and most others
abandon (“failure” state), he receives no positive benefit, but still pays the
cost of fighting. If the soldier abandons, in either state, he receives no pos-
itive benefit, and pays a different kind of cost, which may include punish-
ment by commanders, harsh treatment as a prisoner of war, or both.
In deciding to fight or abandon, soldiers make inferences about the bat-
tle’s likely state, using surrender rates in past battles as a noisy signal about
their own unit’s resolve. If soldiers see that many of their comrades sur-
rendered in recent battles, they will reason that a “failure” state is likely in
the current battle, and that payoffs from fighting under these circumstances
are likely to be worse than if one abandoned. If past surrender rates were
low, soldiers will instead expect a “success” state, where payoffs to fighting
are considerably higher. As more battles occur, soldiers receive more in-
formation, update their priors, and converge in their beliefs. Thus, we can
establish the following testable hypothesis:
H1: Battlefield surrender is increasing in the amount of information soldiers
receive about high rates of surrender in previous battles.
2.1.2 Alternative explanations
While past surrender may influence battlefield decisions, soldiers may also
look to other types of information to assess whether their comrades will
fight or flee. We now survey ten explanations advanced by past research
on combat motivation, and consider their implications for our theoretical
model and empirical analysis. These explanations range from small-group
dynamics within individual units, to macro-level, national institutions. As
independent causes of surrender, many of these explanations compete with
each other. As we argue, however, nearly all of these explanations are con-
sistent with the collective-action framework, either in influencing expecta-
tions of resolve or in shaping individual incentives in battle.
17
Alternative explanation 1: Mutual surveillance. Expectations of battle-
field resolve depend on the observability of battlefield behavior—the abil-
ity of commanders to monitor and direct their troops, and of soldiers to
monitor each other (Hamner, 2011). For this purpose, in part, soldiers have
historically fought in tightly grouped, closed tactical formations (Keegan,
1976). Besides an increased volume of fire, tight formations make aban-
donment more costly and more visible, compared to dispersed formations,
where soldiers are more isolated and unable to observe each others’ actions
(Hamner, 2011). Although combat tactics have evolved away from tight for-
mations, the mechanism at play—mutual surveillance between soldiers—
has imperfect counterparts on the modern, dispersed battlefield.12 The
development of two-way radios and modern communications equipment
in the twentieth century, for instance, has allowed isolated groups on the
battlefield to coordinate and share information, while giving commanders
greater visibility over their actions. Depending on the direction and pace
of this technological diffusion—and its consequences for communications
capabilities in battle—we may expect different baseline rates of surrender
for different combatants, in different wars.
In the context of the collective-action model, mutual surveillance affects
soldiers’ coordination problems. Increased surveillance lowers information
uncertainty and improves coordination, but the effect of this coordination
on surrender could conceivably be in either direction. For example, while
tight formations can provide visual assurances that others will fight, di-
rect observation of troops abandoning the battlefield could swiftly lead to
organizational breakdown. Similarly, increased communication among dis-
persed soldiers could make it easier to coordinate both fighting and surren-
dering as a group.
12The benefits of tight formations typically exceeded their cost in pre-modern warfare,
but changes in the accuracy and destructiveness of weaponry have since turned tightly
grouped troops into clear targets for enemy fire. To increase soldiers’ survival chances,
modern tactics have evolved toward increased dispersion.
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Alternative explanation 2: Training and discipline. Some military schol-
ars attribute surrender to problems of military discipline and training. Here,
expectations of battlefield resolve stem not from operational experience, but
organization-wide standards and procedures. Where military training and
discipline are rigorous, “prowess and personal courage all but disappear
beneath an armor-plated routine” (McNeill, 1982, p. 130). Where these qual-
ities are lacking, surrender becomes pervasive.
Historically, the emphasis on training and discipline emerged out of ef-
forts to improve battle outcomes. Driven by the increased rate of fire from
matchlock firearms, and drawing inspiration from Roman tactics, Maurice
of Nassau introduced a series of reforms to Dutch military training in the
late sixteenth century, emphasizing smaller units, constant drills, and a clear
operational chain of command. These reforms enhanced control over sol-
diers’ actions in battle, decreasing uncertainty over decisions to fight or flee.
Whereas medieval “crowd” armies relied on mass and individual talents to
win battles (Keegan, 1976), Maurice showed that a smaller, more profes-
sional army could consistently defeat a much larger force. Other armies
soon took notice and adopted similar tactics and procedures, which they
passed on to their institutional successors.13
One limitation of military discipline as a cause of battlefield surren-
der is that discipline tends to vary mostly at the national or organizational
level, and—given the time needed to implement new training standards—
it changes relatively slowly. While discipline may explain variation in sur-
render across combatants and across wars, it may be too static to explain
variation across individual battles.
Alternative explanation 3: Social cohesion. Following World War II, lead-
ing social science explanations of combat motivation attributed battlefield
resolve to the strength of within-unit social bonds (Marshall, 1947; Shils
and Janowitz, 1948). According to this view, soldiers are less likely to flee
13Sustainable improvement in discipline is a perennial challenge for military organiza-
tions because of personnel turnover and the individual incentives that compete with orga-
nizational purposes.
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if strong bonds of mutual trust and loyalty exist between them and their
comrades, and more likely to flee if they are socially isolated.14 As in the
collective-action model, mutual expectations about what others will do in
battle are central to the social cohesion story. Where the approaches diverge
is on the origins of these expectations: within-group social structures drive
expectations in the social cohesion school, not information on recent behav-
ior by other units and groups.
While this literature speaks mainly to the internal dynamics of small
units, one empirical implication is that recruitment methods matter: surren-
der should be less likely where units consist of volunteers rather than con-
scripts (McLauchlin, 2015). In volunteer armies, interpersonal relationships
are generally less conflictive, and within-unit social integration is greater
(MacCoun, Kier, and Belkin, 2006; Siebold, 2007). In armies staffed by long-
service professionals, soldiers may therefore expect a higher baseline of re-
solve.
Alternative explanation 4: Ideological cohesion. One challenge to the so-
cial cohesion perspective is that unit composition can change dynamically
through combat and attrition, yet soldiers often continue to fight—even
after initial unit social structures collapse. Drawing on the experience of
World War II, Bartov advances an alternative explanation for combat mo-
tivation, attributing surrender not to mutual expectations of battlefield be-
havior, but to the ideology instilled within soldiers by political authorities
(Bartov, 1992). Where this indoctrination is more extreme and uncompro-
mising (e.g., German troops opposing the Soviet army on the Eastern Front
of World War II, or Japanese troops fighting the Allies in the Pacific theater
of World War II), soldiers should expect higher resolve in their army, and
will therefore be more reluctant to surrender.
14More recent research on unit cohesion has shifted away from social structures, and
toward units’ commitment to specific combat missions and tasks; see, for example, Mac-
Coun (1993). This view holds that trust among soldiers stems not from social bonds, but
from soldiers’ performing their jobs to accomplish their common mission. In many ways,
task cohesion in an army is closely related to military training and discipline, outlined in
alternative explanation 2.
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The empirical implication of the ideological cohesion school is straight-
forward: surrender rates should increase as ideological cohesion breaks
down. The problem is that, in war, state ideology tends to change slowly,
if at all. While ideological differences may help explain variation between
countries and between wars, changes in political ideology may not occur
frequently enough to explain organizational breakdown within war. For
example, there was no coinciding shift in the Nazi regime’s ideology when
Wehrmacht troops began surrendering en masse in 1945.
Alternative explanation 5: Aggregate military power. While we can
group several of the previous explanations under the general rubric of
“troop quality,” rates of surrender may also depend on aggregate prepon-
derance in capabilities, and more general perceptions of the balance of
power. At the macro level, bargaining models of war—both the “costly
lottery” (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1996) and “costly process” (Slantchev, 2003;
Smith and Stam, 2004) variants—assume that the probability of military vic-
tory follows the dyadic balance of power. A lopsided balance should there-
fore increase resolve expectations in the more powerful army. Conversely,
soldiers in weaker armies should anticipate that more of their comrades will
lay down their arms, rather than fight a hopeless battle.
Alternative explanation 6: Offensive advantages. One criticism of macro-
level preponderance is that a smaller force can concentrate its strength at
the weak point of the adversary, creating local superiority despite aggre-
gate disadvantage. As a result, macro-level perceptions of the balance of
power may have little bearing on battle-level outcomes. This insight lies
at the core of literature on offensive advantages (Van Evera, 1998) and the
“3:1 rule” (Mearsheimer, 1989). Within wars, attackers generally begin bat-
tles with numerical superiority, to offset the challenges of fighting defend-
ers in prepared positions. As a result of local preponderance—and other
first-mover advantages like speed, initiative, and surprise—expectations of
resolve may be higher among attacking troops.
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Alternative explanation 7: Principal-agent problems. From the stand-
point of military leadership, battlefield surrender represents a principal-
agent problem (Gates and Nordås, 2016): commanders delegate direct or-
ders to lower-ranking personnel, but cannot perfectly observe that person-
nel’s performance. To prevent surrender, commanders often institute harsh
punishment for insubordination and desertion. During World War II, for
instance, Stalin’s order number 270 stated that Soviet personnel “who sur-
render to the enemy shall be considered malicious deserters, whose families
are liable to be arrested” (Zolotarev, 1997, p. 58–60). Soviet General Georgy
K. Zhukov had a reputation for publicly executing deserting troops to deter
others from fleeing. The implication for the collective-action framework is
that where monitoring is less effective and punishment is less severe, sol-
diers’ incentives to surrender may be higher.
Commanders’ ability to monitor and punish subordinates depends on
many things, including institutional factors like discipline and training, and
tactical considerations like mutual surveillance. Empirically, one circum-
stance where principal-agent problems are arguably most acute is that of
a breakdown in leadership: a commander who surrenders in battle is one
who cannot effectively monitor or punish surrendering troops. To the ex-
tent that such principal-agent dynamics may help solve soldiers’ collective-
action problem, we should expect higher troop-surrender rates in armies
where senior officers had surrendered in recent battles.
Alternative explanation 8: International law. The expected costs of sur-
render depend not only on internal dynamics within one’s own military, but
also on the opponent’s likely treatment of detainees. All else equal, soldiers
are more likely to surrender if they believe the opponent will treat prisoners
well (Grauer, 2014; Reiter and Stam, 2002). One potentially informative sig-
nal of humane treatment is the ratification of treaties stipulating basic rights
for wartime prisoners, like the Geneva Conventions (Morrow, 2014). Where
the opponent has made such commitments under international law, soldiers
may expect the cost of surrendering to be lower than that of fighting, and
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anticipate that fewer of their comrades will stay. Like other macro-level fac-
tors, however, treaty ratification is a relatively static variable, better suited
for explaining cross-national variation than battle-level outcomes.
Alternative explanation 9: Political regime type. Another national-level
signal of humane treatment is political regime type (McLauchlin, 2010; Re-
iter and Stam, 1997). Because of autocracies’ comparative lack of trans-
parency, repressive institutions, and weaker records on human rights, sol-
diers may doubt these regimes’ commitments to protecting prisoners from
abuse. For this reason, soldiers fighting against more democratic armies
may expect more of their comrades to surrender, while those fighting
against more repressive regimes may expect surrender to be rare. Yet regime
type is another macro-level variable that typically remains constant over the
course of a war. While it may explain why troops in some armies have dif-
ferent incentives for fighting than troops in other armies, it is less informa-
tive of why troops from the same country, fighting the same opponent, are
more likely to surrender in some battles than others.
Alternative explanation 10: Military effectiveness. Finally, because
troops often surrender, at least in part, because they are either losing or
expect to lose, information about past surrender may simply be a proxy for
broader conceptions of military effectiveness: whether one’s army “won”
or “lost” a battle, and how well others had fared against the same opponent.
Because definitions of “winning” and “losing” tend to be subjective and
battle specific (Biddle and Long, 2004), quantitative measures of military
effectiveness have tended to focus on relative casualties inflicted by each
side. One example is the loss-exchange ratio (LER), or the number of enemy
troops killed divided by the number of friendly troops killed (Biddle, 2004;
Cochran and Long, 2017). In this case, if troops enter a battle knowing that
others in their position have suffered significant casualties while inflicting
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little damage on the opponent, they may see success as unlikely.15 This
expectation alone may be enough to make them lay down their arms.
These explanations highlight the extensive scholarly debate on the
determinants of battlefield resolve. At their root is an inherent tension
between a soldier’s individual motivation to survive, and the physical
danger of taking or defending some political objective through force. The
question is why soldiers are sometimes able to overcome their survival
instincts and other times not. Most of these approaches agree that the
answer depends on what soldiers expect their comrades to do in battle:
fight if they expect others to fight, flee if they expect others to flee.
The first nine explanations are not inconsistent with a collective action
framework. Mutual surveillance helps alleviate coordination problems in
battle. Discipline, social cohesion, ideology, aggregate power, and attacker
advantages all affect expectations of resolve. Principal-agent problems, in-
ternational law, and political regime type shape individual incentives in
various ways.
Despite this overlap, the collective-action perspective diverges from ex-
isting accounts in two important respects. First, unlike ideology, military
discipline, regime type, and international law—which assume a relatively
static set of expectations in an army over the course of a war—our model
allows these expectations to either remain firm or change as soldiers receive
more information about what others have done. Second, unlike unit cohe-
sion and mutual surveillance—where surrender is primarily an intra-unit
and intra-battle phenomenon—we allow these dynamics to extend across
units and battles, with past surrender in one unit affecting future surrender
in other units and even other countries’ armies.
In sum, the collective-action framework conceptualizes surrender as a
process that unfolds endogenously across battles, depending on the dy-
namic flow of information. Competing with this approach, however, is the
15To evaluate this possibility, we will explore several different ranges over which a sol-
dier makes this judgment.
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view that surrender is a by-product of military effectiveness: since soldiers
observe information not just about surrender, but also about their military’s
general performance in battle, expectations of relative casualties could be
driving decisions to surrender.
2.2 Data
To enable the empirical study of surrender, we developed a new battle-level
data set of conventional wars composed of every major battle in interstate
conflicts from 1939 to 2011. To overcome the selection problems present
in CDB90/HERO and other previous battle data sets, we opted to collect
data for the full population of interstate conflicts since and including World
War II, using Correlates of War (Singer, 1979; Sarkees and Wayman, 2010) to
enumerate the population of cases for which battle data were to be collected.
For each interstate conflict, we assembled a chronological list of battles from
historical encyclopedias (Clodfelter, 2008; Showalter, 2013).
Since wars are hierarchical enterprises conducted by hierarchical organi-
zations, their disaggregation requires some non-trivial decisions about what
constitutes an individual battle. For our purposes, we define a battle as
a major engagement involving at least two opponents fighting over some
clearly defined overarching military objective. This definition does not re-
quire disaggregation down to every skirmish between small units, since
such actions are typically part of larger efforts. Rather, we collected data for
discrete campaigns, disaggregating them further if they entailed multiple
distinct operational objectives and are detailed as such in historical records.
For example, we coded the Normandy D-Day landings by Allied forces on
6 June 1944 as a single battle, rather than dividing it into sub-objectives like
the Gold, Juno, Sword, Omaha, and Utah Beaches. However, we include
separate battles for Caen and St. Lô, since these D-Day objectives saw sub-
sequent fighting distinct from the Normandy landings.16
16In this sense, some battles enter the data set as distinct events because of how military
efforts unfolded over time, rather than because they were independently planned objec-
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In all, our data include 597 battles from eighty-two conflicts, covering 83
percent of interstate conflicts in Correlates of War between 1939 and 2011.17
We collected data for each battle participant, including each coalition mem-
ber fighting on the attacking and defending sides, yielding a total sample
size of 1,720 battle-dyads.18
We collected location data for each battle from historical maps and mil-
itary atlases, recording the geographic coordinates for the towns or geo-
graphic features where fighting took place. We used the distribution of
these locations to construct convex hull polygons encompassing the largest
extent of area over which forces were engaged.19 Figure 2.1 illustrates the
spatio-temporal distribution of battles in our data set. We used these data
to calculate deployment distances to each battle, as well as the geographic
size of the front, and the temporal sequence of events.
We used Clodfelter as the primary source for data on battle participants,
troop numbers and casualty statistics, including killed (KIA), wounded
(WIA), missing in action (MIA), prisoners of war (POWs), defections, and
desertions.20 To capture military commanders’ influence on subsequent
events, we coded separate binary variables as 1 if a flag officer (i.e., those
ranked in the general or admiral grade or equivalent) surrendered, de-
fected, or was captured or killed in battle.21 In addition to raw counts of ca-
tives. Since we are focused on battle outcomes, rather than causes, this inclusion criterion
is appropriate for our needs.
17Interstate wars for which we do not currently have data include: Franco-Thai War of
1940–1941, Offshore Islands War of 1954, Ifni War of 1957–1959, Taiwan Straits War of 1958,
War of Attrition of 1969–1970, Sino-Vietnamese Border War of 1987, Kargil War of 1999.
18The dyads here are directed. For example, the USSR-Germany dyad for Stalingrad
enters the data more than once—first with Germany as the focal combatant (attacker vs.
defender), once with the USSR (defender vs. attacker), and with additional observations
for Italy and other Axis members fighting the USSR in the battle.
19For naval battles, we used approximate geographic coordinates to encompass areas of
water in which ships were attacked or sunk.
20Clodfelter (2008) provides a relatively comprehensive account of force strength and
losses, but organizes this information primarily in narrative form, rather than as tables of
statistics.
21We rely on Clodfelter’s narratives to indicate whether a flag officer surrendered, de-
fected, or was captured or killed in battle. Since these events are high profile and are typ-
ically prominently highlighted in historical records, we assume that Clodfelter captured
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Figure 2.1: Spatio-temporal distribution of battles in data
sualties and prisoners, we calculated the loss-exchange ratio (LER) for each
battle participant (i.e., enemy casualties divided by friendly casualties)—a
standard measure of relative attrition. To account for relative differences in
personnel surrendering from smaller and larger formations, we created an
ordinal measure of battle size.22
most of these events in his narratives.
22The levels, based on the size of the largest force participating in the battle, are (1) 0–
5,000 troops, (2) 5,001–20,000, (3) 20,001–100,000, (4) 100,001–400,000, (5) 400,001–1,000,000,
(6) 1,000,001–10,000,000. These correspond, roughly, to (1) brigade and below, (2) division,
(3) corps, (4) army, (5) army group, (6) theater. We do not use per capita surrender rates for
two reasons. First, the number of personnel directly engaged in combat can vary greatly
over the course of a battle. Second, per-capita surrender rates can be inherently mislead-
ing: the forces engaged in large battles are often only a small proportion of the total force
size present, whereas those engaged in smaller battles are more likely to include a larger
proportion of the total force present.
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To test alternative hypotheses proposed in past literature and control for
other potential confounders, we supplemented this battle-level information
with country-year-level variables from other sources. To account for politi-
cal regime type, we used a modified version of the Polity index (Marshall,
Gurr, and Jaggers, 2014).23 To account for perceptions of the overall balance
of power, we measured relative military capacity, using the Composite In-
dex of National Capabilities (CINC) (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972).24
Because national-level measures of relative power potentially mask signif-
icant local imbalances, we included an indicator of which side is on the
offensive, as well as a measure of the local force ratio at the start of the
battle. We also created a dummy variable for a state’s primary means of
recruitment (from Toronto (2005))—coded 1 if a state relied only on volun-
teers and 0 if it also relied on conscripts. Finally, we considered whether
each side had ratified the Geneva Conventions (International Committee of
the Red Cross, 2016).25
Table 2.1 lists the descriptive statistics for battle-level and country-level
variables.
2.3 Data analysis
We model the determinants of battlefield surrender as follows:
yijk = ρW(y) + γZk + βXij + αi + ζm + θτ(k) + uijk (2.1)
Our unit of analysis is the battle-dyad, where m indexes the war (e.g., World
War II), k indexes the battle (e.g., Stalingrad), i indexes the focal combatant
(e.g., USSR) and j indexes the opponent (e.g., Germany). The dependent
23Because Polity often assigns scores of -66 (foreign interruption), -77 (interregnum), or
-88 (transition) for country-years at war, we converted these missing values to the regime’s
most recent Polity score prior to its -66/-77/-88 value.
24CINC captures states’ combined population, military personnel and expenditures, iron
and steel production, and energy consumption as a proportion of the world total.
25Prior to 1950, when the first state ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions, we coded the
variable based on the 1929 version of the treaty.
28
Variable Mean SD Min Max # Missing
START YEAR 1966.27 23.63 1939 2011 0
POW (PERSONNEL) 13,829.11 80,023.16 0 1,200,000 876
MIA (PERSONNEL) 360.63 2916.20 0 60,000 1005
KIA (PERSONNEL) 6557.61 31,845.47 0 458,080 932
WIA (PERSONNEL) 10,900.44 83,661.08 0 1855,605 1077
BATTLE SIZE 2.42 1.27 1 6 387
FORCE RATIO 6.03 127.18 0 3909.09 775
POLITY 2 2.79 7.80 -10 10 392
MORE DEMOCRATIC 0.60 0.49 0 1 834
CINC 0.08 0.10 0 0.38 385
MORE POWERFUL 0 0.12 -0.33 0.33 735
LER SIDE A 1747.91 6463.96 0 26,000 1069
LER SIDE B 16,202.99 51,305.89 0 179,000 911
COMMANDER SURRENDERED 0.03 0.16 0 1 2
PROFESSIONAL ARMY 0.17 0.38 0 1 452
GENEVA (OPPONENT) 0.65 0.46 0 1 2
DEPLOYMENT DISTANCE 5959.38 7595.41 0 35,279.91 329
INITIATOR 0.56 0.50 0 1 2
Note: N = 1720.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics: battle-combatant variables
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variable yijk is the logged number of soldiers from combatant i who surren-
dered to opponent j in battle k.
The parameter of primary theoretical interest is ρ, which captures the in-
fluence of past surrender rates on surrender in the current battle. We specify
the set of combatants and past battles that influence i’s decision to surrender
with an information flow network, W(y). We consider two types of infor-
mation: instances of past surrender by combatant i to all opponents in war
m (SAME COMBATANT), and past surrender by all other combatants to op-
ponent j during war m (SAME OPPONENT). Following Zhukov and Stewart
(2013), we estimate the ρ coefficient in separate models for each diffusion
measure.26
We assume that soldiers place greater weight on more recent and geo-
















where τ(k) is the start date of battle k, and t indexes the start dates of previ-
ous battles in war m, involving either the same combatant (Eq. 2.2) or other
combatants fighting opponent j (Eq. 2.3).27 The temporal discount rate is
r ∈ (0, 1), with higher values placing a greater weight on more recent bat-
tles, and r = 0 placing equal weight on all past battles in war m. Because
we do not have a strong prior on r, our empirical models automatically se-
lect values that minimize the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).28 We also
26Zhukov and Stewart (2013) show that including multiple, partially overlapping net-
works in a single model can yield biased estimates of autoregressive parameters.
27In wars with only two combatants, the “same combatant” and “same opponent” mea-
sures should converge to the same value.
28Using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) will give the same result as using the
AIC, because we are only modifying one parameter value of the model, and the model’s
complexity remains constant.
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provide sensitivity analyses for all r ∈ (0, 1).

























where dk is the geographic distance, in kilometers, between battle k and all
previous battles in war m, involving either combatant i (Eq. 2.4) or other
combatants fighting opponent j (Eq. 2.5). The spatial discount rate, r ∈
(0, 1), is selected by AIC, with higher values assigning greater influence to
past battles closer to k.
In addition to the information flow network, our model includes a set
of battle-level (Zk) and dyad-level covariates (Xij). These include essential
control variables like battle size, and variables needed to account for ad-
ditional explanations of surrender, like recruitment (i.e., whether i has a
professional army), regime type (i.e., whether i has a higher Polity2 score
than j), and treatment of prisoners (i.e., whether j has ratified the Geneva
Conventions), as well as controls for relative power (i.e., difference in CINC
scores between i and j; local force ratio between i and j), offensive and de-
fensive battles, logistics (i.e., i’s deployment distance), and time (i.e., year
in which the battle began). We also include fixed effects for each combatant
(αi), war (ζm), and season of the year (θτ(k)), and an i.i.d. error term (ukij).
These fixed effects help us account for relatively static, macro-level drivers
of surrender, like ideology, discipline, and technological change from war
to war.
2.3.1 Results
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the empirical determinants of surrender, with tem-
porally and geographically weighted diffusion terms, respectively. The first
two models in each table estimate the effect of information on past sur-
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render by the SAME COMBATANT (Model 1) and other combatants fighting
the SAME OPPONENT (Model 2). The remaining models incorporate battle-
level and combatant-level covariates. Because parameter estimates are
sensitive to scales of measurement, we report standardized coefficients—
representing estimated standard deviation (SD) changes in the outcome fol-
lowing a standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.
Surrender is contagious across battles. The analysis reveals strong evi-
dence for our hypothesis: surrender is more intense following other recent
cases of surrender. According to Model 1 in Table 2.2, a standard deviation
increase in recently surrendered troops from the same army increases the
logged number of troops surrendering in the current battle by .27 SD (95%
confidence interval: .21, .32). This figure is slightly smaller, .24 SD (95%
CI: .18, .31), for surrender from other armies fighting the same opponent
(Model 2).
Parameter estimates are of similar relative magnitude for the geograph-
ically weighted diffusion measures in Table 2.3, which represent the influ-
ence of past surrender in nearby battles. A standard deviation increase in
surrendering troops in spatially proximate battles produces a .23 SD rise
(95% CI: .16, .30) in logged POWs if the surrendering troops were from the
same army (Model 1), and a .19 SD increase (95% CI: .12, .26) if they were
from armies fighting the same opponent.
Figure 2.2 shows a graphical representation of this relationship, through
simulations based on Models 1 and 2 in Table 2.2 (temporal weights), with
fixed effects for Russia/USSR fighting an average summer battle in World
War II. Following a hypothetical increase from 0 to 300,000 recent prisoners
of war from the same combatant—roughly equivalent to Soviet POW rates
during the 1941 Battle of Smolensk—the expected number of surrendering
troops rises by 330 percent per battle, on average (95% CI: 245, 560), from
68,880 to 296,556.29 The rise is a smaller, but still formidable 139 percent
(95% CI: 119, 182), from 92,768 to 222,161 per battle, following an identical




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SURRENDER IN PREVIOUS BATTLES W(y)
W(SAME COMBATANT) 0.27∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.21, 0.32) (0.13, 0.29) (0.12, 0.29)
W(SAME OPPONENT) 0.24∗∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.10∗
(0.18, 0.31) (0.004, 0.18) (0.01, 0.19)
BATTLE LEVEL COVARIATES Zk
BATTLE SIZE 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.17, 0.37) (0.18, 0.39) (0.17, 0.37) (0.17, 0.39)
LOG(FORCE RATIO) −0.03 −0.01
(−0.08, 0.03) (−0.07, 0.04)
DEPLOYMENT DISTANCE −0.01 −0.05 0.11 0.07
(−0.20, 0.19) (−0.25, 0.15) (−0.10, 0.31) (−0.14, 0.28)
INITIATOR −0.63∗∗∗ −0.69∗∗∗ −0.61∗∗∗ −0.67∗∗∗
(−0.81, −0.45) (−0.87, −0.50) (−0.80, −0.43) (−0.86, −0.48)
START YEAR −0.02 0.07∗ −0.01 0.08∗
(−0.09, 0.05) (0.01, 0.13) (−0.08, 0.06) (0.01, 0.14)
DYAD AND NATIONAL-LEVEL COVARIATES Xij
MORE POWERFUL −0.06 −0.13 −0.06 −0.12
(−0.20, 0.09) (−0.28, 0.02) (−0.22, 0.09) (−0.28, 0.04)
PROFESSIONAL ARMY −0.02 −0.24 −0.31 −0.56
(−0.78, 0.73) (−1.01, 0.53) (−1.22, 0.61) (−1.50, 0.38)
MORE DEMOCRATIC −0.31 −0.14 −0.10 0.002
(−1.33, 0.70) (−1.19, 0.92) (−1.18, 0.98) (−1.12, 1.12)
GENEVA (OPPONENT) 0.78 0.51 0.74 0.46
(−0.09, 1.64) (−0.38, 1.39) (−0.13, 1.60) (−0.42, 1.35)
Seasonal fixed effects X X X X X X
War fixed effects X X X X X X
Combatant fixed effects X X X X X X
Observations 844 844 426 426 411 411
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.30 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.47
Log Likelihood −1,092.13 −1,119.79 −518.64 −530.11 −498.13 −508.75
UBRE 0.81 0.87 0.69 0.73 0.68 0.72
RMSE 0.73 0.75 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.69
AIC 2184.25 2239.59 1037.27 1060.22 996.26 1017.51
Notes: Standardized coefficients. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SURRENDER IN PREVIOUS BATTLES W(y)
W(SAME COMBATANT) 0.23∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.09
(0.16, 0.30) (0.04, 0.22) (0.00, 0.18)
W(SAME OPPONENT) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.09∗
(0.11, 0.25) (0.03, 0.18) (0.005, 0.17)
BATTLE LEVEL COVARIATES Zk
BATTLE SIZE 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.19, 0.39) (0.19, 0.39) (0.18, 0.39) (0.18, 0.39)
LOG(FORCE RATIO) −0.02 −0.02
(−0.08, 0.03) (−0.08, 0.03)
DEPLOYMENT DISTANCE −0.04 −0.02 0.06 0.08
(−0.24, 0.16) (−0.22, 0.18) (−0.15, 0.27) (−0.13, 0.30)
INITIATOR −0.72∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗
(−0.90, −0.54) (−0.90, −0.54) (−0.90, −0.53) (−0.89, −0.53)
START YEAR 0.06 0.07∗ 0.07∗ 0.08∗∗
(−0.01, 0.12) (0.01, 0.14) (0.01, 0.13) (0.02, 0.15)
DYAD AND NATIONAL-LEVEL COVARIATES Xij
MORE POWERFUL −0.15∗ −0.16∗ −0.17∗ −0.17∗
(−0.30, −0.01) (−0.30, −0.01) (−0.31, −0.02) (−0.32, −0.02)
PROFESSIONAL ARMY −0.30 −0.30 −0.52 −0.55
(−1.07, 0.46) (−1.07, 0.47) (−1.46, 0.41) (−1.49, 0.38)
MORE DEMOCRATIC −0.39 −0.36 −0.17 −0.15
(−1.43, 0.65) (−1.40, 0.68) (−1.29, 0.94) (−1.26, 0.97)
GENEVA (OPPONENT) 0.54 0.46 0.50 0.43
(−0.34, 1.42) (−0.43, 1.34) (−0.39, 1.38) (−0.45, 1.32)
Seasonal fixed effects X X X X X X
War fixed effects X X X X X X
Combatant fixed effects X X X X X X
Observations 844 844 426 426 411 411
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.28 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
Log Likelihood −1,126.69 −1,132.76 −528.07 −528.64 −509.22 −508.94
UBRE 0.88 0.89 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.72
RMSE 0.76 0.76 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
AIC 2253.38 2265.52 1056.13 1057.27 1018.43 1017.88
Notes: Standardized coefficients. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 2.3: Determinants of battlefield surrender (geographic weights)
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Note: Simulations based on Models 3 and 4 in Table 2.2. Fixed effects: ζm = World War II,
αi = Russia/USSR, θτ(k) = summer.
Figure 2.2: Impact of past surrender on surrender in the current battle
increase in POWs among other armies fighting the same opponent.30
A greater sensitivity of troops toward past surrender rates in their own
army is not surprising. From a theoretical standpoint, signals soldiers re-
ceive through the SAME COMBATANT network should be less noisy than
those from the SAME OPPONENT network. With pre-existing social net-
works, communication channels, and rumor mills, troops are likely to be
better informed about the conduct of units within their own military than
other countries’ armed forces—even if the latter are part of the same coali-
tion. Troops may also see previous surrender within their army as a more
indicative signal of how their own comrades will behave.
Contagion effect is stronger if soldiers think opponent treats prisoners
well. Are soldiers more likely to surrender to opponents who have signed
30Predictions based on Model 2 in Table 2.2.
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treaties on the humane treatment of prisoners of war? The evidence here is
more mixed. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that—if such an effect does exist—it
cannot explain battle-level variation on its own. The coefficient for GENEVA
(OPPONENT) is statistically insignificant in Models 3 and 4.
There is, however, tentative evidence for an interactive relationship be-
tween Geneva ratification and past surrender, supporting existing argu-
ments that expectations of humane treatment increase surrender levels.31
As Table 2.4 shows, the contagion effect is stronger if the opponent has rat-
ified the Geneva Conventions. Here, a standard deviation increase in past
surrender within the same army yields an increase of between .22 (Model
3) and .31 SD (Model 1). Where the opponent had not ratified (about 30
percent of cases), past surrender has no effect.
This apparent heterogeneity is not surprising, given the logic of collec-
tive action. Where the opponent has ratified the conventions, soldiers can
reasonably expect the costs of surrender—narrowly defined as the prob-
ability of harm or death in captivity—to be relatively low. Where oppo-
nents have not ratified, soldiers are more uncertain about these costs, and
are more hesitant to pay them. As a result, ratification of the Geneva Con-
ventions can amplify the contagion effect.
Troops are more likely to surrender if senior officers recently surrendered.
Can some actions by military leaders potentially accelerate the tide of sur-
render? The role of such principal-agent problems is difficult to empirically
establish without battle-level data on monitoring and punishment of de-
serting troops. To the extent that more autocratic governments can institute
more draconian forms of punishment than democracies (Castillo, 2014), we
could assume that the costs of surrendering are higher in the armies of more
repressive regimes. Yet the negative and insignificant coefficients on MORE
DEMOCRATIC in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are not what we would expect to find
if such regimes succeeded in deterring troops from surrendering. More-
31Here, our evidence more strongly supports Morrow (2014)’s argument that treaty rat-
ification shapes battlefield behavior, than Grauer (2014)’s and Reiter and Stam (2002)’s re-




(1) (2) (3) (4)
INTERACTION W(y)× Xij
INTERACTION (SAME COMBATANT) 0.58∗∗∗ 0.45∗
(0.30, 0.86) (0.02, 0.87)
INTERACTION (SAME OPPONENT) 0.26 0.58
(−0.29, 0.80) (−0.08, 1.25)
SURRENDER IN PREVIOUS BATTLES W(y)
W(SAME COMBATANT) −0.27∗ −0.23
(−0.54, −0.01) (−0.64, 0.17)
W(SAME OPPONENT) −0.01 −0.51
(−0.54, 0.52) (−1.16, 0.15)
GENEVA CONVENTIONS Xij
GENEVA (OPPONENT) 0.02 0.11 0.36 0.61
(−0.35, 0.39) (−0.29, 0.52) (−0.61, 1.32) (−0.28, 1.50)
Battle-level covariates X X
Dyad-level covariates X X
Seasonal fixed effects X X X X
War fixed effects X X X X
Combatant fixed effects X X X X
Observations 844 844 426 426
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.30 0.49 0.46
Log Likelihood −1,083.61 −1,121.22 −518.16 −530.26
UBRE 0.79 0.87 0.69 0.73
RMSE 0.72 0.75 0.67 0.69
AIC 2167.22 2242.44 1036.31 1060.52
Notes: Standardized coefficients reported, 95% CI in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 2.4: Interaction between past surrender and opponent’s ratification of
Geneva Conventions
over, while regime type changes relatively slowly, commanders’ treatment
of subordinates can vary greatly over the course of a war.
By way of an indirect test, we examined the impact of past surrender
by commanders on surrender by rank-and-file troops in subsequent battles.
Our reasoning here is that, when a commander has previously abandoned
the battlefield, subordinates are likely to significantly discount the leader-
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ship’s monitoring and punishment capacity. As a result, future comman-
ders’ threats to punish insubordination, surrender, and desertion lose cred-
ibility. If surrender is indeed less likely where monitoring and punishment
capacity is high, then we should expect it to be more likely where comman-
ders have themselves recently surrendered.
Table 2.5 reports the results of these additional analyses, with Models 1
to 4 estimating the impact of past surrender by commanders on surrender
in the current battle by rank-and-file troops. These results confirm that sol-
diers are significantly more likely to surrender if commanders have recently
done the same. A standard deviation increase in surrender by commanders
within the same army yields an increase in the logged number of surren-
dering troops of between .13 (95% CI: 0.04, 0.2) and .25 SD (95% CI: 0.2,
0.3). Unsurprisingly, the actions of commanders in the soldiers’ own army
have a more substantial impact than commanders surrendering from other
armies fighting the same opponent.
Dependent variable:
log(POWs) Commander surrenders
GLM link: identity GLM link: logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SURRENDER BY COMMANDERS IN PREVIOUS BATTLES W(x)
W(SAME COMBATANT) 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗
(0.18, 0.30) (0.08, 0.24) (1.35, 3.17) (0.39, 2.01)
W(SAME OPPONENT) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.05 2.58∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗
(0.10, 0.23) (-0.02, 0.13) (1.58, 3.58) (0.70, 2.76)
Battle-level covariates X X X X
Dyad-level covariates X X X X
Seasonal fixed effects X X X X X X X X
War fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Combatant fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Observations 844 844 426 426 1,718 1,718 813 813
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.27 0.48 0.46 0.15 0.13 0.33 0.35
Log Likelihood −1,111 −1,135 −524 −532 −372 −371 −183 −182
UBRE 0.85 0.90 0.71 0.74 −0.57 −0.57 −0.55 −0.55
RMSE 0.75 0.77 0.69 0.70 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.16
AIC 2223 2271 1049 1063 744 743 366 364
Notes: Standardized coefficients reported, 95% CI in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 2.5: The impact of past surrender by commanders
If surrender by commanders helps drive surrender by their troops, a
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natural question arises: why do commanders surrender? Our data suggest
that the collective-action problems facing soldiers may be part of a broader
problem in military organizations that reaches across ranks. As Models 5 to
8 in Table 2.5 show, commanders are more likely to surrender if other com-
manders have recently surrendered. In making this choice, furthermore,
commanders take cues not only from their own colleagues but also from
other armies fighting the same opponent.
Macro-level state characteristics are poor predictors of surrender. While
these results provide tentative evidence that surrender is contagious across
battles, past surrender rates are, of course, not the only potential drivers
of soldiers’ decisions. Unsurprisingly, surrender rates are higher in larger
battles, where more troops are potentially at risk.32 Surrender rates are also
lower for attacking troops—potentially as a result of offensive advantages
in numbers, speed, and surprise.
Consistent with other recent research, we find most other macro-level
variables to be poor predictors of surrender (Grauer, 2014). Aggregate na-
tional power (MORE POWERFUL), regime type (MORE DEMOCRATIC), and
conscription (PROFESSIONAL ARMY) explain virtually none of the battle-
level variation in surrender. The direction of these estimated effects is con-
sistent with what we might expect from past literature. Fewer troops sur-
render from more materially capable armies. Armies staffed by long-service
professionals are less likely to see higher rates of surrender than conscript
armies. Troops are less likely to surrender if the opponent is less demo-
cratic than their home state. Once we account for battle-level factors like
past surrender and battle size, however, these effects disappear.
2.3.2 Sensitivity analysis
The evidence so far has been supportive of the collective-action model:
troops are more likely to surrender if, based on recent battlefield experi-
ence, they expect others to do the same.
32We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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Note: Values shown are estimates of ρ̂ (effect of surrender in past battles) at different levels
of r (discount rate). Top row replicates Models 1 and 2 from Table 2.2, bottom row replicates
Models 1 and 2 from Table 2.3. r∗ are values of r used in original models.
Figure 2.3: How discount rate affects the contagion of surrender
How sensitive are our results to soldiers’ discount rates (r in Eq. 2.2 to
2.5)? In the preceding analyses, we used values of r that optimized AIC.
As we show in Figure 2.3, these values were relatively low for temporal
discount rates (r∗ = .005, .007 in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2.2) and inter-
mediate for geographic discount rates (r∗ = .581, .197 for Models 1and 2 of
Table 2.3). These choices have implications for the scope of our findings: Ta-
ble 2.2 assumes that soldiers weighed recent and past battles about equally,
while Table 2.3 assumes they focused on battles that occurred nearby.
To ensure that our findings hold under a broader set of time and geo-
graphic horizons, we replicated Models 1 and 2 in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 with
values of r between 0 and 1. Figure 2.3 shows how estimates for ρ̂ gradually
decrease and level off as r increases in the temporal weights models, while
remaining steady in the geographic ones. Overall, however, the value of r
does not fundamentally change our results. The impact of past surrender
remains positive and significant in all four sets of models, regardless of how
40
heavily one discounts long-ago events, or far-away battles.
Another potential objection to our analysis is that dynamics of surrender
are different for ground battles than air and sea battles, but our data set
pools these events together. Because modern sailors and airmen typically
surrender after the destruction of their ship or aircraft, past surrender is less
salient to their decisions.
To address this concern, we reran the models in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 with
a restricted data sample that includes only land warfare. The results are
consistent with those we reported earlier. In the geographically weighted
network, the contagion effect even increases, to .24 SD (95% CI: .17, 32) for
the same combatant, and to .23 SD (95% CI: .16, .30) for other combatants
fighting the same opponent. This increase makes intuitive sense: since it is
more difficult for airmen and sailors to surrender mid-battle, keeping these
battles in the sample should attenuate the estimated effect of past surrender.
2.4 Previous surrender or military effectiveness?
Could more general expectations of military success be driving the conta-
gion of surrender? So far, we have seen little evidence that troops surrender
at lower rates to militarily weaker opponents. As Models 3 and 4 show,
combatants with higher CINC scores than their opponents (MORE POWER-
FUL) have few discernible advantages in this area. Yet because aggregate
national capabilities do not vary across individual battles in a given year,
they are a poor proxy for military effectiveness. Local numerical prepon-
derance as measured by LOG(FORCE RATIO), meanwhile, has no apparent
effect (Models 5 and 6).
To more directly account for perceptions of battlefield success and fail-
ure, we reran our models with several “placebo” diffusion terms, captur-
ing information about total dead and wounded in previous battles, and
previous loss exchange ratios (i.e., enemy dead and wounded divided by
friendly dead and wounded). Higher loss exchange ratios (LER) indicate
superior military effectiveness in the narrow sense of being able to inflict
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Note: Values shown are monthly averages of the logged loss-exchange ratio (top pane) and
average logged surrender rates (bottom pane).
Figure 2.4: Japan’s military effectiveness and surrender rates against U.S.
heavy losses on the opponent with minimal casualties of one’s own. If co-
efficient estimates on these placebo terms are positive, then the tendency to
surrender may simply reflect expectations of higher losses, rather than any
precedent set by previous surrendering troops.
To illustrate this possibility, Figure 2.4 shows Japan’s average monthly
LER in World War II (logged), along with Japan’s monthly surrender rates
(logged). The plots suggest an inverse relationship. Early in the war, Japan’s
military effectiveness was high and surrender rates were low. Beginning in
late 1943, LER dropped below parity (red line), and surrender rates grew.
From this picture, one may conclude that Japanese troops became more
likely to surrender not as a result of cases of past surrender, but because
of an increasingly untenable military situation.
Table 2.6 reports the results of our placebo tests. In each specification,
the confidence interval on the diffusion coefficient covers 0. The high un-




(1) (2) (3) (4)










Battle-level covariates X X X X
Dyad-level covariates X X X X
Seasonal fixed effects X X X X
War fixed effects X X X X
Combatant fixed effects X X X X
Observations 426 426 426 426
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Log Likelihood −531.50 −532.29 −531.11 −532.62
UBRE 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74
RMSE 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
AIC 1063.01 1064.59 1062.21 1065.25
Notes: Standardized coefficients reported, 95% CI in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 2.6: Placebo tests: determinants of surrender
our preferred interpretation of the “past surrender” result. Surrender is nei-
ther more nor less likely in battles that, based on past experience, soldiers
should expect to lose. Nor is the expectation of death by itself predictive
of surrender. If political authorities wish to maintain the resolve of their
armies in battle, these results indicate that they should worry less about
how dangerous a combat environment is likely to be, and more about re-
cent precedents for mass surrender.
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2.5 Conclusion
Our results offer several contributions to research on interstate conflict.
We demonstrate that battlefield surrender can be contagious because of a
collective-action problem within military organizations. Success in battle
requires that soldiers fight as a cohesive unit, but individual decisions to
fight depend on whether soldiers expect their comrades to do the same.
As troops learn of past decisions to surrender within their own army, they
lose confidence in their unit’s resolve, and decide to flee rather than fight.
This pattern is particularly acute if the expected costs of surrender are also
low—either because troops believe the opponent will treat prisoners well,
or because senior officers have recently surrendered, shaking the credibility
of threats to punish desertion and surrender by the rank and file.
In addition to diffusion, we examined several alternative explanations of
surrender. We found tentative, if mixed, support for a few factors that might
affect the parameters of the collective action model—like international law,
principal-agent problems, and offensive advantages. However, we found
no evidence that surrender depends on political regime type, recruitment
methods, or relative national power. Although data limitations prevent us
from directly testing several other explanations—mutual surveillance, dis-
cipline, and ideology—we sought to at least account for them econometri-
cally, through combatant and war fixed effects. We also demonstrated that
it is information specifically on past surrender, rather than military effec-
tiveness generally, that drives soldiers’ decisions.
The determinants of surrender are theoretically important because these
life-and-death choices tend to resonate well beyond individual battles. Al-
though previous research suggests that combatants acquire information
about war-fighting resolve through battle outcomes, scholars often treat
resolve as an exogenous cause of war termination. In our approach, by
contrast, battlefield resolve is of primary theoretical interest. If wars are a
continuation of political bargaining, reconciling informational asymmetries
through the use of force, then understanding the mechanisms and processes
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influencing battlefield resolve is crucial for explaining and predicting bar-
gaining outcomes. Our results illustrate that wartime resolve does not de-
pend solely on political leaders’ assessment of probabilistic battlefield out-
comes. Instead, military officers and their troops are the primary actors mu-
tually influencing each other’s behavior. Because soldiers’ choices in future
battles depend on precedents set by others in the past, it is these cascading
battlefield decisions that ultimately shape and constrain leaders’ choices.
Our study opens several future avenues of research. For example, al-
though we have demonstrated that surrender can have a contagion effect
across battles, we do not analyze how this process begins within battles,
and what critical events must occur to jump-start surrender and its subse-
quent diffusion. While our focus has been on inter-battle dynamics, a more
explicit focus on intra-battle behavior is needed to understand the condi-
tions leading to initial organizational breakdown.
Further research is also needed to understand how different political-
military institutions affect whether the diffusion process occurs, or whether
it can be reversed. We know little about why some military organizations
can absorb losses and adapt to changing circumstances, while others are
unable to recover from battles in which soldiers surrendered en masse. By
disaggregating wars into battles and stepping away from the classical ap-
proach of treating the military as a unitary actor, we can better understand
how collective action dynamics affect battlefield outcomes and, ultimately,
decisions to initiate, continue or terminate war.
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2.6 Appendix
This section formalizes the collective-action model of surrender, which we
described qualitatively earlier. We develop a basic theoretical framework
for a global game using Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007)’s game struc-
ture and apply it to the domain of battlefield surrender. In the model,
survival-oriented soldiers choose either to fight, thus increasing their unit’s
chances of success, or abandon. Soldiers’ decisions depend on what they
expect others to do, based on private information and observation of previ-
ous battles. We begin by specifying a baseline static model, and then discuss
the dynamic version separately.33
The game unfolds as a series of battles in discrete time, indexed by t ∈
{1, 2, ..., T}.34 At t, each soldier i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} in an army simultaneously
chooses to Fight (ait = 0) or Abandon (ait = 1). We denote the proportion of
soldiers abandoning at time t as At ∈ [0, 1].35 The payoffs associated with
fighting and abandoning depend on the resultant battle’s state: success or
failure. The state depends on whether the proportion of soldiers abandoning
exceeds the army’s level of organizational resolve, θ ∈ R. We can interpret
θ as the maximum level of abandonment an army can withstand while still
being able to fight as a cohesive force.
If the abandonment rate is low (At < θ), the battle will end in a success
state, and each soldier who fights will receive payoff B. If, instead, aban-
33The static, one-shot version of the game is partly analogous to an inverted version of
the classical threshold model of collection action from Granovetter (1978). We can think of
each soldier’s individual threshold as determining the level at which they will surrender,
such that a cascade of surrender can trigger within a single battle. This is useful for thinking
about how many soldiers may surrender based upon local signals. However, there are
several limitations of the classical threshold model for our purposes: first, it is not a model
of a coordination game with incomplete information; second, it does not address noisy
signals; and finally, it does not describe the diffusion of information across a sequence
of locally cascading events. The dynamic global game framework incorporates all these
elements.
34The game ends at an undetermined time T, which we assume is determined by political
leaders. We do not directly analyze the decision to terminate war here.
35We assume that N is relatively large, such that an individual soldier’s contribution is
negligible as a proportion of the entire effort.
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donment rates are high (At > θ), a failure state will occur, and each soldier
who fights will receive a lower payoff η. A soldier who abandons will re-
ceive payoff z in the success state and v in the failure state. Payoffs z and
v depend on both the level of punishment abandoning troops receive from
their own army—which is particularly salient in the success state payoff,
z—and the opponent’s treatment of prisoners of war.
In a success state, soldiers prefer fighting to abandoning (z < B). In a
failure state, they prefer abandoning to fighting (η < v). Soldiers also prefer
successful fighting over abandoning in failure (v < B) and, by transitivity,
prefer fighting in a success state to fighting in a failure state (η < B). The
value of z relative to v can vary, based on expected punishment with one’s
own army and expected treatment by the opponent.
The relative cost of fighting for each soldier is c = v−ηB−z+v−η ∈ (0, 1).36
This cost is increasing in the payoffs to surrendering, v and z. In line with
previous research, we should expect v (and c) to be higher when oppo-
nents have ratified treaties on the humane treatment of prisoners. Armies
who increase their opponents’ v therefore increase the relative cost of fight-
ing against them, which makes abandoning more attractive. Similarly, we
should expect z (and c) to be lower when an army can effectively punish
its own surrendering troops. Consequently, armies who decrease z reduce
the cost of fighting (since soldiers then avoid punishment), making fighting
more attractive. Table 2.7 summarizes the payoff structure, with soldiers’
choices in the rows and the battle’s state in the columns.37
2.6.1 Static equilibrium analysis
Following Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007), when θ is perfectly known
by all soldiers, there are two pure strategy equilibria for θ ∈ (0, 1]: all sol-
36Because a soldier finds it optimal to fight if and only if s/he expects success, we can in-
terpret c as the probability of a failure state, in which the proportion of soldiers abandoning
is above the threshold value of organizational resolve (At ≥ θ).
37To simplify notation, we express the payoffs by their differences and normalize them
between zero and one. We thank Scott Tyson for suggesting this simplification.
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A < θ A ≥ θ
Success Failure
Fight (ait = 0) 1− c −c
Abandon (ait = 1) 0 0
Table 2.7: Payoff structure
diers fight (At = 0 < θ) or all soldiers abandon (At = 1 ≥ θ).38 When θ is
imperfectly known and there exists heterogeneous information about orga-
nizational resolve, the decision to fight or abandon depends on signals that
each soldier receives. In this case, Nature draws an initial common prior,
θ ∼ N(ω, 1α ), where α indicates the common prior’s precision. Each soldier
receives a private signal:
xi = θ + εi
where εi ∼ N(0, 1β ) indicates noise, i.i.d. across soldiers and independent of
θ, and β describes the signal’s precision.
Let x̂ ∈ R be a threshold, such that a soldier abandons when xi ≤ x̂.
Given this threshold, the proportion of soldiers who abandon is decreasing
in θ:
A(θ) = Pr(x ≤ x̂) = Φ(
√
β(x̂− θ))
where Φ is the CDF of the standard Normal distribution. This observation
dovetails with previous research: the proportion of soldiers abandoning is
decreasing in the level of organizational resolve, which is related to factors
such as attacker advantages.
Organizational failure occurs when θ ≤ θ̂, where θ̂ solves θ =
A(θ̂): θ̂ = Φ(
√
β(x̂ − θ̂)). The posterior of θ given x is distributed
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This probability is decreasing in x. Consequently, a soldier will find it opti-









ω− θ̂)) = c
A monotone equilibrium (x̂, θ̂) exists for all ω iff β ≥ α22π .
Given a particular α, when β is smaller (i.e., private information is less
precise), there are dominance regions where subsets of soldiers prefer one
action over the other, depending on their individual value for x. However,
as β → ∞, the threshold θ̂ converges to θ∞ ≡ 1− c. When this occurs, the
proportion of soldiers abandoning converges to 1 for all θ < θ∞ and to 0 for
all θ > θ∞.
While this analysis describes only the static, one-shot version of the
game, the same basic mechanisms operate in the dynamic model.39
2.6.2 Dynamic model
In each period t ≥ 1, each soldier receives a private and public signal about
organizational resolve, θ. Furthermore, in t ≥ 2, each soldier also receives
a public and private signal about soldiers abandoning in previous battles,
At−1. In the dynamic game, private information evolves over time as sol-
diers receive more information and update their beliefs. We specify these




Private, θ: xit = θ + εit
Public, θ: zt = θ + ξt
Private, At−1: Xit = S(At−1, υit)
Public, At−1: Zt = S(At−1, ζt)
where εit and υit are idiosyncratic noise terms, ξt and ζt are common noise
terms, and S : [0, 1]×R → R. Each of the noise terms is distributed nor-
mally with mean zero and variance specified as follows, independent of θ,
serially uncorrelated, and i.i.d. across all i for private noise terms (Ibid.):
εit ∼ N(0, 1/ηxt )
ξt ∼ N(0, 1/ηzt )
υit ∼ N(0, 1/γxt )
ζt ∼ N(0, 1/γzt )
The past period’s signals condition posterior beliefs similarly to the static
game.
Two cases illustrate the novelty of modeling the information structure
in this way. First, consider a case where soldiers observe public and pri-
vate signals only about the value for θ, but not the precise size of past levels
of abandonment, At. If a soldier observes that abandonment has occurred
(without knowing the size), and sees that it did not lead to organizational
failure, she will update her beliefs upward about the value for θ. In other
words, by recognizing that the organization was able to sustain some un-
known level of abandonment without total failure, the soldier comes to see
that the army may be more resolved than previously believed, making fu-
ture abandonment less likely. Consequently, when expected resolve is high,
an army becomes more resilient against individual bouts of surrender.
In a second case, where soldiers also observe past levels of abandon-
ment, At−1, the dynamic changes. Here, separate signals about the propor-
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tion of soldiers abandoning in previous battles may counter the effect of
knowing that the organization did not fail, based on the public signal about
θ. When this happens, the likelihood that soldiers will abandon in the next
battle can rise, potentially leading to a cascade effect across battles. These
dynamics establish the microfoundations of the diffusion process posited
by our main hypothesis: the flow of information from previous outcomes
affects soldiers’ decisions in battle, and future surrender increases with in-
formation about past surrender.
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CHAPTER 3
Adapting Counterinsurgency Doctrine in
the Shadow of the Future
The Afghan War has lacked
high-level American
commitment for years now. If
there is any surprise, it is that for
eight years of Barack Obama
and four years of Donald
Trump, the United States
persisted in a conflict that most
senior officials in those
administrations regarded with
pessimism and distaste.
—Eliot A. Cohen, The Atlantic
(Cohen, 2021)
Since 1945, conventional militaries have a poor record of waging coun-
terinsurgencies. Only about one third of post-World War II insurgency con-
flicts have been won by military forces, while the remaining conflicts have
ended in either outright victory for the insurgents (33 percent) or negoti-
ated concessions to their demands (34 percent). For conflicts in which the
state is an external occupier, military victory drops to 24 percent, and in-
surgent victory climbs to 62 percent (Lyall and Wilson III, 2009). Despite
having significant advantages in resources, technology, and training, mili-
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taries struggle to win modern asymmetric conflicts. What makes effective
counterinsurgency doctrine such a vexing puzzle for militaries, and why
are some militaries better able to adapt their doctrine than others?1
Several possible explanations have been offered for why states are suc-
cessful in some counterinsurgencies but not others. Macro-level explana-
tions emphasizing regime type focus on the role that domestic pressures
place on a state’s ability to fight insurgent conflicts (Byman, 2016; Getman-
sky, 2013; Lyall, 2010; Mack, 1975; Merom, 2003). However, several of these
studies find no direct relationship between regime type and insurgency out-
come, making regime-focused explanations relatively weak. Another com-
mon explanation is that military culture leads to better or worse counterin-
surgency by creating organizations that are more or less open to learning
(Long, 2016; Nagl, 2002). Yet existing cultural explanations, which tend
to rely on organizational stickiness over time, are unable to explain vari-
ations in counterinsurgency effectiveness within the same military, such as
the British army’s variable effectiveness between Malaya and Iraq. Other
explanations consider characteristics internal to the conflict to better un-
derstand their outcomes, using them to evaluate the effectiveness of tactics
(Johnston, 2012; Pampinella, 2015) and military strategies (Arreguı́n-Toft,
2001; Enterline, Stull, and Magagnoli, 2013; Lyall and Wilson III, 2009; Paul,
Clarke, and Grill, 2010). However, these existing studies overlook the para-
dox in supposing a single explanation according to a particular strategy or
tactic: opponents can imitate or adjust their strategies or tactics in response,
distorting their effectiveness across other cases. Relocating parts of the pop-
ulation, for example, was a successful strategy for the British in Malaya, but
did not succeed for either the French in Algeria or the U.S. in Vietnam. Ex-
planations that emphasize a particular approach to counterinsurgency fail
to convincingly account for such variation.
In any conflict, military organizations are Darwinian actors facing com-
1I define doctrine as the comprehensive set of political and military decisions about how
to fight a war. A military’s doctrine is the result of learned experiences and observations,
all formed under particular organizational and policy constraints.
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petition for the survival of the fittest. Adaptation, therefore, is a matter of
life or death and can determine the difference between victory and defeat.
As the British military theorist Liddell Hart declares, “Adaptability is the
law which governments survival in war as in life—war being but a concen-
trated form of the human struggle against the environment” (Hart, 1991,
p. 330). Therefore, to explain counterinsurgency effectiveness, I model a
military’s ability to adapt its doctrine to local conditions.
When fighting an insurgency, a military faces high uncertainty about
how best to defeat its opponent because complex local conditions create
enough variation in which strategies and tactics are most effective that they
cannot be identified ex ante—they can only be learned through experience.
Other scholars have made similar arguments about counterinsurgencies.
Kilcullen (2010), for example, argues that the counterinsurgent’s impera-
tive is “to understand each environment, in real time, in detail, in its own
terms, in what that would be understood by the locals—and not by analogy
with some other conflict, some earlier war, or some universal template or
standardized rule-set” (p. 2). Thus, where adaptability is better, a military
can learn which strategies and tactics are more successful than others, and
implement them across the organization in a coordinated and cohesive way.
Conversely, where adaptability is worse, a military will apply an ineffective
doctrine, or will identify and implement improvements too slowly, and will
be less likely to defeat an insurgency as a result. Therefore, by identifying
organizational features that promote or hinder adaptability, we can better
explain and predict insurgency conflict outcomes.
Contrary to fixed military culture explanations, I use the model to show
that doctrinal adaptability arises from a state’s commitment horizon in a
conflict. The commitment horizon is the extent to which the future matters
for the present—i.e., how much the “shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984)
weighs on a military’s decision-making—and is related to the concept of
resolve, i.e., the “firmness or steadfastness of purpose” (Kertzer, 2017).2 In
the model, the commitment horizon can formally be understood as the dis-
2I operationalize commitment horizon qualitatively in Section 3.3 below.
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count factor. I argue that the basis for a state’s commitment horizon varies
by case and is thus not a systematic feature of an organization. When a
state has a higher commitment horizon, the military will persevere despite
setbacks, search for better solutions, and make more effective decisions that
account for complexities in local conditions. When a state has a lower com-
mitment horizon, on the other hand, the military may search for and adopt
quick improvements, but these may be less effective overall.
However, this is not the whole story. The commitment horizon also di-
rectly affects the optimal choice of organizational characteristics—namely,
the level of military autonomy, and the tolerance for political and military
experimentation—and it is these characteristics, which are manifestations
of military culture, that drive the tendency to adapt and thereby improve
effectiveness. Moreover, the model’s results indicate that particular organi-
zational characteristics adopted are nonmonotonic in the commitment hori-
zon level. Consequently, I show that doctrinal effectiveness follows a U-
shaped curve, corresponding to the organizational characteristics adopted
as the commitment horizon increases.
Using the model’s results, I develop a typology of counterinsurgent mil-
itaries according to similar commitment horizon levels and corresponding
organizational characteristics, which can be used to explain a military’s
counterinsurgency effectiveness. I then illustrate the logic of the model
and the implications of this typology in three sets of historical counterin-
surgency cases: the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan; the British in Malaya and
Iraq; and the French in Indochina and Algeria. I show that the variation
in counterinsurgency effectiveness across these cases can best be explained
by the variation in commitment horizons and corresponding organizational
features, rather than alternative explanations such as fixed military culture
or specific counterinsurgency strategies.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the determinants of mil-
itary doctrine and battlefield effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations
by providing a novel approach to explaining military adaptation during
wartime. Furthermore, I build on previous work by connecting the findings
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in the literature on military adaptation into a more unified understanding of
how doctrinal evolution varies across military organizations. Finally, the ex-
planation I provide for counterinsurgency effectiveness has important pol-
icy implications for both conflict dynamics and outcomes.
3.1 Military adaptation and complex conflicts
Existing studies on military adaptation and innovation can be grouped into
those that focus on top-down processes of adaptation, and those that fo-
cus on bottom-up processes. Top-down explanations focus on identifying
the processes through which political or military leaders identify needs for
change and implement organizational change. These explanations have fo-
cused on issues such as the role of intervention by civilian policymakers
(Posen, 1984), intra-service competition for promotion (Rosen, 1991), insti-
tutional structures of delegation (Avant, 1993), changes in the external se-
curity environment induced by an adversary (Zisk, 1993), military leader
replacement (Sorley, 1999), and bureaucratic flexibility (Horowitz, 2010a).
Conversely, other scholars have examined the importance of bottom-up
innovation and adaptation for explaining battlefield effectiveness, which
can involve experimentation with new tactics (Farrell, 2010; Gudmundsson,
1995; Kollars, 2015) or the horizontal sharing of information (Foley, 2012).
Bottom-up adaptation may fail to occur, however, when ideas are lost or
forgotten before they are more fully implemented (Catignani, 2012), or if
there is a culture that discourages experimentation and improvisation (Mil-
ner, 1984), such as when subordinates are discouraged from questioning
policies or ideas are rejected by higher commanders (Nagl, 2002).
More recently, research on the process of military change has focused on
synthesizing the top-down and bottom-up processes into more structured
frameworks (Horowitz and Pindyck, 2020). Some studies, for example, de-
scribe bottom-up learning as adaptation, whereas top-down learning is de-
scribed as organization-wide innovation, e.g., by institutionalizing practices
into doctrine (Murray, 2011; Ucko, 2009). Russell (2011) and Adamsky and
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Bjergam (2012) make similar arguments, describing the development of mil-
itary thought as a dialectical process between soldiers adapting in wartime
and military thinkers innovating doctrine primarily during peacetime. Sim-
ilarly, the evolution of doctrine—when it occurs—has been described as
an iterative process, up and down the chain of command, where changes
are disseminated quickly throughout the organization (Barno and Bensa-
hel, 2020).
More broadly, the role of military culture has been used to explain mil-
itary preferences and doctrinal development over time. Military culture,
in short, is “the ideas about how a military should fight” (Morrow, 2014,
p.270), and therefore provides a basis for explaining the origins of a mili-
tary organization’s preferences (Legro, 1995). Military culture has been in-
voked to explain issues such as the preference for offensive military opera-
tions leading up to the outbreak of World War I (Snyder, 1984; Van Evera,
1984), differences in preference between offensive and defensive doctrines
(Kier, 1997), the extent to which military organizations comply with inter-
national laws of war (Legro, 1995), variation in the levels of individual ini-
tiative among commanders during wartime (Muth, 2011), and differences
in approaches to counterinsurgency operations (Long, 2016). These exist-
ing explanations point to important socialization processes that cause be-
liefs to become ingrained within the military organization over time, but
they are unable to explain doctrinal change without some exogenous shock
to the organization. Consequently, the existing studies on military culture
tend to push the question of doctrinal evolution one step beyond the or-
ganization, rather than trying to explain how cultures and corresponding
doctrines evolve over time through processes within the organization itself.
Some of the literature on civil-military relations has addressed endoge-
nous organizational issues, especially with regard to the power distribution
and divisions of control between political leaders and the military, though
scholars studying these topics are typically less concerned with explain-
ing doctrinal evolution. Since Huntington (1957), much of the focus on
the civil-military power distribution has been on debating the proper (i.e.,
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normative) balance between objective and subjective civilian control. Yet
regardless of the normative implications or prescriptions, understanding
the causes and consequences of civilian oversight is ultimately one that can
be studied objectively and systematically, e.g., by framing the issue as a
principal-agent problem (Avant, 1994; Feaver, 2003). Moreover, evaluating
different levels of military autonomy can be useful for explaining not just
the managerial dilemmas that political leaders face, but also how different
levels of decision-making control affect the development of doctrine and
the military’s ability to learn, adapt, and change the doctrine over time.
Underlying the studies of military adaptation, innovation, and organi-
zational processes is a recognition that modern conflict is highly complex.
Consequently, these studies generally imply that modern battlefield effec-
tiveness requires a complex pattern of force employment, which Biddle
(2004) terms the “modern system.” In the range of possible types of con-
flict, many scholars argue that counterinsurgency is particularly complex
(see, for example, Galula (1964); Jones (2017); Kilcullen (2010); Trinquier
(1961)). In his classic treatise on insurgency, Mao describes the importance
of adaptation as such: “Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the
enemy situation, to the terrain, and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders
must be alert to sense changes in these factors and make necessary mod-
ifications in troop dispositions to accord with them” (Mao, 1961, p. 101).
Similarly, the U.S. Army’s current field manual on counterinsurgency oper-
ations, FM 3-24, refers to a “complex” environment or the “complexity” of
counterinsurgency operations 27 times throughout the document (United
States Army, 2014). Counterinsurgency conflicts therefore provide a useful
substantive context to evaluate military adaptability.
Most existing work on military adaptation and learning has attempted
to describe adaptive processes qualitatively. To my knowledge, no existing
study has attempted to formally model the structure of organizational inter-
actions to explain doctrinal evolution. Therefore, in what follows, I present
a stylized model of doctrinal adaptation in order to provide a more system-
atic analysis of how variations in organizational features affect evolutionary
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doctrinal outcomes in highly complex environments.
3.2 The model
Military organizations are large-scale, distributed systems comprised of
heterogeneous units with competing preferences that interact within a hi-
erarchical structure. When faced with a complex decision space, the inter-
actions between political and military levels, and between military units
in the hierarchy, can lead to adaptive and coevolutionary outcomes for the
entire organization iteratively over time, which lead to an evolution in mili-
tary doctrine. Agent-based models (ABMs) are a useful method for investi-
gating the ways in which such micro-level interaction rules affect emergent
macro-level outcomes (Schelling, 2006), especially when the interactions are
computationally complex, making a reduced-form mathematical solution
extremely difficult (Axelrod, 1997). Consequently, ABMs are a useful ap-
proach for modeling the dynamics of organizational decision-making and
learning that leads to the emergence of a group-wide doctrine. I model the
dynamics of doctrinal evolution with an ABM and gather results through
simulation to evaluate the effects that military autonomy, tolerance for ex-
perimentation, and commitment horizon have on doctrinal effectiveness
over time.
The model of organizational decision-making that I develop draws in-
spiration from the literature on organizational learning (Levitt and March,
1988). A common approach to modeling this type of learning uses “hill-
climbing” as an optimization technique to model the search for improve-
ments, where a search is conducted over a fitness landscape, represent-
ing possible solutions to a problem, in order to find the highest peak on
the landscape, which represents the optimal solution. For example, March
(1991) uses a hill-climbing algorithm to evaluate the tradeoffs between ex-
ploration and exploitation in organizational learning.3 One particular hill-
3March’s concept of an “organizational code” has comparable qualities to that of a doc-
trine.
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climbing model that has gained prominence in the study of complex adap-
tive systems is the NK-model, which describes an adaptive walk process
on a rugged landscape (Kauffman and Levin, 1987). Originally designed to
study biological processes of adaptation and selection in epistatic interac-
tions, variants of NK-models have flourished in numerous organizational
and management strategy studies (see Baumann, Schmidt, and Stieglitz
(2019) for an overview). Properties that make NK-models fruitful for study-
ing adaptive decision-making processes include the ability to incorporate
bounded rationality in the search process, and the ability to vary landscape
ruggedness to evaluate different levels of complexity in local conditions.
I model a set of political and military agents using the NK-model frame-
work, where the agents are organized into a hierarchical network, such that
only agents that are directly connected interact. The agents begin with an
existing shared organizational doctrine, represented as a binary string of
decision variables. Furthermore, the agents share an interest in optimizing
their doctrine to a new environment of unknown complexity. The level of
complexity in the environment affects the interdependence between agents’
doctrinal decisions, meaning that a change in one decision can influence
another decision’s value, where increasing interdependence implies an in-
creasingly complex environment.
The agents attempt to optimize their doctrine cooperatively by delegat-
ing mutually exclusive subsets of the doctrine across the organization and
exploring a decision landscape for their assigned subsets. Subsets are di-
vided between agents having superior authority over the hierarchy, repre-
senting political decisions, and those within the remainder of the hierarchy,
representing military decisions. The agents then search for changes in de-
cisions that improve the fitness of their subsets. Political decisions are im-
plemented with certainty into the doctrine, whereas bottom-level military
agents share their information up the chain of command. As information
is filtered up the hierarchy, higher-ranking agents aggregate their subordi-
nates’ information with wider evaluation scopes so that the combined in-
formation leads to improved fitness. The resulting decision at the senior
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military level incorporates all the military decision subsets, and combined
with the political decisions, becomes an updated doctrine for the entire or-
ganization. The process is then repeated iteratively until an equilibrium
is reached, in which no agent prefers to make any changes to its assigned
subset. The equilibrium decision string then represents the final evolved
doctrine.
An ABM specifies properties of an environment, a set of agents, the in-
teraction topology, and the action sequence. I explain each of the model’s
components in detail below. In the appendix, I provide an example of a
single iteration of the model.
3.2.1 Environment
Doctrine D is characterized as a string of length N comprised of attributes
Di ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ [1, N]. Each Di represents a decision and is randomly as-
signed an initial value. The initial string can therefore be interpreted as the
status quo doctrine existing at the beginning of the conflict. For each Di de-
cision, there are K ∈ [1, N − 1] dependencies on other decisions within the
doctrine. The K dependencies are also randomly assigned and remain fixed
for a particular simulation. Each Di decision can therefore take on 2K+1 pos-
sible fitness levels, which depend on the binary value for Di and the binary
values of its K other dependent decision values. For the total doctrine, the
2K+1N ∈ [0, 1] fitness levels are randomly assigned and normalized by N.
The environment defines the ruggedness of the fitness landscape. For
any given landscape, there is always one global optimum that represents
the ideal set of decisions for the environment. Furthermore, for a fixed N,
complexity increases with K because decisions become more interdepen-
dent, implying that the fitness value for a particular decision can become
“frustrated” by the values of the decisions upon which it depends. Thus
as K increases, the decision landscape becomes more rugged, increasing the
number of local optima across the entire landscape and making the envi-
ronment more complex.
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3.2.2 Agents and interaction topology
The agents in the model represent individuals or close-knit communities of
individuals that share the same behavior and can be represented as a single
agent, such as combat units or a command staff. To focus the analysis, I
treat agents as units, but refer to them as individuals or agents for ease of
discussion. Agents are organized and interact within a fixed hierarchical
network, which represents the chain-of-command structure that commonly
exists in armed groups to help control the information flow and decision-
making between upper and lower echelons (Millett, Murray, and Watman,
1988).4
The interaction topology defines the role that each agent has in the doc-
trinal decision-making process. Each role, furthermore, is a specialized fo-
cus on a limited subset of the organization’s war-fighting mission. To de-
velop this structure, I define the interaction topology of an ideal-type hi-
erarchy as a balanced tree, with an additional node at the top of the tree
to represent the commander-in-chief, referred to hereafter as the political
leader.5 The hierarchy in the model is designed to correspond to the dif-
ferent levels of a conflict: political, strategic, operational, and tactical. This
hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The aggregation of all the decisions
made across these levels corresponds to the comprehensive doctrine.
In the model, I represent the military structure as a two-level tree with
two subordinates per node. Above the tree, the top-level agent in the inter-
action structure represents the political leader. The political leader is thus
directly connected only to the top agent in the tree, which represents the
senior-level military commander and whose role is to determine the strate-
gic decisions for the military. The senior commander has two subordinates
that serve as mid-level commanders and are in charge of determining op-
erational decisions. Each of these operational-level commanders also has
4Additionally, because military hierarchies are fractal—i.e., the structure between in-
dividuals within a single unit is the same as the structure between units across the
organization—the model can apply across different levels of analysis.
5In a balanced tree, each node has a fixed number of subordinate nodes, and there are a








Figure 3.1: Hierarchy levels and information flows in the model
two subordinates, which represent its bottom-level units and are in charge
of tactical decisions.
The flow of the model’s decision between agents is illustrated in Figure
3.1. Decisions that comprise the doctrine are divided between political and
military levels. The political leader in the structure has ultimate decision-
making authority over her own decisions, the political requirements. The re-
maining decisions, the military requirements, are then divided equally and
assigned as sets of sub-decisions down to the tactical-level units. Thus the
political leader and the tactical-level agents directly explore the landscape
by “experimenting” with how fitness levels change with different values
for each of their assigned decision sets. However, only the political lead-
ers’ decisions are chosen with certainty for the doctrine. Each tactical-level
agent, instead, makes a recommendation for his decision(s) to his direct su-
perior, an operational-level commander. Each operational-level comman-
der is responsible for evaluating aggregations of his subordinates’ delegated
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sub-decisions, which represent the operational decisions, and selecting the
higher fitness combination of operational decisions to recommend to the
senior commander. Finally, the senior commander is responsible for eval-
uating aggregations of the operational recommendations to select the total
military requirements with the highest overall fitness level, which represent
the strategic decisions. The decisions at the political and strategic levels ag-
gregated together comprise the full doctrine, which is then distributed to all
agents.
3.2.3 Action sequence
Agents act according to the following sequence:
1. Political requirements are represented by P, the subset of political de-
cisions. The political leader compares the political requirements’ sta-
tus quo fitness level f (PSQ) to the fitness level resulting from a random
change, or mutation, in a single political requirement value f (PM). If
f (PM) > f (PSQ), then the political leader updates P to incorporate the
requirements with PM, otherwise she retains PSQ.
2. Decisions delegated to the tactical level are represented by T. Each
tactical-level agent compares his assigned decisions’ status quo fitness
level f (TSQ) to the fitness level resulting from a random mutation in
one of his delegated decision values, f (TM). If f (TM) > f (TSQ), then
the tactical-level agent recommends TM to his operational-level com-
mander. Otherwise, he recommends TSQ. The recommendation is rep-
resented by TR.
3. Each operational-level commander j ∈ {1, 2} compares the fitness
level for his subordinates’ (T1 and T2) combined status quos with the
fitness levels of all possible composites of T j1 and T
j
2’s recommenda-
tions. The operational-level commander then recommends the com-
posite with the highest overall fitness for this decision subset, repre-
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sented by OR. The comparisons consist of the following composites:6
• f (T j1,SQ, T
j
2,SQ)
• f (T j1,R, T
j
2,SQ)
• f (T j1,SQ, T
j
2,R)
• f (T j1,R, T
j
2,R)
4. The senior commander compares the fitness level for the operational-
level commanders’ (O1 and O2) combined status quos with the fitness
levels of all possible composites of O1 and O2’s recommendations in
the same fashion as in Step 3. The senior commander then selects
the military requirements S with the highest overall fitness within the
decision subset, which represent the strategic decisions.
5. Aggregated political requirements and military requirements (P, S)
comprise the updated doctrine D for the entire organization, which
are distributed to each of the agents. Repeat from step 1 until the last
iteration is completed.
Figure 3.2 illustrates an example of an agent’s decision process. In this
illustration, doctrine D has five components, and complexity K is two—i.e.,
each decision has two other decisions upon which it depends. An agent
responsible for evaluating D1 will compare the status quo fitness level to
the mutated fitness level, taking into account how the fitness level changes
given the other decision values upon which it depends, which is determined by
the landscape. Thus, in this example, the agent determines that the mutated
value for D1 has a higher fitness level than the status quo value.
3.2.4 Observations about the model
Bounded rationality, complexity, and delegation. Agents try to maximize
the fitness level of the decisions for which they are responsible according to
6Note that if both T j1 and T
j
2 recommend the status quo, all of the comparisons will be
the same and no change will occur. Likewise, if one agent recommends the status quo but
not the other, there will only be two comparisons. This holds for Step 4 as well.
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0 0 1 0 1
fSQ(001) = 0.02 < fM(101) = 0.03
Figure 3.2: Example of experimental search in the NK-model
their role in the structure, which corresponds to an area of expertise. The
political leader and the tactical-level agents are each responsible for a mu-
tually exclusive subset of the entire doctrine and are thus limited in their
rationality relative to the interests of the entire organization, because each
is concerned only with maximizing its own subset. The operational-level
commanders each consolidate their subordinates’ recommendations and try
to maximize these composites, but they are also limited in their rationality
because they are only concerned with maximizing their tactical aggregated
subsets. The senior commander, likewise, tries to maximize the operational-
level commanders’ composites. The resulting doctrine therefore entails the
political leader’s subset and the senior commander’s subset, which is an
aggregate of all the delegated tactical-level subsets after they have been fil-
tered through the operational level.
The limits of expertise create additional challenges for agents’ searches
for improved fitness levels at higher levels of interdependence (i.e., com-
plexity). In particular, at high complexity, the decision(s) in areas outside
of agents’ expertise have a greater effect on decisions within their exper-
tise, and vice versa. One way to manage this problem is by varying how
much decision-making autonomy the military has compared to the political
leader. By lowering autonomy, more decisions are retained at the political
level, whereas increasing autonomy increases the number of decisions that
are delegated and thus evaluated at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels. To address this possibility I parameterize military autonomy as a
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variable in the simulations, which I discuss in more detail below.
Adaptation and doctrinal experimentation. At each iteration, the
political-level agent and the tactical-level military agents “experiment” by
randomly changing a sub-decision to evaluate whether fitness improves for
their respective subsets. These experiments correspond to efforts by units
within the organization to develop better solutions to problems and adapt
to the environment. When the political leader successfully finds a higher
fitness level, the political requirements are mandated for the next doctri-
nal update. For tactical-level agents, however, their successful experiments
do not always get incorporated into the doctrine: a successful tactical-level
experiment must pass the check by both operational- and senior-level com-
manders to ensure that the aggregated fitness levels improve at the opera-
tional and strategic levels, respectively. Therefore in the model, experimen-
tation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for doctrinal adaptation.
Agents must be able to experiment to search for better solutions, but the
military components of the doctrine will only adapt if higher-order agents
believe the improvements are valuable for a wider scope of the organiza-
tion.
Although experimentation is necessary for change, it may not always be
the case that experimentation is preferred within an organization. March
(1991) shows that organizations face tradeoffs between exploration and ex-
ploitation. Thus in some cases, experimentation will increase organizational
volatility, whereas leaders might prefer stability in order to exploit existing
capabilities. Therefore, in the simulations, I parameterize the level of exper-
imentation at both the political and military levels in order to evaluate how
preferences for experimentation affect doctrinal evolution.
Competing preferences. Although the agents act cooperatively to search
for doctrinal improvements, agents’ individual preferences differ, which
creates competing interests both horizontally and vertically in the hierar-
chy. Horizontally, agents have competing interests when their preferred
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subset of decisions cannot be aggregated with either the status quo or a
recommended subset that is submitted for consideration up the chain of
command. Vertically, agents have competing interests in two regards. First,
preferences for political requirements and strategic military requirements
may differ, creating a tension between political and military decisions. Sec-
ond, within the set of military agents, competing preferences exist up and
down the chain of command, because each level has a different scope of
consideration for making decisions.
The military autonomy parameter models the effect of different weights
on political leaders’ decisions relative to the military overall. To narrow the
focus of my analysis, I do not directly model the effects of differing pref-
erences and competing interests between military components, and there-
fore weight each recommendation equally. However, an extension in the
model could allow for the effects arising from certain phenomena observed
empirically, such as interservice rivalries and competition between units,
and disagreements or distrust between upper and lower military echelons,
which would skew the weights favoring one agent’s decisions over an-
other. Because these additional features would lead to straightforward re-
sults without providing additional theoretical value (e.g., heavily weighting
one agent, level, or branch’s decisions will favor their preferences over an-
other agent, level or branch), I do not include them in the model.
Similarly, to maintain the focus on my analysis, I do not evaluate varia-
tions in hierarchical structures. Thus I do not model an unbalanced tree—
i.e., where there is an uneven number of agents between vertical branches
or horizontal levels—nor do I model a flatter, more networked organization.
However, future research could extend the model to explicitly evaluate how
changes in organizational design and structure affect doctrinal consensus.
Inefficiency of the equilibrium doctrine. Every landscape has one global
optimum, which represents the most effective doctrine for the landscape.
However, high complexity means that the number of local optima is also
high. Because of the organizational dynamics associated with bounded ra-
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tionality, adaptation, and competing preferences, it is possible that the doc-
trine settles on an equilibrium that is only a local optimum. Therefore, the
equilibrium may be inefficient, leading to a suboptimal outcome for the or-
ganization and lower overall fitness.
3.2.5 Complexity and organizational feature parameters
I evaluated the model through a series of simulations, in which I ran pa-
rameter sweeps across a range of possible values for a set of variables of
interest. The range of parameter values I evaluated are:
N = 10
COMPLEXITY (K) ∈ {k ∈N : 1 ≤ k ≤ 9}
MILITARY AUTONOMY ∈ {a ∈N : 1 ≤ a ≤ 9}
PR(POLITICAL EXPERIMENT) ∈ [0, 1]
PR(MILITARY EXPERIMENT) ∈ [0, 1]
I keep fixed the total number of decisions in the doctrine, N = 10, because
the results are the same for different levels when normalized by N. The
main structural model variable therefore is the number of interdependent
decisions, K, from 1 to N − 1, representing the level of complexity. Addi-
tionally, organizations have varying characteristics that affect the ways in
which doctrinal decisions are made. The first characteristic I model is MILI-
TARY AUTONOMY, the amount of relative decision-making latitude granted
to the military. I model military autonomy as the extent to which political
leaders delegate decision-making power from the political to the military
level. This dimension captures the concept of military influence, which cor-
responds to the amount of decision-making power that the military has over
political leaders without a direct forceful takeover, such as by coup (Feaver,
1999). When military autonomy is high, the military has greater control
over the set of decisions, and and thus the military has substantial influence
over policy-making. Conversely, when military autonomy is low, military
decisions have far less influence on political requirements, and most deci-
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sions are made at the political level and passed down the chain of command
from the political leader.
As part of the military autonomy process in the model, any decisions
delegated to the military are divided equally down the chain of command,
which corresponds to a division-of-labor, or specialization, effort. I assume
that the political leader always retains a non-zero number of decisions for
herself, and always delegates a non-zero number of decisions to the mili-
tary. Therefore, the minimum number of decisions that can be delegated in
the model is one, and the maximum number of decisions is nine. When the
number of delegated decisions is not divisible by four, they are distributed
between the lower levels as evenly as possible. Thus, for example, if MILI-
TARY AUTONOMY = 3, the decisions will be delegated as a 2-1 split between
the two operational commanders; the first two decisions will then be del-
egated between each of the two tactical agents for the former operational
agent, and the single remaining decision will be assigned to one tactical
agent for the latter operational agent.
Two additional variables affect the search for doctrinal changes: the
probabilities of political and military experimentation, which I treat as in-
dependent values. These probabilities correspond to the tolerance for ex-
perimentation by agents at the political and military levels, respectively.
The probability of an experiment increases in the tolerance for experimen-
tation at the corresponding level. It is important to note that tolerance for
experimentation affects the potential for change in the doctrinal decisions
that a particular agent has control over, but not necessarily the impact of
such changes. Thus, for example, if military autonomy is low and the toler-
ance for military experimentation is high, the military will be likely to make
changes, but because it has little control over doctrinal decisions, it can only
have a small impact on any potential changes that might occur. Likewise, if
military autonomy is high but the tolerance for military experimentation is
low, then few changes will likely occur because the military controls most of
the doctrine but has little tolerance for change. The same dynamic applies
to the political level.
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Variable Mean SD Min Max
COMPLEXITY (K) 0.50 0.26 0.10 0.90
MILITARY AUTONOMY 0.50 0.26 0.10 0.90
PR(POLITICAL EXPERIMENT) 0.50 0.29 0 1
PR(MILITARY EXPERIMENT) 0.50 0.29 0 1
FINAL DOCTRINE FITNESS 0.86 0.09 0.28 1
FINAL DOCTRINE ITERATION 21.88 33.57 1 200
Number of observations: 810,000
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics: simulation variables
3.3 Model analysis
To analyze the model, I conducted a parameter sweep across the range of
values for each of the variables. For each pair of discrete K-MILITARY AU-
TONOMY values, I ran 1,000 simulations of 200 iterations (time periods)
each.7 In each simulation, the probability of political and military exper-
iments were drawn independently from a random uniform distribution.
This resulted in 810,000 simulations covering the entire range of parameter
values. Descriptive statistics for the simulation data are provided in Table
3.1. Fitness measures are normalized by the maximum possible fitness per
simulation (which depends on the simulation’s particular landscape), and
complexity (K) and MILITARY AUTONOMY are normalized by the number
of doctrinal decisions, N = 10.
To evaluate the effect of the commitment horizon level (i.e., the discount
factor), I computed a discounted final fitness level, δtF, for each simulation.
The commitment horizon, δ ∈ (0, 1), affects the time value of the final doc-
trinal fitness F, where t is the number of iterations needed to reach an equi-
librium. Thus, the organization’s total payoff depends on how much it dis-
counts the future fitness value of the final doctrine: when δ is low, an orga-
nization will prefer a doctrine that may provide a lower fitness level sooner
7Within the full simulation results, the likelihood of failing to reach model convergence
by the 200th iteration is less than 0.001.
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rather than wait for a better doctrine later, whereas when δ increases, the
organization is more willing to wait for a better doctrine that takes longer
to achieve.
I then used unbiased recursive partitioning, a supervised learning algo-
rithm, to find the parameter values that maximize the final doctrinal fitness
value at each 0.01 increment for the commitment horizon level. Unbiased
recursive partitioning is a tree-based classification algorithm that uses re-
cursive partitioning of the parameters to create a conditional inference tree
(Hothorn, Hornik, and Zeileis, 2006). This approach is useful for generaliz-
ing and predicting output variables in the data (Patel, Abbasi, Saeed et al.,
2018).The results of the algorithm provide a partition (i.e., a range of values)
of each model parameter that maximizes the correlation with the observed
final fitness value.
Next, I selected the set of partitions that maximize the final doctrinal fit-
ness value for each discount level increment, based on the expectation that a
military will optimize their organizations for the commitment horizon they
have in a conflict. I limited the focus of the optimization to high complexity
landscapes—corresponding to the substantive focus of counterinsurgency
conflicts—by selecting the partitions that had no upper limit on K.8
Once I determined the optimal parameter values for each commitment
horizon level at high complexity, I then evaluated how the results grouped
together into similar characteristics using k-means clustering. This ap-
proach is a form of unsupervised learning, which iteratively minimizes the
within-class sum of squares for a set of clusters (Hartigan and Wong, 1979;
MacQueen, 1967). Because the computed clusters may vary based on how
the algorithm initializes, a wide variety of indices have been developed to
evaluate clustering results. Therefore, I used a method which computes 30
such indices for determining the relevant number of clusters and proposes
the clustering scheme that is chosen by the plurality of the indices (Charrad,
Gahhazli, Boiteau et al., 2014).
8The 95% confidence interval for the lower limit of complexity for this restriction is
Klower = (0.70, 0.74).
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3.3.1 Moving from exogenous parameters to endogenous equilibria
Ever since John Nash’s pioneering concept of strategy equilibrium (Nash,
1950), game theorists have understood an equilibrium as a set of decisions
from which players will not deviate. Because each player’s optimal de-
cision depends on every other player’s decision, an equilibrium is inher-
ently endogenous. However, in the agent-based NK-model, the parameters
(such as K, autonomy, and experimentation) are exogenous, and therefore
one may reasonably ask whether it makes sense for organizations to lack
a conscious choice about the parameters they adopt. Yet as I explore the
parameter space in the model, I evaluate all possible solutions in order to
find those that are optimal, based on the assumption that organizations will
choose only those sets of parameters that provide an optimal solution. This
is somewhat analogous to defining the full game tree in which all possible
decisions are mapped out, even though multiple decisions may ultimately
be off the equilibrium path. Therefore, I make an explicit assumption that
the exogenous features I have modeled are endogenously determined in re-
ality.
3.4 Results
Figure 3.3 visualizes the results of the model analysis. Each data point in
the figure plots the average (undiscounted) optimal final fitness value for a
specific commitment horizon level, with 95% confidence intervals for each
fitness value. I plot the undiscounted fitness values because doing so pro-
vides a standardized way to compare outcomes across commitment horizon
levels. Moreover, the undiscounted fitness values represent the realized ef-
fectiveness that the organization achieves, regardless of how long it takes to
reach the doctrine. Consequently, comparing undiscounted fitness values
allows us to evaluate what the expected final observed effectiveness is for
different commitment horizons.
The results from the k-means clustering algorithm indicate that there are
five distinct clusters across the range of commitment horizon values. These
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clusters, depicted in Figure 3.3, correspond to distinct sets of organizational
characteristics from the model, which are listed in Table 3.2. Because the
clusters are broadly distinguishable by the commitment horizon level, it
makes sense to discuss them in reference to these levels. Therefore, the
commitment horizon defines the categorization, and the levels of military
autonomy and tolerances for political and military experimentation are pre-
dicted by this categorization. Thus, for example, at a low commitment hori-
zon, a cluster exists which corresponds to medium military autonomy, low
tolerance for political experimentation, and high tolerance for military ex-
perimentation. These clusters suggest a typology of counterinsurgent mili-
taries according to their commitment horizon, which I discuss below.
Commitment Horizon (δ) Military Autonomy Political Experim. Tolerance Military Experim. Tolerance
0.01 – 0.26 Low 0.43 – 0.53 Medium 0.00 – 0.01 Low 0.65 – 1 High
0.27 – 0.56 Medium 0.02 – 0.13 Low 0.00 – 0.005 Low 0.00 – 1 Any
0.60 – 0.66 Medium High 0.30 – 1 Med/High 0.71 – 1 High 0.00 – 0.003 Low
0.58 – 0.90 High 0.37 – 0.49 Medium 0.00 – 0.01 Low 0.44 – 0.91 Med/High
0.57 – 0.99 Highest 0.72 – 0.96 High 0.13 – 0.50 Medium 0.82 – 1 Very High
Note: Row-wise cluster characteristics, computed by k-means clustering, for each type il-
lustrated in Figure 3.3. Numeric ranges are the minimum and maximum values for δ, and
the average minimum and maximum partition values for all other variables.
Table 3.2: Cluster characteristics
Another important feature to observe in Figure 3.3 is the trend in doc-
trinal fitness across commitment horizon levels—and thus, across clusters.
The results in Figure 3.3 suggest that doctrinal effectiveness follows a non-
monotone, U-shaped curve as the commitment horizon increases. The
model generates this surprising result because of the ways that the opti-
mal organizational characteristics vary according to the commitment level.
In particular, the least effective organizations are not those with the low-
est commitment, because these organizations will urgently try to “shore
up” a quick solution. Rather, the least effective are those with a lukewarm
commitment: they have neither the urgency to find quick fixes, nor the en-
durance to search for better solutions over a longer duration. This result has
important implications for predicting how each of the organizational types
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Note: Effect of commitment horizon (δ) on doctrinal effectiveness (F) in high complexity
environments (lim KN → 1), clustered by type (see Table 3.2 for details), with 95% confi-
dence ellipses for each type. F is the average of the simulated final fitness for the optimal
organizational characteristics at each δ (formally, arg max F ∀ δ, as determined by unbiased
recursive partitioning), with 95% confidence interval lines plotted for each fitness level.
Locally estimated scatterplot smoothing (LOESS) curve with 95% confidence interval band
is also plotted to illustrate general trend pattern across δ levels.
Figure 3.3: Overall fitness and commitment horizon level (i.e., discount fac-
tor), clustered by type
will perform in counterinsurgency conflicts, as I will describe in the next
section.
3.4.1 A typology of counterinsurgency militaries
The results from the analysis suggest a typology of counterinsurgency mil-
itaries according to their commitment horizon. In what follows, I describe
each type, using mythological archetypes as a way to help identify each
type.
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Low commitment horizon: the Proteus. Proteus was a god in Greek
mythology. If someone wished to consult him, they had to surprise and cap-
ture him. However, he would attempt to escape capture by shapeshifting.9
Therefore, in personifying adaptation and quick escape, Proteus represents
an archetype of a military that possesses some adaptability, but will try to
“cut and run” rather than commit to a long struggle.
Proteus resembles a military that has a low commitment horizon. From
Table 3.2, we see that a low commitment horizon corresponds to medium
military autonomy, low tolerance for political experimentation, and high
tolerance for military experimentation. These characteristics translate to a
military with moderate decision-making autonomy that has a strong will-
ingness to search for doctrinal changes that will improve its effectiveness.
Concurrently, while the political leader retains some decision-making con-
trol, she will rarely make any changes to her decisions, preferring to main-
tain the status quo. Consequently, any adaptations that occur will likely
come predominantly from the military in response to tactical-level inputs
based on encounters with the local environment. Moreover, due to a low
commitment horizon, these changes will tend to occur quickly.
A low commitment horizon and its corresponding military character-
istics will result in moderate counterinsurgency effectiveness, relative to
other types. A military facing a low commitment horizon will essentially
jury rig its doctrine: it tries to improvise “on the fly,” and does so quickly
when facing unanticipated situations. These efforts are done in an attempt
to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, but the lack of an enduring com-
mitment means that any results achieved will be moderate at best.
Medium commitment horizon: the Goliath. Goliath was a quintessen-
tial ancient warrior, described in the Bible as a fearsome, heavily armed
and armored giant with enormous strength. However, Goliath was one-
dimensional, relying on brute force for victory in combat. Thus, he believed
he could win a one-on-one battle against David, a young shepherd, through
9Britannica. “Proteus.” https://www.britannica.com/topic/Proteus-Greek-mythology.
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sheer power. Yet David recognized that Goliath’s size and armor reduced
his mobility. Therefore David, wearing no armor and lacking advanced
weaponry, avoided close combat and slayed Goliath where he was most
vulnerable, by slinging a rock at his forehead.10 Goliath therefore represents
an archetype of a traditional large-unit military: it is large and powerful, but
nevertheless vulnerable because of an incorrect belief that fighting a pitched
battle—which may have led to success in the past—is the surest path to vic-
tory regardless of context. Such a military is unprepared for unconventional
combat, because it lacks the flexibility to adapt to local conditions.
Goliath corresponds to a military that has a medium commitment hori-
zon in counterinsurgency conflict. With a medium commitment horizon,
the optimal organizational characteristics feature low military autonomy,
low tolerance for political experimentation, and any level of tolerance for
military experimentation. Consequently, the political leader retains control
over most decisions and is unlikely to make many changes to the status quo
doctrine. Moreover, even if the military has a high tolerance for experimen-
tation, any changes it makes from tactical-level inputs are unlikely to have
much impact because the military has so little control over the overall doc-
trine. Additionally, any changes that do occur are more likely to occur at
the political level, because that is where most decision-making power is re-
tained. Therefore, the optimal characteristics for a Goliath type imply that
few doctrinal changes will occur with a medium commitment horizon.
Furthermore, a medium commitment horizon will result in poor coun-
terinsurgency effectiveness, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. Counterintuitively,
moderately increasing the commitment horizon above the Protean type
leads to both stifled adaptation and lower overall effectiveness. This re-
sult emerges from ambiguity and uncertainty about the level and duration
of commitment. The Goliath type lacks the same urgency that drives the
Protean type to find the quickest solution, but also lacks a commitment to
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Note: Survival probability is the likelihood that the doctrinal equilibrium has not been
reached.
Figure 3.4: Short-term survival curves plotted by type
improvements over an extended period. Consequently, the payoffs from
solutions at or near the initial status quo are greater than payoffs from so-
lutions that are either too quick and short-term focused or too slow and
long-term focused.
The dynamic that drives the distinction between the Goliath type and
those with other commitment horizons can be seen in Figure 3.4, which
plots each type’s survival curves for the first 20 time steps, i.e., the short
term. Both the Protean type (corresponding to the blue, low commitment
horizon curve), and its sister type, the Military Sisyphus (depicted as the
red, high commitment horizon curve), initially have a higher doctrinal sur-
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vival probability—i.e., higher likelihood of not having reached a doctrinal
equilibrium—than the Goliath type, depicted by the orange (medium com-
mitment horizon) curve. However, a few time steps later, the blue curve
drops below the orange, but the red remains above and then even with the
orange curve. Thus, initially, the Goliath type is most likely to have reached
equilibrium; shortly thereafter, the Protean type is most likely, whereas the
Military Sisyphus type is less likely. It is this dynamic between the survival
curves—in conjunction with the relative expected payoff for each solution—
that help determine the types’ optimal characteristics. Consequently, the
lack of urgency to find a quick solution, combined with a shorter commit-
ment horizon than the high type, leads to less incentive for the Goliath type
to adapt. As a result, the Goliath type ultimately optimizes by adopting
characteristics that encourage stagnation, leading to poor overall effective-
ness. Notably, the Goliath type also faces the longest total survival curve,
implying that Goliath types may be more likely to experience high-duration
conflicts than other types, assuming duration is correlated with the doctri-
nal survival curves.
Medium-high commitment horizon: the Political Sisyphus. In Greek
mythology, Sisyphus was condemned to an eternal punishment in Hades
where he was forced to roll a monstrous boulder up a hill. As he rolled
up the boulder, it would appear to almost fall over to the other side, but
each time he tried, the boulder would tumble back down again under its
own weight.11 Thus, Sisyphus “would heave, would struggle to thrust
it up, sweat drenching his body, dust swirling above his head” (Homer,
2002, p. 269). Sisyphus exemplifies a military archetype that exhibits high
endurance and persistence, yet lacks sufficient ability to achieve its goal,
which may be in sight but is ultimately beyond its ability to reach.
The Political Sisyphus type is one of two variations that are observed in
the model at medium-high and high commitment horizons. The other vari-
ation, the Military Sisyphus, will be described next. As Figure 3.3 illustrates,
11World History Encyclopedia. “Sisyphus.” https://www.ancient.eu/sisyphus/.
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the two Sisyphus types have completely overlapping clusters, suggesting
that they are organizational variants of a single type.
The characteristics of a Political Sisyphus type—a military with a
medium-high commitment horizon in a counterinsurgency—are medium
or greater military autonomy, high tolerance for political experimentation,
and low tolerance for military experimentation. With these features, an
organization optimized for medium-high commitment in a counterinsur-
gency will delegate control of some doctrinal decisions to the military, but
with the understanding that most of these decisions will not be subject to
change. Instead, most of the changes will occur at the political level; in fact,
the Political Sisyphus is the only type that exhibits high tolerance for po-
litical experimentation. As such, we would expect to see an organization
with a medium-high commitment horizon regularly changing its political
approaches in an attempt to find a political solution to the conflict, rather
than focusing on adapting militarily as the primary means for improving.
These changes will occur over time, as the organization possesses a moder-
ately high level of commitment in the conflict. However, the total effective-
ness for a Political Sisyphus is only moderate at best. While it is better off
than the Goliath type, its fitness is below other types that could be achieved,
both at low and higher commitment levels.
High commitment horizon: the Military Sisyphus. The Military Sisyphus
type is like its political counterpart in terms of similar commitment level
and overall effectiveness. Instead, the primary distinction between the two
types is in where changes tend to occur: the Military Sisyphus type features
low tolerance for political experimentation and medium or greater toler-
ance for military experimentation. Consequently, most adaptations and im-
provements to the doctrine will occur over an extended period of time at the
military level, rather than the political level. Yet the total effectiveness for a
Military Sisyphus is approximately the same, if only slightly better, than the
Political Sisyphus. Nevertheless, compared to the Protean type, the Military
Sisyphus’ expected total fitness is similar.
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Note, also, that the optimal organizational characteristics for the Pro-
tean and the Military Sisyphus types are nearly identical. This suggests
that a military which organizes by these characteristics will match both a
low and a high commitment horizon for counterinsurgency. Yet even if the
same military is involved in a low commitment conflict and transforms to
one with a high commitment, either in the same conflict or elsewhere, its
total effectiveness will be approximately the same. Therefore, while a naı̈ve
actor might think that a shift from a low to a high commitment would im-
ply greater effectiveness, in fact the U-shaped aspect of the effectiveness
curve suggests that the overall doctrinal changes will not result in demon-
strable improvements. Thus, the Military Sisyphus type toils with greater
endurance, but fails to achieve its goals to any greater effect.
Highest commitment horizon: the Atlas. Atlas was portrayed in Greek
mythology as having eternal endurance, responsible for holding the weight
of the heavens or the earth on his shoulders, or holding up pillars in the
Atlantic Ocean that separated the heavens from the earth.12 Atlas therefore
embodies an archetype of a military with the greatest possible endurance
that is fully committed to reaching its goal until it is achieved, regardless of
the challenges it encounters.
The Atlas type coincides with a military possessing the highest commit-
ment horizon in a counterinsurgency. Such an organization will be marked
by high military autonomy, medium tolerance for political experimentation,
and very high tolerance for military experimentation. As such, an Atlas
type military will have high decision-making autonomy, with a very strong
willingness to to search for doctrinal changes at the military level, as well
as a strong willingness to search for changes at the political level. Given the
very high commitment horizon, one or more of these changes may occur
slowly over time. Nevertheless, the political and military levels act in con-
cert, adapting to each other’s changes and working together toward com-
prehensive improvements over the long run.
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Note: Survival probability is the likelihood that the doctrinal equilibrium has not been
reached.
Figure 3.5: Long-term survival curves plotted by type
A very high commitment horizon with Atlas-type characteristics will
exhibit the highest overall effectiveness of all the counterinsurgency types.
Intuitively, this makes sense: when an organization is willing to search for
improvements and is committed to a long time horizon, it is more likely to
achieve a strong solution. This result also corresponds with March’s model,
which demonstrates that the best way for an organization to optimize over
the long run is to engage in high exploration before exploiting the discov-
eries (March, 1991).13 The tradeoff, of course, in my model is that it may
13See also the theory of simulated annealing, which is a useful optimization technique
for finding a global optimum when time considerations are less important.
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take longer to reach a better outcome: the organization must endure the po-
tentially difficult process of adapting to local conditions, searching for solu-
tions, and changing—possibly many times—as new and better approaches
are discovered. As depicted in Figure 3.5, the Atlas type (highest commit-
ment horizon, purple line) has the highest survival curve for much of the
early search process. Notably, however, as time continues the Atlas type’s
survival curve drops below the other types. This result indicates that the
duration of a conflict involving an Atlas type may sometimes be shorter
than a conflict involving the lower commitment types. Thus, contrary to
what one might expect, a military with a very high commitment horizon
may actually experience a shorter counterinsurgency duration than a mil-
itary with a lower commitment horizon. Therefore, commitment horizon
level and conflict duration are not necessarily equivalent.
3.5 Illustrative cases of counterinsurgency types
To illustrate the logic of the model and evaluate the typology of counterin-
surgent militaries I have developed, I next consider the historical record
from several modern counterinsurgencies. For each of these cases, I briefly
discuss which counterinsurgency type the military resembles and how well
the model’s predictions fit the case. While I will describe the relevant com-
ponents of each case, much has already been written about these cases, and
therefore I refer the reader to outside historical literature for additional de-
tails.
The typology of counterinsurgent militaries describes a set of organi-
zational equilibria that share similar features across commitment horizon
levels. Yet if states are rational actors, why would they want to adopt a
less effective strategy profile if they recognize that there are better solu-
tions possible? For example, why remain as a Goliath type profile, given
that it is strictly dominated by all others? First, it is important to empha-
size that my model implies that political-military systems optimize their
organizational features according to the commitment horizon, which then
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explains their overall effectiveness. Therefore, commitment horizons are
the primary driving force of all the other features. However, I argue that
commitment horizons vary by case, and therefore are not systematic fea-
tures of an organization.14 The organizational features adopted follow from
the commitment horizon, and these features (i.e., the strategy profile) will
tend to remain stable throughout the conflict—so long as it is not too costly
for the organization to change. Therefore, it is possible to change charac-
teristics and induce change if the benefits sufficiently outweigh the costs,
though only within the bounds of what the nearby commitment horizon
will allow.15 Nevertheless, in most of the cases I discuss below, the strategy
profiles tend to remain stable, and thus the costs of reaching a new equilib-
rium by adopting new organizational features may often be too high.
The cases I will evaluate are: the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan; the British
in Malaya and Iraq; and the French in Indochina and Algeria. I selected each
of these cases according to the method of concomitant variation, which is
based on the principle that the cause of changes in a variable across a set
of cases can be inferred by identifying other variables that also change in a
systematic way across the cases (George and Bennett, 2005). Thus, I have
identified a set of cases where there is variation in commitment horizons
(and corresponding organizational characteristics) that can be used to ex-
plain variation in counterinsurgency effectiveness. Within these cases, sev-
eral variables are held constant to isolate them as possible causes: namely,
the cases all involve Western democratic militaries, after World War II, fight-
ing counterinsurgencies outside their own borders.16
14To evaluate the qualitative features of commitment horizons empirically, I operational-
ize the parameter below by considering political and military leaders’ beliefs and expecta-
tions about the conflict, as well as exogenous features such as geographic distance.
15Thus, as I will explain below, the Political and Military Sisyphus types can transform
into each other, because they share overlapping commitment levels, and the only major or-
ganizational change is the relative emphasis on political versus military experimentation—
an arguably low-cost organizational change.
16The one minor exception is the French military in Algeria, because at the time the
French considered Algeria to be part of France—Algérie française—rather than a separate
colony. Nevertheless, Algeria was distinct from la Métropole in virtually every way except
for its sovereignty.
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Furthermore, the selected cases include the same state fighting separate
counterinsurgency conflicts against different opponents, and therefore I can
compare variation not only between armies, but also within armies across
different conflicts. This is important because it helps account for alternative
explanations of counterinsurgency effectiveness, including strategy selec-
tion and fixed military culture. As I will show, because of the variation in
outcomes within the same army across conflicts, fixed military culture is not
an effective explanation for counterinsurgency effectiveness. Additionally,
because the same strategy applied in separate conflicts has led to different
outcomes, strategy selection is also not an effective explanation.
Operationalizing commitment horizon requires carefully evaluating po-
litical and military leaders’ beliefs and expectations about the conflict in its
earliest stages, without consideration for the conflict’s total duration as un-
derstood ex post. To do so, I considered the following questions for each
case, summing up the responses (lower = −1, higher = +1) to determine
the overall commitment horizon. Table 3.3 provides a summary of each
case’s commitment horizon according to these scores:
1. Did the conflict begin because the counterinsurgents’ military or civil-
ian population was attacked?
Yes = higher commitment. No = lower commitment.
2. Do political and military leaders expect a short-duration conflict?
Yes = lower commitment. No = higher commitment.
3. Are there strong domestic constraints (selectorate opposition, domes-
tic crises, etc.) to the counterinsurgency campaign?
Yes = lower commitment. No = higher commitment.
4. Is there an emphasis on having an “exit strategy”?
Yes = lower commitment. No = higher commitment.
5. Is the conflict geographically distant from the counterinsurgents’ own
country?
Yes = lower commitment. No = higher commitment.
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Case Attacked? Expect short war? Domestic constraints? Exit strategy? Distant war? Score Commitment Horizon
U.S. in Iraq No (−) Yes (−) Yes (−) Yes (−) Yes (−) -5 Low
British in Iraq No (−) Yes (−) Yes (−) Yes (−) Yes (−) -5 Low
French in Indochina Yes (+) Yes (−) Yes (−) No (+) Yes (−) -1 Medium
U.S. in Afghanistan Yes (+) No (+) No (+) Yes (−) Yes (−) 1 Med. High/High
French in Algeria Yes (+) Yes (−) Yes (−) No (+) No (+) 1 Med. High/High
British in Malaya Yes (+) No (+) No (+) No (+) Yes (−) 3 Highest
Table 3.3: Operationalizing commitment horizon for each case
3.6 The Proteus (low commitment horizon)
3.6.1 U.S. in Iraq, 2003–2011
The U.S. military had a low commitment horizon from the very first stages
of the Iraq war: in November 2001, U.S. military officers who began plan-
ning for an invasion of Iraq assumed that the war would end after Saddam
Hussein was deposed (Barno and Bensahel, 2020). Moreover, domestic op-
position to the war was quite high even before it began, with public sup-
port for the war hovering between 52 and 59 percent (Smith and Lindsay,
2003). When the war began in March 2003, political and military leaders
alike thus expected that U.S. forces would swiftly overwhelm the Iraqi mil-
itary through “shock and awe,” the Iraqi people would install a friendly
democratic regime, and U.S. forces would exit the country soon thereafter.
Initially, events reinforced these expectations. In just three weeks, the U.S.
military managed to defeat Iraqi forces, conquer Baghdad, and overthrow
the Saddam Hussein regime. Soon after, however, an insurgency began to
emerge and quickly escalate, marked by improvised explosive devices, car
bombs, mortars, and suicide attacks against occupying forces and civilians
alike throughout the country. In 2003, Iraqi civilians suffered an estimated
7,300 fatalities; by 2006, that number would rise to 34,500 (O’Hanlon and
Livingston, 2011).
Thus, U.S. forces quickly found themselves in a highly complex environ-
ment requiring adaption to local conditions. Interdependencies between
doctrinal decisions that arose due to competing sectarian groups, Muslim
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cultural beliefs that were foreign to many U.S. troops, political definitions
(and the lack thereof) on lawful combatants, new insurgent tactics, and new
technologies of war all contributed to complexities that far exceeded what
the U.S. military had previously trained for. The insurgency that emerged
involved dozens of groups, including Ba’ath Party loyalists of the Saddam
regime, Sunni militias such as Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Shi’a militias such as
the Mahdi Army. The complexity of Shi’a-Sunni relations also helped create
a sectarian civil war that added to the conflict’s challenges.
A Protean type military will optimize for its low commitment horizon in
a counterinsurgency by adopting medium military autonomy, low tolerance
for political experimentation, and high tolerance for military experimenta-
tion. As a result, it will quickly adapt its doctrine, but will achieve moderate
total effectiveness. How well does the evidence from the U.S. efforts in Iraq
support these predictions?
The U.S. military has historically possessed high autonomy over its doc-
trine, given the expertise it brings to bear on the problem of fighting con-
ventional combat. Whether as AirLand Battle in the 1980s and 1990s or its
successor, network-centric warfare, the conventional doctrine emphasizes
large-scale, highly mobile operations that are designed to overwhelm an en-
emy’s command and control structure and thereby defeat opposing forces.
However, due to the inherently political nature of the conflict in Iraq, U.S.
political leaders retained greater control over some of the doctrinal deci-
sions. Consequently, after an initial period of high military autonomy, po-
litical leaders withdrew some decision-making control from the military,
thereby creating a set of political requirements that remained for the dura-
tion of the conflict. As a result, in accordance with the Protean type, we can
characterize the U.S. military as having medium autonomy over its doctri-
nal decisions in the Iraq war.
As conditions in Iraq deteriorated following the early conventional vic-
tory, therefore, the political interest in taking control of some doctrinal deci-
sions increased. For example, senior military and political leaders came to
recognize that the military’s existing approach, emphasizing stability opera-
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tions in Iraq, was proving insufficient. Within the first year of the war, there
was greater discussion among the leadership at the Pentagon that wag-
ing a counterinsurgency would require changing policies and approaches
(Ucko, 2009). Furthermore, a particularly high-profile decision was con-
trolled at the political level that would create lasting political damage to the
George W. Bush administration: namely, the authorization by the highest
levels of government that military units could engage in “enhanced inter-
rogation techniques”—euphemism for torture—which led to the inhumane
treatment of detainees and events such as the torturing of Iraqi prisoners at
Abu Ghraib prison (United States Senate, 2008).
Throughout the duration of the Iraq war, political experimentation was
fairly sparse, supporting the model’s expectation. Although Bush signed
the Detainee Treatment Act in 2005, which codified the humane treatment
of detainees and banned torture and waterboarding for the military, it was
not until Leon Panetta became Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
in 2009 that a similar ban was applied to CIA interrogators. Thus, some
torture was tolerated for several years, even after the fall-out from media
exposure about the treatment of Iraqi detainees. Separately, the Bush ad-
ministration chose to dissolve the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2004
in order to hastily jump start Iraqi self-rule and end the U.S. occupation,
though it ultimately did not have the desired effect. Similarly, both in 2005
and in 2010, the White House switched from favoring an Iraqi government
chosen by elections to a power-sharing deal. Yet the single most apparent
political change during the war was the “Surge,” President Bush’s decision
to send an additional 30,000 soldiers to reinforce the U.S. presence in Iraq.
Beyond this decision, high-level U.S. political leaders maintained a stable
set of nation-building requirements for the military in Iraq, which focused
on developing a self-determined democratic government and training se-
curity forces that could eventually maintain stability in the country without
U.S. support. Ultimately, despite the lack of major progress toward its pol-
icy goals, U.S. political leaders remained steady in their requirements until
U.S. troops were withdrawn from Iraq at the end of 2011.
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Tolerance for military experimentation, on the other hand, was far
higher. In the early stages of the insurgency, with troops isolated from the
Iraqi population on large bases, the U.S. military’s mission was to transi-
tion security to Iraqi control as soon as possible. U.S. forces would con-
duct counterinsurgency missions by patrolling outside of the base, driv-
ing around in heavily armored vehicles. Moreover, the most common
approach taken by U.S. troops was purely focused on heavy-handed “ki-
netic” operations—missions involving lethal force. Yet as conditions dete-
riorated, some began to recognize that new approaches were needed. Evi-
dence from numerous studies of the U.S. military in Iraq demonstrates that
it experienced substantial bottom-up adaptation throughout the organiza-
tion (Barno and Bensahel, 2020; Burton and Nagl, 2008; Kollars, 2015; Rus-
sell, 2010). As a result, for example, as early as 2003, then-Major General
David Petraeus led his unit in an unprecedented effort to provide public
goods to northern Iraqi cities, including restarting telephone service, paving
roads, and trading Iraqi oil with Turkey and Syria for electricity in the re-
gion (Boot, 2013). By 2005, some other commanders, such as then-Colonel
H.R. McMaster, led their units to enact tactics that further shifted the em-
phasis away from kinetic operations toward providing support to the local
population, treating detainees with respect, and establishing effective intel-
ligence about insurgents (Boot, 2013; Burton and Nagl, 2008). In December
2006, FM 3-24 (the Army’s counterinsurgency field manual, authored by
then-Lieutenant General Petraeus), was published, establishing the official
doctrine of population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) and reinforcing
many of the solutions McMaster’s and Petraeus’ units had identified and
implemented.
Beginning in 2007 (and coinciding with Petraeus’ command of all U.S.
forces in Iraq), the new doctrine was implemented in Iraq. U.S. troops
were no longer kept isolated in their bases; instead, they were placed into
smaller outposts throughout population centers. From there, they would
patrol the local area, living among Iraqi civilians and gaining their trust.
Rather than armored convoys, foot patrols became more common. The re-
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sults from these changes were significant, coinciding with a sharp drop in
overall violence within a few months (Boot, 2013).
Despite invading Iraq with no clear expectation of—or plan for—waging
a counterinsurgency, the U.S. military thus managed to adapt its doctrine,
transforming from a conventional to a counterinsurgent force, thereby im-
proving its overall effectiveness (Burton and Nagl, 2008). As a Protean
type facing a low commitment horizon, the U.S. military navigated the
rugged landscape of social, political, and technological complexity in Iraq
primarily through bottom-up military experimentation that discovered bet-
ter solutions to the challenges driven by local conditions. The Iraqi “Anbar
Awakening,” the 2006 publication of FM 3-24, the political experimenta-
tion with the surge in U.S. forces, and the implementation of population-
centric COIN, all converged around the peak of the insurgency and together
led to the subsequent decline in insurgent violence (Biddle, Friedman, and
Shapiro, 2012). By 2009, there were an estimated 3,000 civilian fatalities, fur-
ther declining to 1,600 fatalities in 2011 (O’Hanlon and Livingston, 2011).
Nevertheless, despite its improvements as an organization, U.S. military
effectiveness in Iraq was mostly short-lived. After U.S. forces were with-
drawn at the end of 2011, sectarian violence continued. A year later, tens of
thousands of Sunnis took to the streets to protest the predominantly Shi’a
government. Soon after, ISIS emerged as a formidable extremist group, sig-
nificantly threatening Iraqi security and stability. ISIS eventually waged an
organized offensive to capture Anbar province, and U.S.-trained Iraqi forces
collapsed in battle, leading to the fall of Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul in 2014
(Lehmann and Zhukov, 2019).
In short, the characteristics of the U.S. military in Iraq from 2003 to 2011
fit the predictions of a Protean-type military in a counterinsurgency. Its be-
lief in a quick victory led it to adopt a low commitment horizon, and its
organizational features corresponded to its type, as it adopted medium mil-
itary autonomy, low tolerance for political experimentation and high toler-
ance for military experimentation. Furthermore, the U.S. military adapted
quickly to local conditions, as it sought to quickly find a solution to an un-
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expected insurgency. Moreover, although it managed to improve upon its
initial effectiveness, its overall success was temporary, and thus it achieved
only moderate effectiveness in the long run. Therefore, the U.S. military’s
quick adaptability and overall effectiveness also matches a Protean type,
further bolstering support for the model’s predictions.
3.6.2 British in Iraq, 2003–2009
The British military in Iraq also fits the Protean type. Their commitment to
Iraq was closely tied to the U.S. military’s, and consequently their organi-
zational characteristics also closely mirrored those of the U.S. Therefore, be-
cause of the close similarities between the two militaries, I will only briefly
discuss the British case. The reason I include it, however, is because of a
key distinction in the British military’s beliefs: namely, that because of their
past success in other counterinsurgencies—including in Malaya (discussed
below), Kenya, and Northern Ireland—the British (and others) believed that
they had discovered the keys to maximize counterinsurgency effectiveness.
In particular, many have attributed the British military’s success to a com-
bination of a long-term, fixed military culture and the correct application of
a “hearts and minds” formula (Porch, 2013). Yet rather than serving as a
model for the U.S. and others to follow, the British would also demonstrate
only moderate effectiveness in Iraq.
As with the U.S. military, the British invaded Iraq in 2003 with similar
levels of public support and expecting a short conflict, and therefore also
had a low commitment horizon. For example, the British intended to re-
duce the number of troops used for an invasion by half within the first six
months of the war (Akam, 2018). Yet the situation began to quickly deterio-
rate in Basra, where the British military was responsible for operating. Like
the U.S., the British military had organized for a conventional conflict, and
was unprepared for what followed the initial invasion success. Without a
plan for conducting a counterinsurgency, they failed to implement effective
local solutions, leading to escalating insurgent violence and civil unrest. By
2006, at least one British general was openly remarking to journalists that
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the British should withdraw from Iraq (Dixon, 2009).
British military autonomy was somewhat less than that of the U.S. mil-
itary. British political control of its doctrinal decisions was driven by risk
aversion: political leaders required military approaches that would mini-
mize casualties, given the unpopularity of the war domestically. For ex-
ample, British political leaders mandated that British forces would not em-
bed training teams with Iraqis, despite the fact that British policy “had
pegged withdrawal to building up Iraqi security forces” (Akam, 2018, p.
227). Moreover, the decisions that British political leaders controlled did
not change during the war, and thus there was minimal tolerance for polit-
ical experimentation.
As with the U.S., however, the British military experienced high toler-
ance for military experimentation, especially as conditions in Iraq wors-
ened. For example, the training group that prepared soldiers for deploy-
ments shifted from teaching conventional tactics in 2003 to an “emphasis
on creativity, acceptance of ideas from the bottom up, and rapid response
to reactions in the field” by 2008 (Akam, 2018, p. 327). Yet the trajectory of
doctrinal experimentation and military effectiveness that the British experi-
enced was different than the U.S. military. The situation in Basra remained
relatively stable until 2005, when violence quickly escalated as the Mahdi
Army militia gained influence in the city. For the next two years, the sit-
uation showed no signs of improvement. Eventually, the British military
would experiment by negotiating with the Mahdi Army to help reduce vio-
lent attacks in the city. As part of this negotiation, the British military agreed
to withdraw troops from the city and provide “overwatch” from the Basra
airport (Mumford, 2011). The withdrawal from the city increased the mili-
tia presence in Basra, which then led to worsening conditions in the city.
Soon after, operations by Iraqi security forces, supported by the U.S. mil-
itary, would help clear the militia presence from parts of Basra (Ucko and
Egnell, 2013). The British, for their part, would instead focus primarily on
training Iraqi security forces until the political decision was made to with-
draw most British troops from Iraq by 2009.
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The British military achieved moderate counterinsurgency effectiveness
in Iraq—and arguably even poorer than the U.S. military. Together, these
two cases demonstrate that there is some variation in effectiveness even
within military types. Nevertheless, compared to the Goliath type, it is clear
that what the U.S. and British each achieved in Iraq can broadly be catego-
rized as moderate effectiveness, largely due to their short-term adaptability.
3.7 The Goliath (medium commitment horizon)
3.7.1 French in Indochina, 1946–1954
After World War II ended, the French military deployed 50,000 troops to
reacquire French Indochina, the French colonies comprising present-day
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Soon after, an insurgency against French
forces began, spearheaded by the Viet Minh, the Vietnamese national in-
dependence coalition led by Ho Chi Minh. Initially, French political and
military leaders characterized the conflict as a “mop-up of outlaw bandits”
(Fall, 1961). The combination of colonial claims and an incorrect belief in the
Viet Minh threat therefore meant that the French commitment horizon in the
conflict lacked any short-term urgency, as U.S. and British forces possessed
in Iraq in 2003. However, neither did the French have a long-term commit-
ment that signaled a willingness to invest the effort to finding a long-term
solution to the conflict. As historian Martin Windrow describes,
...for much of the war the French were hampered by disunity be-
tween the military and civilian authorities, and a lack of any real
continuity in strategic planning. Their home governments came
and went, none of them able to pursue a coherent policy either
for winning the war or for abandoning it, and in the face of soar-
ing costs each one was less committed than the last. Every cou-
ple of years a new commander-in-chief arrived and appointed
new regional commanders, each inheriting a disappointing sit-
uation from his predecessor, and each denied the scale of rein-
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forcements needed to achieve any real transformations in the
strategic balance. (Windrow, 2004, p. 128)
French military doctrine at the time asserted the superiority of the de-
fense, the origins of which can be traced back to the interwar period (Kier,
1997). Consequently, by late 1947, when Viet Minh insurgents had secured
control over large areas of the countryside, the French military began a
quest for a large set-piece battle (Fall, 1961). The French believed that if
they could fight the Viet Minh in open battle, they would overwhelm the
Viet Minh through firepower from defensive fortified positions. Through-
out the remainder of the war, this doctrine would not change. The French
thus built the De Lattre Line, a defensive line of over 900 concrete block-
houses, around the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam, where much of
the insurgent activity occurred.
As a Goliath type, the French military was characterized by low military
autonomy. Political leaders maintained that the French military mission
was to “protect grateful colonial subjects from looting, murder, and . . . the
threat of Communist slavery” (Windrow, 2004, p. 184). Yet despite this in-
sistence, French political leaders failed to provide any guidance to the mil-
itary on how to conduct the war (Ambler, 1966). However, the lack of po-
litical guidance does not necessarily imply high military autonomy. Rather,
French political leaders simply expected the French military to carry out
its mission without consideration for the unique aspects of unconventional
conflict, including the importance of winning over the civilian population
and understanding the interdependencies between political, strategic, and
tactical issues. Therefore, the military maintained its scattered positions
along the De Lattre Line, assigning over 80,000 troops to statically man the
De Lattre Line and wait from fortified positions for the Viet Minh to at-
tack. As a consequence, the French had few remaining troops to carry out
offensive operations against insurgent strongholds or develop an effective
intelligence network (Boot, 2013).
One reason that French political leaders remained so indecisive about
the conflict is that French domestic politics at the time were markedly un-
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stable. The French Fourth Republic, formed after World War II ended, was
faced with the difficult task of rebuilding the country socially and polit-
ically. With such pressing domestic concerns to address, the war in In-
dochina was viewed by French politicians as a distant conflict, and as such
was never carefully managed. Consequently, the tolerance for political ex-
perimentation in the conflict was essentially non-existent. Thus, both po-
litical and military decisions remained mutually stagnant, reinforcing the
existing doctrine and preventing any major adaptations in the way the war
was conducted.
During the conflict, the French military experienced a mixture of stag-
nant tactics and sporadic, inchoate doctrinal experimentation that was
never implemented across the organization. Overall, tolerance for military
experimentation was low. For example, aerial forces would engage in indis-
criminate bombing of villages with the intent to kill civilians, naval forces
would ineffectively spray enemy gun positions with automatic weapon
fire, and ground forces—lacking tactical surprise—would conduct limited
“mop-up operations” in villages that often would either be ambushed along
the route, or would not encounter any insurgents at all (Fall, 1961). Because
so many static troops were dedicated to the De Lattre Line, the French failed
to ever find an effective solution to the dilemma of choosing “between a
deep penetration for a short time or a shallow penetration for a long time”
(ibid., p. 73).
Often, military experimentation that did occur would happen at the
company or battalion level, as junior commanders came to recognize that
existing conventional tactics were ineffective against a flexible insurgency
(Kelly, 1965). Nevertheless, such experimentation remained isolated at
these lower levels, and was never aggregated into a broader strategy across
the military. However, two experimental programs were attempted with
higher-level approval, but they also ultimately failed to impact the existing
doctrine. The first program was the creation of 52 “commando” battalions
of the Vietnamese National Army, the Tieu-Doan Kinh-Quan (TDKQ). The
purpose of the TDKQs was to use Vietnamese units who already knew the
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terrain, culture, and people, so that they could win their hearts and minds
and seek out and defeat the insurgents militarily. While the idea seemed
promising, the Viet Minh recognized the potential threat that the TDKQs
posed and crushed them in their first military encounters. These initial de-
feats ruined the TDKQ reputation among the local population, thereby pre-
venting the program from building on any success, and eventually leading
to its demise (Fall, 1961).
The second experimental program was a French commando unit, the
Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), later retitled as the
Groupment Mixte d’Intervention (GMI). This unit was created based on the
experiences of French partisans fighting against the Germans during World
War II (Pottier, 2007). The early GCMA recruits in 1951 were noted for be-
ing trouble-makers and were “considered too individualistic by their unit
commanders who were glad to get rid of them that way” (Fall, 1961, p. 242).
Thus, in the midst of an organization that stifled most creativity and innova-
tion, a unit was create that was composed of like-minded individuals who
were far more innovative than their previous commanders could tolerate.
The GCMA/GMI would succeed where the rest of the French army failed:
members would infiltrate Viet Minh-controlled areas and live among the lo-
cals, recruiting partisans and leading groups up to a thousand strong. These
groups would then sabotage Viet Minh supply and communication lines
and create areas that were free of Viet Minh influence. By 1953, the program
had achieved enough success that recruits were among the elite members of
the French military, growing in size from 5,000 to 14,000 men. Nevertheless,
the program remained unpopular among conventionally minded comman-
ders who often lost airlift capability to the unit, as well as some of their best
soldiers (Windrow, 2004). Ultimately, French investment in the program
would prove to be too little and too late.
Although the GCMA/GMI achieved much success in a limited time,
they were the exception. The conventional French units were far less adept
at operating among the local Vietnamese population, lacking the requisite
cultural and linguistic skills to establish relationships with civilians. Seem-
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ingly minor cultural interactions from a Western perspective could have
major consequences: “a European’s most natural response to the delight-
ful village children was to hand out sweets, ruffle their hair, and perhaps
compliment their parents. Nobody had told the soldiers that to touch an
infant’s head was to damn it to lifelong bad luck, or that to praise its beauty
attracted the vengeance of envious spirits” (Windrow, 2004, p. 186). More-
over, because the French were mostly isolated from civilians except for brief
encounters in villages, trust between French and Vietnamese locals rarely
developed. Consequently, the Viet Minh steadily grew in strength and in-
fluence, so that by 1953 the French military estimated that they controlled
only 25 percent of Vietnam (Boot, 2013).
Thus the French situation deteriorated to the point that a decisive mil-
itary victory over the Viet Minh no longer appeared possible. Instead,
when the French prime minister appointed General Henri Navarre to the
Indochina command in 1953, Navarre’s charge was to break the stalemate
and find an “honorable solution” so that the French could negotiate a fa-
vorable peace agreement. Navarre therefore pivoted from a strategy that
focused on the overstretched De Lattre Line to consolidating forces into a
small number of “air-ground bases” placed in strategic locations. Notably,
however, the French defensive doctrine did not change. As Navarre later
testified, “We were absolutely convinced of our superiority in defensive for-
tified positions; this was considered in Indochina as dogma, and we were
absolutely persuaded that a fortified position could hold out easily at odds
of three to four against” (Windrow, 2004, p. 216).
In March 1954, the French would finally get their set-piece battle at a
heavily fortified air-ground base in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. How-
ever, the result was disastrous for the French: by that time, the Viet Minh
had built up strong conventional capabilities, and they besieged the French
fortress. After a two-month battle, the French positions were overrun, and
nearly 12,000 soldiers surrendered. It was a decisive defeat for the French
military, and the war ended soon after. The 1954 Geneva Accords, far from
being an honorable solution for the French, led to a complete withdrawal
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of French forces and partitioned Vietnam along the 17th parallel, setting the
stage for the subsequent U.S. war in Vietnam.
As this case illustrates, the French military in Indochina fits the predic-
tions of a Goliath-type military in a counterinsurgency. The French lacked
the urgency to find a quick solution to their doctrine’s ineptitude, but they
also lacked a long-term commitment, instead falling into the zone of a
medium commitment horizon where the model expects doctrinal stagna-
tion and poor effectiveness to occur. Indeed, this is what we observe from
the historical record. With low military autonomy and lacking any political
experimentation, the few higher-level military experiments that did occur
(such as the TDKQ and the GCMA/GMI) never amounted to any substan-
tial improvements in doctrine that could be adopted across the organiza-
tion. Overall, the French military never adapted to local conditions, and
consequently it achieved poor overall counterinsurgency effectiveness. In-
stead, the one-dimensional French military doctrine stagnated in Indochina,
drawing out a conflict that eventually led to a decisive French defeat.
3.8 The Political Sisyphus (medium-high commitment hori-
zon) and the Military Sisyphus (high commitment hori-
zon)
As previously described, the Political Sisyphus and the Military Sisyphus
types can be considered variants of each other. These two types have over-
lapping commitment horizons, broadly characterized as medium-high to
high. Both types also tend to have medium military autonomy. Thus, the
main distinction between the two types is in their tolerance for experimen-
tation. The Political Sisyphus has a high tolerance for political experimenta-
tion and a low tolerance for military experimentation, whereas the Military
Sisyphus is the opposite. The next two cases illustrate how one Sisyphean
type can transform into another in the same conflict, leading to a change in
the relative emphasis that is placed on political versus military experimen-
tation.
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3.8.1 French in Algeria, 1954–1962
Just four months after the ceasefire in Indochina, another war broke out in
Algeria that would embroil France in eight more years of counterinsurgency
operations. This time, however, the conflict was much closer to home. Ad-
ditionally, the French governed Algeria as an extension of France itself, and
therefore Algeria was more closely associated with France than its other
colonies. Moreover, about ten percent of the Algerian population consisted
of French and other European migrants and their descendants, and these
pieds noirs strongly supported French rule. Consequently, from the very be-
ginning of the conflict, France had a much higher commitment horizon in
Algeria than it did in Indochina. However, as in Indochina, there was no
sense of urgency at the beginning of the conflict (Kelly, 1965). Political and
military leaders alike initially failed to recognize the growing insurgency as
a powerful nationalist movement that could upend the status quo. There-
fore, there was little incentive to find quick solutions to the insurgency.
Phase I: The Military Sisyphus, 1954–1958 In the first half of the war, the
French military adopted characteristics that matched a Military Sisyphus
type. In Algeria, the higher commitment horizon led to a noticeable ex-
pansion in French military autonomy compared to Indochina. Political de-
cisions were limited to managing yearly budget appropriations and legis-
lation addressing conscription, which restricted the number of troops de-
ployed to Algeria in the conflict’s early period (Kelly, 1965). Other issues
controlled by political leaders involved colonial administration, but in this
area especially, there was little tolerance for experimenting with new poli-
cies. For example, after the insurgency emerged in 1954, the French premier
declared that Algeria would remain part of France, and that the government
would implement the 1947 Algerian Statute. This statute was originally de-
signed to create local reforms and increase Muslim Algerian participation
in the Algerian government, but French and Algerians alike had opposed it
in 1947; thus in 1954, Algerian nationalists considered it a particularly weak
concession (Heggoy, 1972). Tepid French politicians, tied up by their own
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domestic challenges, therefore granted moderately high military autonomy
but had low tolerance for political experimentation in the Algerian conflict.
Early in the conflict, the Front de libération nationale (FLN), the nationalist
Algerian organization conducting the insurgency, was unconsolidated and
lacked the level of organization the Viet Minh possessed in Indochina. Nev-
ertheless, the French military was initially unprepared for an insurgency,
as the first groups of soldiers deployed to Algeria were still trained in con-
ventional approaches. Moreover, military commanders, like their civilian
leaders, believed that a police action would suffice to restore order. Early
operations focused on establishing fortified locations and conducting mop-
up operations, to little effect (Heggoy, 1972). However, by 1955, as more
soldiers returned from Indochina, their experiences informed new perspec-
tives about how to fight a counterinsurgency conflict (Paret, 1964). Thus, af-
ter an initial period of stagnation, the French military then began adapting
its practices toward a more comprehensive counterinsurgency focus. How-
ever, often the French thought the lessons they learned were perfectly trans-
ferable to the Algerian theater, and so, for example, would refer to the FLN
as “les Viets,” and believed that the FLN and Viet Minh efforts were both
part of a wider Communist effort to establish global domination (Horne,
1977). Therefore, because the early practices applied were not implemented
with concern for the local Algerian context, many of the initial efforts did
not lead to successful adaptations right away.
Gradual changes made by the French military, however, led to further
improvements. These adaptations developed over time, as soldiers dis-
covered new lessons and began to piece together the complex interdepen-
dencies that existed in the conflict. A French military school established
in Arzew, which was created to provide a 12-day class to deploying offi-
cers, illustrates how the military learned to understand the landscape of
the Algerian context. Initially, the school emphasized operational practices
against insurgents, but the curriculum evolved over the next several years
to incorporate Mao’s texts on revolutionary warfare, and then eventually to
broader non-military issues such as cultural dimensions of Algerian society
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and Islam (Heggoy, 1972).
Other efforts led to additional doctrinal innovations as well. For exam-
ple, in 1955 the French created the Section Administrative Spèciale (SAS), a
civil-military program conducted by specially trained soldiers to provide
hearts-and-minds style support to Algerian villagers (Kelly, 1965). In ru-
ral Algeria, small groups of insurgents would periodically ambush French
patrols and terrorize local villages indiscriminately into providing support.
Over 400 SAS detachments were initially created to counter these efforts,
and as time went on they achieved some success at winning the support of
the rural population (Horne, 1977). Another approach the French military
undertook involved relocating thousands of Algerians from rural villages to
regroupment camps—barracks-style camps built to better control and pro-
tect the population from the insurgents. From 1957 to 1961, over two million
civilians would be relocated to these camps (Kelly, 1965).
The most visible event during the first half of the war occurred in Algiers
in 1957. Insurgent efforts increased in Algiers through 1956, as the FLN and
French engaged in tit-for-tat actions—the French arresting and executing
FLN members, the FLN conducting terrorist attacks against local civilians,
usually those of European origin—that further enraged each side. By Jan-
uary 1957 the French determined that they needed to reestablish control in
Algiers, especially over the Casbah quarter of Algiers, where the FLN were
holed up. General Jacques Massu’s 10th Parachute Division was granted
full police powers and responsibility for Algiers, and began systematically
imposing control over the city in an effort to dismantle the FLN organiza-
tion within it. These efforts included developing a system of quadrillage,
which “divided the city up into sectors, sub-sectors, blocks and buildings,
each bearing a number or letter” (Horne, 1977, p. 198). Within each block,
“loyal” Muslim citizens were given responsibility for reporting suspicious
activity to the French military. Algerians were required to show identifi-
cation papers at checkpoints, and soldiers regularly patrolled the city day
and night (Heggoy, 1972). Furthermore, the French recruited double agents
to infiltrate the FLN, which sowed doubt within the FLN and led to self-
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destructive purges within the organization (Boot, 2013).
Most infamously, however, Massu’s soldiers engaged in systematic tor-
ture of captured Algerians in an expedient effort to root out further terrorist
activity. These efforts were sanctioned by Massu and other French lead-
ers based on the belief that they were necessary to prevent further violence
(Horne, 1977). Indeed, one of the masterminds of French counterinsurgency
doctrine at the time, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Trinquier, explicitly advo-
cated the use of torture for counterinsurgency. Trinquier, who served as
a member of the GCMA/GMI in Indochina and also in the Battle of Al-
giers, would publish Modern Warfare in 1961, which helped inform French
thinking about counterinsurgency in the Algerian War and influenced sub-
sequent counterinsurgency theories. In his book, Trinquier emphasizes im-
portant points about counterinsurgency, such as the need for a military to
adapt to new conditions, but he also devotes an entire section to explain-
ing and justifying the use of torture against prisoners during interrogation
(Trinquier, 1961).
Ultimately, Massu and his men would manage to eradicate most FLN
activity in Algiers. By October 1957, the Battle of Algiers had ended and the
FLN was defeated in the city, an “undisputed success” for the French mili-
tary by most accounts (Kelly, 1965). Outside of Algiers, the French military
also achieved greater effectiveness. Oran Province, for example, became
“almost impermeable to rebel terrorism” (Kelly, 1965, p. 177). Other parts
of the country, however, including the more mountainous region of Kabylia,
were still controlled by the FLN, and the insurgents also found safe havens
in bordering Tunisia. Equally important, moreover, was the fact that the
“pacification” efforts were imposed by the French military without the con-
sent of the Algerian people. Thus in Algiers, for example, a sense of grow-
ing solidarity among Algerians arose as they experienced the months-long
repressive operations of Massu’s men (Heggoy, 1972). The French military’s
success would soon prove to be limited to the short term.
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Phase II: The Political Sisyphus, 1958–1962 Coinciding with the first years
of the Algerian War was a slowly unfolding French political crisis that had
continued from the Indochina years, as the French Fourth Republic’s do-
mestic legitimacy faltered. As a result, in the first four years of the conflict,
a civil-military relations imbalance existed that heavily favored the mili-
tary. The military’s failure in Indochina, moreover, had created resentment
among soldiers toward their political leaders and the French civilian pop-
ulation (Windrow, 2004). Consequently, some military leaders, along with
sympathetic colonial ministers, began to perceive a lack of political support
for their efforts, and feared that the Indochina failure would be repeated in
Algeria. Ultimately, political crisis would strike France in May 1958, when
a group of military leaders drafted plans for a coup d’état in order to in-
stall Charles de Gaulle in power, whom they believed would support the
military in Algeria. Under the threat of a coup, the French Parliament ap-
proved de Gaulle as its new leader, and he commissioned a new constitution
for France to replace its weak political institutions, thereby establishing the
Fifth Republic.
After returning to power, however, de Gaulle quickly determined that
“permanently pacifying Algeria against the wishes of most of its populace
would be too costly to contemplate” (Boot, 2013, p. 374). After the mil-
itary’s use of torture in Algiers became public, moreover, French public
opinion soured toward the military’s efforts in Algeria. Furthermore, de
Gaulle recognized the military’s excessive political power, and commenced
a major purge of military leaders from leadership roles in Algeria in order
to remove the activist influences from the military. Within ten months, ap-
proximately 1,500 officers in Algeria were transferred or had retired (Horne,
1977). Thus, 1958 marked a distinct phase transition for the military with
a change from a Military to a Political Sisyphus type. By that time, more-
over, the military had succeeding in reducing insurgent activity throughout
Algeria, and de Gaulle began searching for a political solution to the war.
Military experimentation declined as the existing efforts continued, and po-
litical experimentation increased.
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De Gaulle’s words and actions indicate a high level of experimenting
with different approaches to the conflict. One French politician even re-
ferred to de Gaulle in 1960 as “this prince of ambiguity” (Horne, 1977, p.
373). For example, in October 1958, de Gaulle offered the Algerians a paix
de braves—a peace deal designed to save face for the insurgents (Bernstein,
1993). After that failed to end the conflict, he broadcasted a radio address
the following year in which he offered the Algerian people three options
for self-determination: remain integrated as part of France, fully secede, or
establish an independent association with France (Horne, 1977). Overall
between 1957 and March 1960, he publicly changed his position on Algeria
multiple times, as historian Alistair Horne documents:
1957: “Of course independence will come, but they are too
stupid there to know it.”
June 1958: “Je vous ai compris!”
June 1958: “Vive l’Algérie française!”
June 1958: “L’Afrique est foutue, et l’Algérie avec!”
October 1958: Algerian independence? “In 25 years, Delou-
vrier.”
March 1959: “The French army will never quit this country; and
I, General de Gaulle, will never deal with those people from
Cairo and Tunis.”
January 1959: “Algeria has chosen peace.”
April 1959: “I am the only person capable of bringing a solution
to Algeria.”
May 1959: “a new Algeria bound forever to France . . . ”
August 1959: “Peace is a necessity. This absurd war.”
September 1959: “I deem it necessary that recourse to self-
determination be here and now proclaimed.”
January 1960: “une solution qui soit française”
January 1960: “How can you listen to the liars and the conspir-
ators who tell you that in granting free choice to the Algerians,
France and de Gaulle want to abandon you, to pull out of Alge-
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ria and hand it over to the rebellion?”
March 1960: “Independence . . . a folly, a monstrosity . . . France
must not leave. She has the right to be in Algeria. She will re-
main there . . . ” (Horne, 1977, p. 378)
As these quotes illustrates, de Gaulle switched between Algerian in-
dependence, French control of Algeria, and a variety of options blending
these positions at various times during the latter part of the conflict. While
these examples are public statements, they may not necessarily be honest
representations of de Gaulle’s position, but instead may have been tacti-
cal statements made to advance his position at different times. However, if
de Gaulle did have some stable position throughout the conflict, he never
made it clear enough to anyone that a doctrinal consensus could develop
around it. Accounts from various public officials are consistent in por-
traying de Gaulle as either ambiguous in his position, or else as someone
who advanced different positions to different people, possibly as a trial-
and-error strategy. For example, General Massu believed that de Gaulle
had always intended to withdraw; Pierre Mendès-France, one of the pri-
mary politicians opposed to de Gaulle, believed that de Gaulle had always
preferred Algérie française; Army General Andrés Beaufre believed that de
Gaulle had created a “formula” for a resolution to the conflict but discov-
ered that it did not work; Minister for Algerian Affairs Louis Joxe believed
de Gaulle had no clear position; and Bernard Tricot, one of de Gaulle’s ad-
visers, thought that de Gaulle never preferred integration, but also thought
that he spent time searching for an optimal position (Johnson, 2000; Horne,
1977, p. 377). Thus, the totality of the historical record suggests that de
Gaulle’s behavior matches the political decision-maker in the agent-based
model: he experimented with a new position, evaluated its payoff, and
changed when he found what appeared to be a better position, even if it
meant switching back to a previous option. As frustratingly ambiguous as
it was politically for many at the time, de Gaulle’s process can be explained
as a search over a rugged landscape.
The French military, on the other hand, proceeded without any signifi-
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cant changes to its operations before de Gaulle’s rise to power. It continued
relocating rural villagers to the regroupment camps and built a long line
of fortifications along the Tunisian border to limit insurgent cross-border
movements. Additionally, the SAS program became more centralized un-
der the French army as it institutionalized what it had learned, further re-
flecting how the French military had little tolerance for experimenting with
new approaches after 1958, instead choosing to consolidate its existing ap-
proaches (Heggoy, 1972).
Overall, the French military achieved high counterinsurgency effective-
ness in Algeria, but only in the limited military sense that the FLN strug-
gled to operate within the country by 1958. Nevertheless, this success was
limited to the short term, as effective solutions to the political and social el-
ements of the conflict were never found. Moreover, the overall effectiveness
of many French decisions are particularly questionable in hindsight, as they
often encouraged an Algerian identity separate from France, rather than
keeping it integrated. The regroupment camps tended to be overcrowded,
which spread diseases and led to malnutrition among its inhabitants—
Algerians were observed eating grass in the field, and some infants died
from the cold. The regroupment policy also had the unintentional effect of
disrupting the Algerian tribal structures and encouraging a shared sense of
solidarity and hence national identity among the inhabitants (Horne, 1977).
SAS officers tended to focus on turning Algerians into French collaborators,
showing less concern for Algerian values and instead emphasizing French
principles (Paret, 1964). The systematic use of torture in the Battle of Al-
giers may have helped the French military root out FLN insurgents in the
city, but it created strong resentment among Algerians toward the French,
increasing the nationalists’ resolve. Furthermore, as Horne points out, if the
French had lost the Battle of Algiers, they may have agreed to a peace settle-
ment with the FLN and foregone the additional costs of four more years of
conflict (Horne, 1977). Thus, the use of torture backfired against the French
in multiple ways.
In the end, France lacked the commitment to Algeria that would have
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been needed to achieve greater effectiveness in the long run. Consequently,
the French military held a tight grip on the Algerian population while
waiting for an elusive political solution to appear—an approach that the
French people (of the metropole) determined to be unsustainable indefi-
nitely. The FLN found sanctuaries in Morocco and Tunisia and maintained a
respectable and well-equipped army, while its leaders internationalized the
conflict politically, helping to build international opinion against the French
(Heggoy, 1972). De Gaulle eventually shifted toward disengagement from
the conflict, but not before another civil-military relations crisis occurred:
a cabal of French generals organized for a putsch in 1961, and after that
failed, several broke away from the army and organized the Organisation
Armée Secrète, which committed its own terrorist campaign in an attempt to
keep the French in Algeria. Eventually, de Gaulle agreed to a cease-fire with
the FLN, which was put into effect in March 1962. The final agreement was
a total French capitulation, as it abandoned all of its prior bargaining posi-
tions, including French control over parts of Algeria, dual nationality for the
pied noirs, and Algerian association with France. Algeria won its indepen-
dence from France, the FLN took revenge on Algerians who had supported
the French, and over one million European civilians fled to France within
one year.
The case of the French military in Algeria illustrates how a Sisyphean
type can achieve doctrinal adaptations that increase effectiveness, but over-
all its achievements tend to fall short of its goals. The French were highly
committed to Algeria, but due to various constraints, they lacked the
long-term commitment to maintaining Algérie française indefinitely. Con-
sequently, the French adapted to the Algerian conflict—first militarily, and
then politically—and found some success, but only for a while. Ultimately,
without finding better solutions to the complex Algerian situation, the
French chosen to abandon their efforts rather than endure without better
effectiveness.
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3.8.2 U.S. in Afghanistan, 2001–2021
The U.S. war in Afghanistan has followed a similar trajectory as the French
counterinsurgency in Algeria, and thus also matches a Sisyphean type that
transitioned from a Military to a Political Sisyphus over time. Given the
circumstances of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. has possessed a
much higher commitment to the conflict than it ever had in Iraq: Osama bin
Laden and his al Qaeda operatives had found political refuge with the Tal-
iban regime in Afghanistan, which allowed them to plan and conduct the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Therefore, U.S. political and military
leaders were highly committed to rooting out al Qaeda, replacing the Tal-
iban regime, and ensuring that another major terrorist attack could never be
planned inside Afghanistan again. Nevertheless, the U.S. approach always
included a focus on an “exit strategy,” i.e., how to make the country safe
so that the U.S. could withdraw its forces as soon as possible. Yet finding
a solution to this problem was never fully resolved: namely, how to ensure
Afghanistan did not become a terrorist safe haven again without stationing
U.S. combat forces in the country indefinitely.
Because the U.S. military’s organizational characteristics in Afghanistan
match those discussed in the Iraq case (i.e., as the Protean type), I will only
briefly discuss the U.S. in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the dual cases of the
U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan fit precisely with the typology’s expectations:
i.e., that a Protean and a Military Sisyphus type both have matching levels
of military autonomy and tolerances for political and military experimen-
tation, and only differ in their commitment levels. Moreover, their overall
doctrinal effectiveness levels will be approximately equal, as they both tend
to achieve moderate effectiveness.
In Afghanistan, the U.S. remained a Military Sisyphus type from the
2001 invasion until approximately 2011. The transition to a Political Sisy-
phus is harder to pinpoint than the French case in Algeria, as the U.S.
transition did not coincide with a dramatic change in political institutions.
Nevertheless, a defining event that approximates the point at which a tran-
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sition occurred is the U.S. military’s mission to kill Osama bin Laden in
May 2011. Before the bin Laden mission, military decision-making dictated
most of the doctrinal approaches to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The
Afghan insurgency was relatively quiet until 2006, when violence began
to spike. U.S. efforts to counter the insurgency then focused primarily on
military operations to disrupt and dismantle insurgent groups, which con-
tinued through 2009. That year, President Barack Obama decided on an
Afghanistan “surge,” sending an additional 70,000 U.S. forces to augment
the 30,000 already deployed to the country (Peters and Plagakis, 2021). Yet
even during this period, there was discussion of a withdrawal timetable.
Thus, as with the U.S. in Iraq, even the major political change represented
by the Afghan surge occurred against the backdrop of consistent motiva-
tions to bring troops home. In 2010, for example, a NATO summit in Lisbon
established a plan to hand over full responsibility for Afghan security start-
ing in July 2011, when NATO troops would begin withdrawing.
From 2009 to 2011, U.S. military operations continued at an even higher
level than before the “surge,” and the military, along with its coalition part-
ners, achieved considerable success at reducing insurgent attacks. Through-
out the first ten years of the war, the U.S. military demonstrated consider-
able experimentation with new approaches as it adapted to the Afghanistan
conflict, attempting various efforts focusing on large-scale operations,
smaller-scale provincial teams, “clear, hold, and build” approaches, and sta-
tioning troops at small outposts throughout the country (see, for example,
Barno and Bensahel (2020), Farrell, Osinga, and Russell (2013), and Long
(2016) for detailed descriptions). With the eventual success of the U.S. mil-
itary’s counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, capped by the bin Laden
mission—which provided a decisive military accomplishment against the
world’s top terrorist leader—there emerged a natural transition point to fo-
cus more on political rather than military solutions. Thus, one month after
bin Laden was killed, Obama announced plans to reduce U.S. troop levels
to pre-surge numbers by the summer of 2012.
By 2011, political leaders therefore took over most of the U.S. experi-
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mentation efforts, attempting different approaches to find improvements
for how to manage and support Afghanistan’s fledgling government and
security forces. There were, however, some political experiments before
2011. For example, in March 2009, Obama declared a new strategy for
the conflict by connecting stability in neighboring Pakistan to success in
Afghanistan. Then in November 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
tied all subsequent civilian aid to Afghanistan to improvements in Afghan
President Hamid Karzai’s efforts to fight corruption in his administration
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). Yet after 2011, political experiments
predominated, as what some characterized as “mission creep” expanded.
Yet after the first decade of war, “misguided assumptions” and a lack of
understanding about the country, its culture, and its political complexity
meant that the search for further improvements would take years (Whit-
lock, 2019b). For example, after a period in the first decade of the war
in which U.S. efforts aimed at centralizing Afghan authority, a shift was
made to pursue decentralization to the provinces. Additionally, in 2014, the
U.S. supported an Afghan power-sharing agreement between fierce polit-
ical rivals Abdullah Abudullah and Ashraf Ghani after disputed election
results. Overall, the U.S. has spent more money in Afghanistan on vari-
ous nation-building projects than it spent on the Marshall Plan, adjusted
for inflation. With these projects, political leaders have periodically shifted
their emphasis between goals for Afghanistan between Western democratic
governance, training competent security forces, developing free-market lib-
eralism, and support for women’s rights (Whitlock, 2019a). Negotiations
with the Taliban since 2018 to end the insurgency led to minor gains over
multiple rounds of meetings, but mostly stalled. In February 2020, the U.S.
signed a precarious deal with the Taliban to end the war within 14 months.
Yet even following the deal, uncertainty remained as to whether the agree-
ment would survive.
In April 2021, President Joseph Biden announced that the U.S. would
withdraw all remaining forces from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021,
even without certainty about Afghanistan’s long-term stability and secu-
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rity. At that point, the Taliban controlled at least 15 percent of the country’s
territory and still conducted attacks against Afghan targets while period-
ically negotiating with U.S. diplomats (Roggio and Gutowski, 2021). At
least as of 2018, two thirds of Afghanistan’s budget was still funded by in-
ternational aid (Ruttig and Bjelica, 2018). Chronic corruption was rampant
within the Afghan government. Overall, the U.S. achieved moderate coun-
terinsurgency effectiveness in Afghanistan, first militarily and then politi-
cally. As the French decided in Algeria, the U.S. determined that endur-
ing in Afghanistan without seeing further improvements was not worth the
costs. It remains to be seen how Afghanistan manages its affairs after U.S.
troops finally withdraw, yet the conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan
government appears likely to continue (Cohen, 2021).
3.9 The Atlas (highest commitment horizon)
3.9.1 British in Malaya, 1948–1960
British Malaya was a loose affiliation of sultanates on the Malay Peninsula
that had been under British control since the late 18th century. In Septem-
ber 1945, after the defeat of Japanese forces in World War II, British troops
arrived to reoccupy the region. To simplify administration of the territory,
the British decided to form the Malayan Union in 1946. However, the union
was heavily opposed by ethnic Malay citizens, who resisted the British plan
to grant suffrage and equal rights to Chinese and Indian minorities in the re-
gion, as well as by the traditional rulers, whose authority was subordinated
by the British governor. Seizing on the simmering unrest, the Malayan
Communist Party, over 90 percent of which was comprised of Chinese mi-
norities, began an insurgency on the peninsula in 1948 (Hack, 2009).
Of all the counterinsurgencies evaluated thus far, the British in Malaya
can be characterized as having possessed the highest commitment horizon.
Beginning in 1948, the British colonial administration reorganized the states
as the Federation of Malaya, which reinstated the rulers’ previous positions
as heads of state. From at least 1948, the British had intended that the
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Malayan federation would be part of the British Empire’s goal of decolo-
nization by establishing the Commonwealth of Nations, the modern form
of which was formally declared at a meeting in London in 1949. Therefore,
the British had a very high commitment horizon for the emerging coun-
terinsurgency campaign, as they expected that the region’s political and
economic association with the United Kingdom would continue indefinitely
into the future. Thus, even though Britain was committed to Malaya’s in-
dependence, it did so because British political leaders recognized that a de-
colonization strategy was in Britain’s long-term interest, and therefore they
sought to cultivate a long-term political and economic relationship with an
independent Malaya that would be incorporated into the British Common-
wealth.
Furthermore, the challenge for the British in Malaya was of a somewhat
different order than the other cases previously considered. In Malaya, be-
cause the insurgents were primarily ethnic minorities, they lacked signif-
icant support from the civilian population throughout the conflict. More-
over, insurgent forces numbered around 8,000 at their peak—far fewer than
the other cases. There is no reason to believe these factors alone deter-
mined British success from the start. Nevertheless, they likely contributed
to British beliefs that they could more easily succeed in a counterinsurgency
campaign, and therefore may have helped contribute to a very high com-
mitment horizon.
Despite having a very high commitment level, for the first three years of
the conflict, the British military lacked significant political investment and
struggled to adapt. Initially, the British troops were sent to protect local
tin mines and rubber plantations, which were used by the British colonials
for resource extraction and served as targets for the insurgents. As with
other militaries of different types, the British experienced the same chal-
lenges of transforming from a conventionally-minded military engaged in
large-scale operations to one that was more flexible, responsive to local con-
ditions, and that accounted for the various complex interdependencies be-
tween political, social, and operational demands. There were some lower-
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level tactical innovations that occurred, such as the creation of small-scale
“Ferret Force” groups that emphasized “native trackers, small patrols, and
the inclusion of interpreters and local natives in army operations” (Nagl,
2002, p. 69). For the most part, there was little progress to show for these
efforts. Nevertheless, both at the military’s strategic level, such as with the
establishment of the 1950 Briggs Plan—which institutionalized resettlement
villages—and at the political level, British leaders recognized that “we can-
not expect any sudden or overnight transformation in the situation. The
only possible thing to do is to take one state at a time and get it and keep
it permanently dominated” (Nagl, 2002, p. 72). Thus there was no urgency
to find a quick solution, but there was emphasis on making incremental
improvements and achieving progress over time.
Notably, British leaders advocated no increase in British troop levels
even when they faced a stalemate situation by 1951, believing that the so-
lution lay in better training local police officers. Moreover, they recognized
the need for effective government institutions early on, and by early 1952,
the British government had declared that “the policy of Her Majesty’s Gov-
ernment in Great Britain is that Malaya should in due course become a fully
self-governing nation” (Nagl, 2002, p. 88). Coinciding with this declara-
tion, Prime Minister Winston Churchill appointed General Sir Gerald Tem-
pler as British High Commissioner for Malaya, granting him extensive civil
and military autonomy to defeat the insurgency. Therefore, as of 1952, the
British military possessed high autonomy in waging the counterinsurgency,
matching an Atlas type.
Furthermore, tolerance for political experimentation was moderate. As
previously noted, British political leaders sought arrangements with the
local Malayan leaders that would satisfy all parties—hence the shift from
the unpopular Malayan Union to the more widely accepted Federation of
Malaya. These political efforts were then integrated into the military’s ef-
forts as a primary goal. For example, a March 1953 Colonial Office Memo-
randum notes, “We all aim at helping the colonial territories to attain self-
government within the British commonwealth. To that end we are seeking
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as rapidly as possible to build up in each territory the institutions which its
circumstances require” (Nagl, 2002, p. 101). This policy matched Malayan
demands for self-government and eventual independence (Clutterbuck,
1966). Once Templer was installed as High Commissioner for Malaya, he
emphasized both a willingness and an urgency to make changes politically
across the different levels of government, starting with the rural and mu-
nicipal levels. Consequently, municipal elections helped create alliances
and coalitions among different political parties, which had the dual effect of
meeting British requirements for the region and helping to create a sense of
national identity among the multiethnic Malayan population (Nagl, 2002).
Tolerance for military experimentation in the British military was very
high, especially after Templer arrived. For example, in 1952, Templer de-
vised the creation of a doctrinal document titled The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist
Operations in Malaya, which he conceived of as a living document that
would be open to “criticisms and improvements” for revised versions. Sub-
sequent editions with updated material were published in 1954 and again
in 1958 (Nagl, 2002). As part of these efforts, the British tried different ap-
proaches to isolating the insurgents in addition to the resettlement camps,
including food denial programs that attempted to starve out the insur-
gency. One innovation that found particular success was a program that
allowed insurgents to earn a bounty for surrendering. Those who surren-
dered would often later help lead patrols on raids against insurgent base
camps, earning additional rewards and assisting the British in further dis-
rupting the insurgents in the process (Nagl, 2002). In order to persuade in-
surgents to surrender, the Psychological Warfare (“Psywar”) section of the
British Information Services had to experiment with different approaches.
One British officer remarked that “Psywar policy evolved largely as the re-
sult of trial and error,” and various programs and platforms were used, in-
cluding leaflets, films, press, and loudspeakers on jeeps and aircraft (Nagl,
2002, p. 93). In summary, as John Nagl notes: “The British army demon-
strated a remarkable openness to learning during the years from 1952 to
1957. Bottom-up input was welcomed, from tactical innovations . . . through
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operational ones . . . District advisers, British army privates, and Surren-
dered Enemy Personnel were asked for ideas on better ways to accomplish
the objectives of the organization” (Nagl, 2002, p. 105).
By 1955, insurgent leaders began making overtures for peace talks. In-
surgency participation had dwindled from 8,000 people at its 1951 peak to
3,000 by the end of 1955; attacks had declined from a peak of 500 per month
to 65 a month; and civilian casualties had dropped from 80 to 12 per month
(Short, 1975). Furthermore, by 1955, a Malayan political coalition had con-
solidated gains in the legislature, and Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman
took over direction of the war. By 1956, most of eastern Malaya was in
government control, and a date for Malayan independence and a draft con-
stitution was established (Clutterbuck, 1966). The British government then
granted independence to Malaya on August 31, 1957, thus removing the in-
surgents’ primary motivating purpose of national self-determination, and
the insurgency collapsed for all but the most committed members. It then
continued in small concentrated areas until July 1960, when it was declared
officially over.17 In the end, not only did Malaya achieve independence,
but it also produced political reconciliation between the Malay and Chinese
ethnic communities (Ucko, 2010).
As an Atlas type, the British in Malaya exhibited a very high commit-
ment horizon, and they adopted characteristics that allowed them to adapt
and improve their effectiveness: high military autonomy, medium political
experimentation, and very high military experimentation. They focused on
implementing changes and making improvements, but they were not urg-
ing quick solutions in order to shore up effectiveness. Instead, they recog-
nized the importance of patience, integrating political and military efforts,
and persistent pressure on the insurgents. Consequently, despite having a
very high commitment horizon, the British managed to achieve higher ef-
fectiveness in a lower-duration conflict than less committed types, which
matches the model’s predictions.
17However, a small-scale insurgency would continue along the Malaysian-Thai border
until 1989 (Hack, 2009).
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3.10 Commitment Horizon Optimization or Inefficient Opti-
mization?
The implication of my model is that the commitment horizon drives
military performance. I assume that all political-military systems opti-
mize their organizational features according to the commitment horizon,
which explains their overall effectiveness. An alternative explanation for
(in)effectiveness is that the organization did not optimize its features given
its commitment horizon. To consider whether militaries may sometimes
simply be inefficient, thus leading to lower military effectiveness, I evalu-
ated the organizational opportunity cost at each commitment horizon—i.e.,
which features the organization forgoes in an optimal arrangement—and
consider what these inefficient features suggest about overall effectiveness.
Commitment Horizon (δ) Mil. Autonomy Pol. Experim. Tolerance Mil. Experim. Tolerance Avg. Fitness
0.01 – 0.26 Low 0.26 – 0.45 Med 0.0007 – 0.01 Low 0.31 – 1 Med/High 0.73
0.27 – 0.56 Medium 0.30 – 0.57 Med 0.00 – 0.18 Low/Med 0.42 – 1 Med/High 0.75
0.60 – 0.66 Medium High 0.39 – 0.49 Med 0.00 – 0.01 Low 0.66 – 0.97 High 0.79
0.58 – 0.90 High 0.59 – 0.89 High 0.04 – 0.66 Low 0.70 – 0.95 High 0.80
0.57 – 0.99 Highest 0.55 – 0.80 High 0.18 – 0.62 Medium 0.67 – 0.99 High 0.80
Table 3.4: Organizational opportunity costs (next-best characteristics for
less-than-optimal organizations)
Table 3.4 lists the organizational characteristics for each commitment
horizon type if it chose the next-best arrangement to an optimal one. Two
items are noteworthy in this table. First, there is very little variation in each
of the organizational features. This implies that if organizations are not ac-
tually optimizing by their commitment horizon, then we should see very lit-
tle variation in their organizational features regardless of their commitment
horizon—at most, according to Table 3.4, a moderate increase in military
autonomy and military experimentation only at high commitment levels,
coinciding with potentially greater political experimentation. However, as
the illustrative cases demonstrate, the historical record provides evidence
of substantial variation in military autonomy and the tolerance for political
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and military experimentation. This variation cannot be explained by orga-
nizational inefficiency.
Second, the average total fitness is increasing in commitment horizon
for suboptimal organizations, rather than U-shaped. This implies that we
should see a linear increase in overall effectiveness as commitment horizon
increases. Again, however, the illustrative cases demonstrate that this is
not what we observe empirically. For example, we would expect that the
French had greater effectiveness in Indochina than the U.S. did in Iraq (or
likewise that the U.S. had greater effectiveness in Vietnam than it did in
Iraq). Clearly, however, this is not correct.
Therefore, given the variation in organizational characteristics that we
observe across cases, as well as the U-shaped pattern in effectiveness across
commitment horizon levels, we can conclude that organizations do indeed
optimize for their commitment horizons, and their effectiveness cannot sim-
ply be explained by inefficiencies.
3.11 Conclusion
This paper contributes to our understanding of the determinants of mili-
tary doctrine and battlefield effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations
by providing a novel approach to explaining military adaptation during
wartime. I have shown that militaries waging counterinsurgencies can be
categorized according to a typology defined by their commitment horizons.
Depending on how large the shadow of the future looms, militaries will
adopt certain organizational features to optimize their performance in a
complex environment. These features—the level of military autonomy and
the tolerance for political and military experimentation—directly affect the
extent to which learning and doctrinal adaptation will occur, and thus over-
all performance. As the results of my model indicate, overall counterinsur-
gency effectiveness follows a U-shaped curve as the commitment horizon
increases. Those militaries with a moderate commitment horizon tend to
perform most poorly, as they lack both the urgency to adapt and the drive
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to persist and search for better solutions over time. On the other hand, the
militaries that experience the greatest overall effectiveness are those that
have the highest commitment level, because the organizational characteris-
tics adopted allow the political and military levels to work in conjunction
to find improvements over time.
Two alternative explanations for counterinsurgency effectiveness do not
hold up against the results of my model: fixed military culture and strategy
replication. First, fixed military culture, although a widespread explana-
tion in the literature on military effectiveness, lacks explanatory strength
because it treats militaries as static, and therefore expects that certain mil-
itaries will always perform better than others in counterinsurgencies. Yet,
as others have also pointed out, the British “school” of counterinsurgency,
widely acclaimed by many because of British military’s success in Malaya
and other earlier insurgencies, was exposed as a myth based on its perfor-
mance in Iraq, as well as Afghanistan. Similarly, the “American way of
war” is not a good explanation for the U.S. military’s failure in Vietnam or
its early struggles in Iraq. The U.S. military did, in fact, adapt and improve
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it avoided the same outcome that it experi-
enced in Vietnam. Likewise, the French military experienced two consecu-
tive insurgencies but performed quite differently between the two of them.
In short, despite its persistence in the literature, fixed military culture is a
weak explanation for counterinsurgency effectiveness. Instead, my results
demonstrate that military culture—as manifested in the level of military au-
tonomy, and the tolerance for political and military experimentation—can
develop through processes within the organization itself in response to a
state’s commitment horizon.
Strategy replication—what Taber (2002) refers to as the “methods
fallacy”—is also a poor explanation for counterinsurgency effectiveness.
What works in one conflict will not necessarily work in another. For ex-
ample, the British in Malaya are are often viewed as the model for coun-
terinsurgency success that should be emulated by other militaries. Indeed,
the British did achieve high counterinsurgency effectiveness. However, too
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often the wrong lessons from the conflict have been drawn. It is not the par-
ticular solutions the British found that should have been emulated, but their
very high level of commitment and the willingness to search for a solution
based upon local conditions that mattered most.
In other words, the complexity and uniqueness of local conditions re-
quires militaries to learn through experience what strategies will work best,
and adapt as they identify solutions. This critique has been made before
in more qualitative terms. For example, in 1966, around the time 400,000
U.S. troops were deployed to Vietnam, Tilman (1966) wrote: “the Malayan
Emergency offers few policy guidelines applicable in the Vietnamese set-
ting. It is fallacious to equate the two, and the sooner this fallacy can be laid
to rest the better it will be for policy-maker and critic alike.” Yet U.S. mili-
tary leaders, presumably unaware of these claims or else choosing to ignore
them, tried to replicate the British army’s success by adopting many of the
same strategies, at the cost of substantial American and Vietnamese blood
and treasure.
The results in this paper also have important implications for under-
standing conflict dynamics and outcomes in counterinsurgencies. In par-
ticular, the results suggest that only a certain type of organization is likely
to perform most effectively at counterinsurgency: namely, the Atlas type,
which has the highest commitment level in a conflict. This suggests that
political and military leaders evaluating whether to engage in counterinsur-
gency operations would be well served in carefully examining how commit-
ted they are, to include how committed their selectorate is. If policymakers
identify less than the utmost level of commitment, they may find that avoid-
ing such a conflict may be better in the long run. Instead, if they do have an
Atlas-type commitment horizon, then adopting the organizational features
that encourage the military and political leaders to work in a dialectic ap-
proach to adaptation as a coordinated organization will help them achieve
the greatest overall effectiveness in a counterinsurgency.
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3.12 Appendix
To illustrate the model, consider the following simple example. The model
contains eight agents: the political leader (Agent 1), the senior military
leader (Agent 8), two operational-level military leaders (Agents 6 and 7),
and four tactical-level subordinate units (Agents 2, 3, 4, and 5). The hierar-
chical interaction structure is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
8
6 7
2 3 4 5
1
Figure 3.6: Information flow between agents in the example
Initialization. Suppose that N = 5, K = 2, and MILITARY AUTON-
OMY = 4. For simplicity, suppose also that the probability of a political
and a military experiment is one. Additionally, suppose that the initial
doctrine is D = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1), and for illustration purposes that each de-
cision Di is dependent upon the two decisions adjacent to the right in D,
where any dependencies to the right of the last decision loop back to the
beginning of the string.18 Therefore, D1 depends upon D2 and D3, and
D4 depends upon D5 and D1, and so on. The complete set of possible
18In the simulations, the dependencies are randomly assigned.
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(0,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,1,0) (0,1,1) (1,0,0) (1,0,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,1)
f1,2,3 0.06 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.06
f2,3,4 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.09
f3,4,5 0.02 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.13
f4,5,1 0.06 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.18
f5,1,2 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.01
Table 3.5: Model example fitness levels
fitness levels in the fitness space for this example are listed in Table 3.5,
which are randomly assigned. The entire doctrine’s fitness level is com-
puted as F(D) = ∑i fi(D), the sum of all the individual fitness levels for
each of the decisions. Therefore, from Table 3.5, the initial doctrine’s fitness
level is F(D) = f1,2,3(0, 0, 1) + f2,3,4(0, 1, 0) + f3,4,5(1, 0, 1) + f4,5,1(0, 1, 0) +
f5,1,2(1, 0, 0) = 0.02 + 0.08 + 0.01 + 0.10 + 0.14 = 0.35.
Step 1. Because MILITARY AUTONOMY = 4, the political leader and the
subordinate units are each assigned a single decision to evaluate. Suppose
the political leader, Agent 1, is assigned D1, and the tactical agents, Agents
2 through 5, are assigned D2 through D5, respectively. Therefore, given
the existing status quo doctrine, Agent 1 begins with a decision value of
D1 = 0. Holding constant the interdependent decisions (i.e., D2 = 0 and
D3 = 1), Agent 1 then evaluates whether randomly changing a value in its
decision subset (in this case, just a single decision) will improve its subset
fitness level. Comparing the two possibilities, we see that f1,2,3(0, 0, 1) =
0.02, whereas f1,2,3(1, 0, 1) = 0.03. Consequently, Agent 1 will change the
political requirements in the next iteration so that D1 = 1.
Step 2. Tactical-level agents 2 through 5 evaluate their decision in
the same manner as Agent 1. However, whereas the political leader’s
evaluation is a doctrinal requirement (i.e., it is implemented in the next
iteration with certainty), tactical-level agents’ evaluations are only rec-
ommendations to their direct superior commander. Agent 2 finds that
f2,3,4(0, 1, 0) < f2,3,4(1, 1, 0), and therefore recommends D2 = 1. Agent 3
finds that f3,4,5(1, 0, 1) < f3,4,5(0, 0, 1), and recommends D3 = 0. Agent 4,
finding that f4,5,1(0, 1, 0) > f4,5,1(1, 1, 0), recommends no change, D4 = 0,
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and Agent 5 finds that f5,1,2(1, 0, 0) < f5,1,2(0, 0, 0), and therefore recom-
mends D5 = 0.
Step 3. Operational-level Agent 6 considers Agent 2 and 3’s recommen-
dations and evaluates which composite decision of (D2, D3) to recommend.
Therefore, Agent 6 evaluates the status quo fitness level of f2,3,4(0, 1, 0) +
f3,4,5(1, 0, 1) = 0.08 + 0.01 = 0.09, and also fitness levels of Agent 2’s rec-
ommendation for D2 and the D3 status quo f2,3,4(1, 1, 0) + f3,4,5(1, 0, 1) =
0.15 + 0.01 = 0.16, the D2 status quo19 and Agent 3’s recommendation
f2,3,4(0, 0, 0) + f3,4,5(0, 0, 1) = 0.08 + 0.15 = 0.23, and both Agent 2 and
3’s recommendations for D2 and D3 together, f2,3,4(1, 0, 0) + f3,4,5(0, 0, 1) =
0.09 + 0.15 = 0.24. In this case, Agent 6 decides to recommend that
(D2, D3) = (1, 0). Agent 7 does the same comparisons for Agent 4 and
5’s recommendations and decides to recommend that (D4, D5) = (0, 0).
Step 4. The senior commander, Agent 8, then evaluates Agent 6 and
7’s recommendations to decide how to implement the military require-
ments in the doctrine at the strategic level. Agent 8 compares the fitness
for the status quo f2,3,4,5(0, 1, 0, 1), the fitness of Agent 6’s recommenda-
tion for (D2, D3) plus the status quo for (D4, D5), i.e., f2,3,4,5(1, 0, 0, 1); the
fitness of the status quo for (D2, D3) plus Agent 7’s recommendation for
(D4, D5), i.e., f2,3,4,5(0, 1, 0, 0); and the fitness of Agent 6 and 7’s combined
recommendations, i.e., f2,3,4,5(1, 0, 0, 0). The result of these comparisons
is that Agent 8 decides to implement military operational requirements
(D2, D3, D4, D5) = (1, 0, 0, 1). Thus the senior commander implements
Agent 6’s recommendations for (D2, D3) but rejects Agent 7’s recommen-
dations, preferring to retain the status quo values for (D4, D5) instead.
Step 5. Combining the decisions, the doctrine changes to D =
(D1, D2, D3, D4, D5) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1) with F(D) = 0.70, and the process re-
peats from Step 1 until the final iteration. An equilibrium will occur when
no agent prefers to make changes.
19Note that in this case, although the status quo value for D2 is unchanged, its fitness




Commitments and Foreign Policy
Pursuits
Opportunism and flexibility
. . . are military rather than civic
virtues.
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Sun
Tzu, 1983)
Force projection and military troop deployments are a common method
states use to pursue their foreign policy interests, respond to international
crises, and signal commitments to their allies. In order to demonstrate that
an alliance commitment is credible, states must issue costly signals—i.e.,
information that communicates that a state will use force if a “red line”
is crossed, and which is costly enough that only a credible actor would
issue the signal. Positioning high levels of lethal force in proximity to a
region of interest is one common way to issue a costly signal to deter or
compel a threatening actor. Historically, long-standing troops or extended
troop buildups have often been necessary to signal a deterrent or compel-
lent threat’s credibility against an adversary. For example, during the latter
part of the Cold War, the U.S. stationed roughly 250,000 troops in West Ger-
many alone, which served to signal U.S. commitment to defending NATO
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countries in order to deter a Soviet invasion of western Europe.1
However, since the end of the Cold War, states have deployed fewer
troops overseas, but to more countries. Figure 4.1 illustrates these relation-
ships.2 The left panel plots the total annual number of troops deployed both
overall and within defense alliances, and the right panel plots the propor-
tion of dyads with deployments in the same fashion. As Figure 4.1 shows,
there is a declining trend in troop levels and deployments to allies, coin-
ciding with an increasing trend in deployments overall. What explains this
phenomenon? A common explanation is that with the end of the Cold War
and the rise of transnational terrorism, the threat of interstate war has de-
clined whereas the threat of conflict from non-state actors has increased,
changing the way states pursue their foreign policy interests. This may par-
tially explain states’ force projection behavior, but it is not entirely satis-
fying. Despite the declining threat of interstate war, alliances still remain
an important feature of the international system, as states still have a long-
term concern about potential hostility arising from other states. A more
compelling explanation for the trends in force projection behavior must be
able to take into account not only the changes in the security environment,
but also the continued importance of alliances as a way to deter militarized
disputes. Furthermore, another important puzzle arises from these dynam-
ics: given the changes in the way states pursue their foreign policy interests,
can they continue to credibly signal their commitments if they deploy fewer
troops to their allies, and if so, how?
In this paper, I argue that states have altered the way they signal their de-
1My focus in this paper is on defense alliances, rather than those that are primarily
offensive or serve as non-aggression pacts, because costly public signals such as troop de-
ployments are much more important in demonstrating credibility for defense alliances. In
contrast, deployments are not likely to be used in purely non-aggression pacts, where the
commitment is to not use force, or strictly offensive alliances, which tend to be short-lived
due to an imminent conflict and where secrecy is often preferred. For example, the most
recent empirical example of an offensive alliance was in 1956, when France, Israel, and
the U.K. signed a secret agreement shortly before initiating the Suez Crisis (Leeds, Ritter,
Mitchell et al., 2002).
2These plots exclude deployments for United Nations and Multinational Forces and
Observers peacekeeping missions.
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Note: Linear trends of smoothed conditional means and standard error bounds are in-
cluded. The dashed (red) line is the total level, and the solid (blue-green) line is the level
within defense alliances.
Figure 4.1: Annual Deployment Trends, 1985–2018
fensive alliance commitments and pursue foreign interests as a consequence
of technological advances that have increased force projection capabilities.
Specifically, one of the primary mechanisms driving troop deployment lev-
els is the speed and amount of force with which a state can respond to an
international crisis. Greater response speed and volume can serve as a sub-
stitute for large quantities of standing, foreign-based troops. Increased re-
sponse capability is the direct result of technological improvements in mili-
tary logistics, which affects military capabilities such as strategic airlift and
aircraft carriers. This mechanism of mobility capacity therefore has a direct
effect on the credibility of signals sent by states within defensive alliance
agreements and alters states’ behavior in pursuit of foreign policy interests.
Alliances use a mixture of tying-hands and sunk cost signals, where
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tying-hands signals are sometimes, but not always, costly enough by them-
selves to credibly signal commitment (Fearon, 1997). Tying-hands signals—
e.g., committing publicly to defense treaties, making public statements and
speeches—generate audience costs, i.e., the costs that would be incurred ex
post by a public audience punishing an actor that backed out of a commit-
ment. These costs can occur through a loss in international reputation or
being voted out of office at the next election, for example. This is in contrast
to sinking costs—e.g., with troop deployments and overseas bases—which
are paid ex ante regardless of whether they are ever used, making them in-
herently more costly. Fearon notes, however, that an empirical puzzle ex-
ists based on this theory: sunk costs convey full commitment, but we still
observe only partial commitment in some cases—i.e., alliances lacking sig-
nificant sunk cost signaling. Therefore, either audience costs are sufficient
to signal credibility in these cases, or else there is something else going on
that allows partial commitment to be sustained in equilibrium.3
If audience costs alone were sufficient to signal credibility, we would ex-
pect little change over time in states’ capabilities to respond to international
crises. If this were the case, states could simply respond to security crises
with a slow build-up of their existing capabilities in order to forestall the ex
post audience costs if they were to fail to respond, much as coalition forces
took several months to build up forces after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in
1990 as a signal of their commitment to defend Saudi Arabia and compel
Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait. However, states do invest in their
ability to respond quickly to crises. Therefore, I argue that it is the develop-
ment of rapid mobility capabilities which underlies the partial commitment
cases, and it is these capabilities that are missing from the existing explana-
tion for alliance commitment signaling.
The deployment trends in Figure 4.1 can therefore be explained by
changes in force projection capacity. As states’ mobility and force projection
3Alternatively, it is possible that the system is not in equilibrium when there is partial
commitment. However, I follow Fearon (1997) and assume that partial commitment is
possible in equilibrium.
126
capacity increases, the need to deploy large quantities of troops in order to
signal credible commitment goes down, leading to fewer deployed troops
among existing alliance partnerships. Additionally, fewer deployments to
allies create opportunities both to respond to emerging crises and to in-
vest in additional non-binding security relationships—e.g., paying partners
for geographic access, or providing training and short-term security rather
than promising long-term protection. Moreover, the perceived threat en-
vironment in the post-Cold War order has led to a more diffuse constel-
lation of actors than the bipolar divisions of the Cold War. Consequently,
states have an incentive to diversify their partnerships to respond to these
threats. Many of these partners also prefer more limited security ties rather
than strong defense pacts (Ciorciari, 2010). Therefore, as force projection
capacity increases, the tendency to increase the number of “noncommittal”
deployments—i.e., deployments in which tying-hands signals of commit-
ment are less likely to occur—goes up, which allows states to send and
withdraw troops to security partners as a situation demands, rather than
committing to the partners’ long-term defense. This also help explain the
puzzle of why, in recent years, there has been a growing number of lim-
ited bilateral defense agreements accompanied by nearly no new mutual
defense alliance agreements (Kinne, 2018).
Furthermore, increased force projection capacity has important effects
on states’ tendencies toward militarized disputes. Increased force projection
capacity helps deter militarized disputes against allied states. The decrease
in foreign troops on allies’ territories does not make allies more vulnera-
ble to disputes, as the force projecting states’ promise to quickly respond
to disputes is perceived as credible by potential aggressors. At the same
time, however, as states deploy to more non-allied locations globally, they
are more likely to use military capabilities for coercive diplomacy. This in-
crease a state’s chances of initiating a militarized interstate dispute (MID).
Consequently, increased force projection capacity is a double-edged sword:
it helps deter disputes against allies, but it increases the likelihood a state
will initiate disputes elsewhere.
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Thus, in sum, the consequences of increased force projection capacity
are: 1) a decreased level of troops deployed to allies and consequently
a greater reliance on tying-hands signals of credible commitments in al-
liances; 2) an increased propensity to deploy troops for crisis responses
and limited security partnerships without committing credibly to these
partners’ long-term defense through costly tying-hands signaling; and 3)
a lower likelihood that allies will be the targets of disputes, but a higher
likelihood that force projecting states will initiate militarized disputes.
4.1 Alliances and force projection
The existing literature on alliances has little to say about the impact that
technological advances in force projection capacity and mobility speed have
on states’ alliance commitments and international deployments. Among
the research that deals with alliance commitments, theoretical explanations
emphasize the importance of costly signals for alliance credibility (Fearon,
1997; Morrow, 2000), as well as some of the theoretical implications of differ-
ent types of signals in international crises (Slantchev, 2005; Tarar, 2013; Tarar
and Leventoğlu, 2012). On the other hand, the existing literature on force
projection does not say much about alliances either. Previous studies mostly
attempt to explain the effects that geographic distance has on power pro-
jection through the concept of the loss-of-strength gradient (Blechman and
Kaplan, 1978; Boulding, 1962; Markowitz and Fariss, 2013; Mearsheimer,
2001; Webb, 2007), whereby states become less powerful as they travel far-
ther from their borders. The two strands of literature separately addressing
alliances and force projection share a common framework for understand-
ing states’ military power. However, missing from the literature is a direct
connection between the capacity for states to project force and the effect that
this capacity has on states’ alliance commitments.
The idea that alliances serve as a general deterrent threat can be linked
to Schelling’s argument that the threat of military force can coerce an actor
to change its behavior based on the anticipation of such violence; therefore,
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the power to hurt is most useful when it is held in reserve, and an effective
alliance should reduce the likelihood that an allied actor will be the target
of aggressive behavior from non-allied actors (Schelling, 1966). Huth (1988)
distinguishes between different types of deterrence in an alliance according
to whether they are of a general form, or whether they are more immediate
in nature. General deterrence involves the existence an ongoing adversar-
ial relationship between states where the threat of war is not immediate,
which encompasses the purpose of alliance commitments. In contrast, im-
mediate deterrence arises when a potential attacker actively considers the
use of force, and the defender state responds in a direct manner by threat-
ening retaliation in order to prevent the attacker from carrying out its plan.
This latter form of deterrence is thus tied to MIDs and international crises.
In order for an alliance to be effective, the promise by one actor to come
to another’s aid if attacked must be deemed credible (Morrow, 2000). Con-
sequently, signaling such credibility becomes essential for creating an ef-
fective alliance. Costly signals are the primary mechanism theorized for
establishing credible commitments in alliances, as opposed to “cheap talk,”
which is a low-cost signal that therefore lacks credibility. Fearon (1997) ar-
gues that leaders can generate costly signals through two possible channels.
First, leaders can tie their own hands through publicly observable commit-
ments, which generates audience costs that the leaders will suffer ex post if
they fail to follow through with their commitments. Alternatively, leaders
can sink costs in particular ways in order to convey credible resolve ex ante,
since a less committed actor would not pay such costs.
Following Fearon, subsequent research has explored the theoretical im-
plications of different signals in the context of international crises. For ex-
ample, military mobilization can be viewed as both a tying-hands and a
sunk cost signal in situations where a crisis occurs and faces possible es-
calation, since it increases the probability of winning should a conflict be-
gin and it requires costs that are paid regardless of the outcome (Slantchev,
2005). Similarly, power shifts caused by mobilization may result in wars
linked to commitment problems (Tarar, 2013). On the other hand, audience
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costs can reduce the likelihood of war, even when the generated audience
costs are not particularly high (Tarar and Leventoğlu, 2012). Notably, al-
though these approaches have considered the impact of costly signaling in
immediate crisis situations, less attention has been paid to understanding
costly signaling in grand strategy and general deterrence.
Empirical studies have also uncovered various effects of alliance cred-
ibility that can be connected to the costly signals argument. For example,
defensive alliances reduce the likelihood that allies will be targets of MIDs,
whereas offensive or nonintervention alliances increase the likelihood that
a challenger will initiate a dispute (Leeds, 2003). Similarly, defense pacts
in which both high capability and high credibility exist lead to a decreased
likelihood that one of the members in the agreement will be the target of a
militarized dispute. Moreover, defense pacts that are designed to include
more peacetime military coordination also lead to a lower likelihood of dis-
putes targeted at member states (Johnson, Leeds, and Wu, 2015).
Other studies have also explored the issue of alliance politics from the
perspective of partner states, i.e., states that host foreign troops on their
soil. At the local level, hosting foreign troops can sometimes create frictions
between the populace and the deployed troops, especially when the threat
against the host country is less salient. For example, Japan has long dealt
with local tensions arising from U.S. troops on Okinawa, where over 20,000
U.S. troops are stationed (Denyer and Kashiwagi, 2018). These local ten-
sions can develop into domestic pressures to reduce the size of the foreign
footprint. Due to these domestic political preferences, as well as a desire to
maintain policy autonomy and avoid undue dependency, some states may
therefore choose to limit the extent to which they provide access to allies
and security partners (Ciorciari, 2010).
Distinct from the alliance literature, force projection is considered an im-
portant element of both immediate and general deterrence: the more a state
can project its power outside its own borders, the more threats it can de-
ter from other actors (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978). Existing research on
force projection has primarily focused on understanding the effect of ge-
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ographic distance on power projection. Scholars generally assume a loss-
of-strength gradient in force projection (Boulding, 1962), in which power
weakens with geographic distance, and especially so across large bodies of
water (Mearsheimer, 2001). The extent to which the loss-of-strength gra-
dient matters as force projection ability increases, however, is disputable.
Markowitz and Fariss (2013), for example, show that as the cost of project-
ing force declines through improvements in technology and gains in eco-
nomic power, states will project power at greater distances and at more fre-
quent rates. However, Webb (2007) has argued that any advantages that a
state has in projecting power are only temporary in nature, and therefore
the loss-of-strength gradient will continue to matter for deterring and re-
sponding to threats as technology evolves.
Among the research that considers troop deployments explicitly, exist-
ing studies tend to evaluate the consequences of troop deployments, rather
than their causes. Furthermore, many of these studies limit their focus ex-
clusively to U.S. troop deployments, which raises concerns of sample bias.
For example, recent studies have explored how troop deployments affect
host states’ economic development (Kane, 2012), foreign policy (Machain,
2013), defense spending (Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn, 2016), hu-
man rights violations (Bell, Clay, and Machain, 2017), financial and polit-
ical stability (Aklin and Kern, 2019; Brathwaite and Kucik, 2018), foreign
direct investment (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007), trade (Biglaiser and DeR-
ouen, 2009), and public attitudes about foreign troops (Flynn, Machain, and
Stoyan, 2019). While the consequences of such deployments are certainly
important to study, evaluating the determinants of troop deployments can
extend this literature by providing a more comprehensive understanding of
the force projection causal pathway.
The strands of literature separately addressing alliances and force pro-
jection share a common framework for understanding states’ military
power. However, these research agendas have tended to operate in par-
allel to each other. Consequently, missing from the current literature is a
direct connection between the capacity for states to project force and the
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effect that this capacity has on states’ alliance commitments. Such an ap-
proach can shed light on how alliance dynamics have shifted over time,
and explain the consequences for the way states respond to international
crises and engage in other foreign policy pursuits.
4.2 Consequences of increased force projection capacity
Logistics
A military can only operate for a sustained period if it is properly supplied.
Logistics have thus been a critical underlying factor in the success or fail-
ure of many military campaigns throughout history (Van Creveld, 2004).
Therefore, improved logistical capabilities can significantly increase a mili-
tary’s ability to operate successfully. Although force projection capabilities
can come in many different forms, in this paper I focus specifically on the
effect of airlift and aircraft carrier capabilities. These elements of “dynamic
force employment” (United States Department of Defense, 2018) have freed
up many previous logistical constraints and allow greater flexibility in re-
sponding to crises. Airlift capabilities are an important feature in moving
equipment and troops in a rapid manner, when minimizing crisis response
time is desired. In a similar way, aircraft carriers provide blue-water navies
with the capability to project force to nearly anywhere on the globe on short
notice. Recently, for example, the U.S. deployed a carrier strike group to the
Persian Gulf to project force in the region in response to tensions with Iran
(The Economist, 2019).
The capacity to project force through airlift capabilities has shifted dra-
matically over the last several decades. For example, the Lockheed C-5
Galaxy currently used by the U.S. can fly at three and a half times the air-
speed of the WWII-era Douglas C-47 Skytrain. Moreover, since the C-5 is
capable of being refueled mid-air, its range is effectively unlimited, and is
constrained only by the crew’s physiological limits to continue flying with-
out rest. At its cruise speed, the C-47 could fly for 10 hours to a range of
1,600 miles, roughly the distance between Los Angeles and Memphis. In
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the same amount of time, the C-5 can travel 5,710 miles, or the approxi-
mate distance from Los Angeles to Berlin—while also carrying 34 times as
much cargo. The substantially increased capacity to transport supplies and
troops, at greater speed and distance, illustrates how decreased logistical
constraints can grant states a greater flexibility to respond to crises.
Similarly, naval capabilities among the major powers have risen dra-
matically over time, which have also resulted in increased mobilization ca-
pacity. As naval propulsion technology has evolved, ships have shifted
from being coal-powered to oil-powered, which has decreased the overall
need for bases and increased traveling efficiency (Harkavy, 1999). More-
over, the advent of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers has created a level of
flexibility previously considered impossible to achieve: such carriers are
able to operate without refueling for years, significantly freeing up logis-
tical constraints. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers can therefore respond
more quickly to a crisis, remain in a location longer, and also have more
space to carry fuel for aircraft, while also having substantially larger ca-
pacity to carry aircraft and military personnel (Spencer and Spring, 2007).
Given that aircraft carriers also operate in international waters, they can
travel to particular regions and loiter in a chosen location with relative free-
dom of movement, thereby reducing the constraints imposed by territorial
sovereignty.
The evolution of mobility capabilities has had a profound impact on mil-
itary logistical requirements, providing more capable states the ability to
respond militarily to international crises with greater flexibility than ever
before. For example, in 2015 Russia deployed 4,000 troops to Syria after the
Syrian government requested its aid against rebel groups in the Syrian civil
war. Similarly, a large coalition of states each deployed hundreds of troops
to Iraq to fight the Islamic State, including Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. Whereas troop buildups in previous
decades might take months or even years to accomplish, these latter de-
ployments typically occurred within days or weeks of initial political dis-
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cussions about possible military action.
Alliance commitments
One of the primary ways in which states signal their commitment in an
alliance is by deploying troops into the allied country. The presence of mil-
itary forces on foreign soil is a high-visibility signal of the state’s commit-
ment to uphold its promise to protect the host country from military threats.
For example, the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and
Republic of Korea, which entered into force in 1954 following the Korean
War armistice, paved the way for the continual presence of U.S. military
forces in South Korea. Yet not all defense agreements are upheld by the
presence of foreign troops, and therefore audience costs may provide an al-
ternative credible signal of resolve (Fearon, 1997). However, it is unclear
when and why audience costs can be sufficient in some alliances but not
others. All else equal, one would expect that a change in troop deployment
levels should be directly related to a change in alliance commitments, since
it indicates a shift in arrangements between states. Yet this understanding
of costly signaling in incomplete.
When signaling commitment in an alliance, part of the agreement’s cred-
ibility hinges on the speed at which members can respond to a potential
threat in an effective manner when faced with an immediate deterrence sit-
uation. Immediate deterrence is most successful when a potential attacker
determines that the costs of an attack are high and the probability of suc-
cessful attack is low. Therefore, successful deterrence in a militarized dis-
pute hinges in large part on the balance of forces between sides involved
in a dispute (Huth, 1988). Moreover, military strategies generally tend to
favor seizing the initiative through rapid and decisive use of force (Betts,
1991; Snyder, 1984; Van Evera, 1984). Consequently, one of the primary
reasons why troops are stationed overseas is because maintaining constant
force presence allows a rapid response to a crisis. Consider again the pres-
ence of U.S. troops in South Korea: since Seoul is only 35 miles from the de-
militarized zone (DMZ) dividing the Korean peninsula between North and
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South, a North Korean surprise invasion across the DMZ could occur so
swiftly that, without a constant presence of U.S. troops, South Korea would
likely suffer significantly greater costs. However, by stationing U.S. troops
in South Korea, the U.S. signals its resolve to swiftly defend South Korea
from the threat of North Korean attack, which has helped deter a major
conflict between the two countries. The presence of troops on the Korean
peninsula assures a military balance that would decrease the chances of a
successful North Korean surprise offensive without very high costs. To il-
lustrate this relationship, see Figure 4.2, which plots the number of troops
the U.S. has deployed to South Korea from 1970 to 2018. This figure shows
that deployment levels have remained very consistent with only a slight
decline over time, which fits with the argument I present here.4
From a logistical standpoint, improved mobility capacity means fewer
foreign bases are needed to store supplies, including fuel, food, weapons,
and other military necessities. Therefore, as mobility response increases, we
would expect to see fewer overseas bases and lower overall troop deploy-
ments. However, although the supply chain becomes more efficient, states
may still find it in their interest for certain preexisting foreign bases to re-
main as logistical hubs from which to provide supplies to regional countries
allied without foreign bases. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense
has developed a basing strategy in recent years to minimize costs while
maximizing rapid response capabilities by designating locations as either
a Main Operating Base (MOB), a Forward Operating Site (FOS), or a Co-
operative Security Location (CSL). The MOB acts as the logistical hub with
permanently stationed troops and substantial infrastructure, and includes
bases such as Ramstein in Germany, Kadena in Japan, Camp Humphreys
4Although data is missing for 1981–1982, the trend is still consistent over time. Addi-
tionally, the spike in troop levels in 2005 is due to a temporary increase in the number of
U.S. Navy forces deployed to South Korea. The Military Balance (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1970-2018), the source for this data, does not typically specify the reason
for deployments, so it is unclear why this spike occurred, and most likely is a feature of
when the numbers were recorded that year. For example, is possible that the 2005 spike
was due to the large humanitarian assistance, including U.S. naval forces, sent in response
to the tsunami that struck southeast Asia in December 2004.
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Note: Linear trend of smoothed conditional means and standard error bounds are in-
cluded.
Figure 4.2: Annual U.S. Deployment to South Korea, 1970–2018
in South Korea, and Al Udeid in Qatar. These bases are typically located
in countries where a defense alliance agreement exists and provide support
for an entire continent or geographical region. Contrasted with a MOB is
the FOS, which is an expandable facility with limited military presence and
possibly prepositioned equipment, such as the Sembawang port facility in
Singapore and Soto Cano in Honduras. Finally, a CSL is a facility with lit-
tle or no permanent presence, but which provides contingency access to an
area and serves as a location for “security cooperation activities”—in other
words, an area operated by an allied country but which provides access to
U.S. forces in the event of an international crisis (Harkavy, 1999).
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When a threat is particularly high and enduring, permanent troop de-
ployments may still be the most effective form of deterrence for an alliance.
Yet there are many cases where the threat of an attack is less salient, in which
case the constant presence of troops becomes less necessary. Given the de-
velopment of logistical capabilities over time and the concurrent greater
speed on mobilizing in response to a crisis, states that might otherwise have
used deployments to signal their credibility in an alliance can instead use
rapid mobilization “on demand” as crises occur. This leads to my first hy-
pothesis:
H1: Force projection capacity serves as a substitute for deployments when
signaling credibility in alliances. As force projection capacity increases, de-
ployment levels in alliances will tend to decrease.
4.2.1 Foreign policy pursuits and militarized disputes
As states pursue security, they can face an arms-versus-allies—or equiv-
alently, internal-versus-external balancing—tradeoff (Morrow, 1993). This
tradeoff depends on the extent to which states prefer autonomy to rely-
ing upon other states for security. As states increase the capacity to project
power beyond their borders, they gain increased autonomy to pursue their
own interests and respond more flexibly to crises. Additionally, the reduc-
tion of forces committed to allies results in additional forces available for
other deployments, if and when states perceive sufficient threats from other
regions. Furthermore, as states increase the capacity to project power be-
yond their borders, they will more frequently project power (Markowitz
and Fariss, 2013). Because states have increased autonomy with these capa-
bilities, they will tend to place greater emphasis on limiting their commit-
ments for new partnerships, rather than expanding into new alliance com-
mitments. However, the increased autonomy accrued with force projection
capabilities also allows states to complement existing alliance partnerships
through the shift in signaling strategies as previously described. This high-
lights an important caveat to the theory of the internal-versus-external bal-
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ancing tradeoff: in terms of force projection capabilities, increased auton-
omy can serve to complement existing alliances, rather than substitute for
them.
In addition to increased autonomy with increased force projection ca-
pabilities, changes in the perceived threat environment over the last three
decades have also changed states’ incentives in the way they build secu-
rity relationships. Power projecting states have an incentive to establish
relationships that enable them to respond to a diffuse array of threats with-
out abandoning their allies. While I do not directly evaluate the types of
security partnerships that states establish, recent studies have shown that
very few new post-Cold War alliances have been forged, whereas there has
been a large increase in new security cooperation through bilateral, lim-
ited security partnerships (Kinne, 2018). Increased force projection capac-
ity can help explain this phenomenon, as many developing countries have
demonstrated a preference for more limited, flexible security ties with ma-
jor powers (Ciorciari, 2010). Furthermore, many smaller states may have an
incentive to partner with larger states if it is tied to financial, economic, or
security gains.
At the same time, more limited security partnerships are also in the in-
terest of major powers, who often have many other allies to which they have
committed themselves for defense, or who wish to address security issues
where they would prefer to avoid long-term commitments. Therefore, in
order to avoid the prospect of over-promising on commitments, states with
higher force projection capacity and their security partners are choosing to
establish modest, non-committal ties rather than strong defense pacts. For
example, France, Russia, the U.K. and the U.S. have each recently expanded
their foreign military presence in several African countries by deploying
troops for training programs, counter-extremist operations, and antiterror-
ism cooperation (Blaise, Schmitt, and Gall, 2019; O’Mahony, 2018; Schmitt,
2019; Taylor, 2017). Similarly, China recently constructed its first overseas
military base in Djibouti, which houses several hundred troops and serves
as a strategic naval port for the Horn of Africa (Jacobs and Perlez, 2017). The
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partner states in these agreements, for their part, have a number of reasons
to provide access and accept foreign troop deployments, such as for finan-
cial gain, or to secure economic or military aid to deal with local threats.
This leads to my second hypothesis:
H2: As force projection capacity increases, the likelihood of deploying troops
to new locations increases.
Finally, increased force projection capacity has important effects on
states’ tendencies toward militarized disputes. If force projection capac-
ity serves as a substitute for alliance deployments as hypothesized in H1,
then states with greater force projection capabilities will still be able to de-
ter threats against their allies. In other words, the decrease in foreign troops
on allies’ territories does not make allies more vulnerable to disputes, as
the force projecting states’ promise to quickly respond to disputes is per-
ceived as credible by potential aggressors. Consequently, I expect that in-
creased force projection capacity helps deter militarized disputes against
allied states. At the same time, however, if states deploy to more non-allied
locations globally as hypothesized in H2, then they may be more likely to
use military capabilities for coercive diplomacy. Consequently, I expect that
increased force projection capacity will increase a state’s chances of initiat-
ing a militarized interstate dispute (MID). Thus, I expect that increased force
projection capacity is a double-edged sword: it helps deter disputes against
allies, but it increases the likelihood a state will initiate disputes elsewhere.
This leads to my third hypothesis:
H3: As force projection capacity increases, the likelihood that an allied state
is the target of a militarized dispute goes down, whereas the overall likelihood
of initiating a militarized dispute goes up.
4.3 Data
My primary explanatory variable, MOBILITY INDEXit, measures the force
projection capacity that state i possesses in year t, using specific air and
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naval capabilities as a proxy for overall force projection capacity. To create
this index, I collected data on each state’s airlift capabilities and the types
of aircraft carriers that it possessed in a given year from The Military Balance
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970-2018).5 A state-year’s mo-
bility index is computed as the average of two values: the product of aircraft
capacity values and the number of aircraft, summed over all aircraft types,
and the product of aircraft carrier capacity values and the number of carri-
ers, summed over all carrier types. Prior to taking the average, I re-scaled
the separate measures by the maximum and minimum values for the data
so that they are each in the range [0, 1].6
The primary dependent variable, DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt, measures the
number of troops deployed from state i to within the geographic borders
of state j in year t, which I also collected from The Military Balance (In-
ternational Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970-2018). Because this paper
focuses on a state’s force projection and its relation to alliances and other
security agreements, I exclude deployments for United Nations or Multina-
tional Force and Observers peacekeeping missions, as they are not directly
related to force projection capacity or alliance commitments. To evaluate
the probability of deployment, I create an indicator DEPLOYMENTijt which
equals 1 if troops were deployed from i to j in year t, and 0 if no troops were
deployed.
5I collected the number and type of each mobility aircraft in a state’s air force for each
year, then recorded specifications for each aircraft’s cargo capacity (pounds), cruise speed
(knots), and un-refueled range (nautical miles) from various online sources. In the same
manner, I also recorded each aircraft carrier’s displacement (pounds), speed (knots) and
un-refueled range (nautical miles). Each individual aircraft and aircraft carrier’s mobility
value is the product of their three respective specifications.
6Due to the uneven distribution of capabilities, many states have very small mobility
index values. Therefore, for the remainder of the paper, I limit my focus for state i (the
potential “force projector”) to those states in the 60th percentile and above for MOBILITY
INDEX.The distribution of MOBILITY INDEX has a large tail of states with almost no force
projection capacity, and which have never deployed troops, making their state i directed-
dyadic observations less relevant for understanding force projection behavior. Directed
dyads for state j (the potential host of force projection) include all other states in the inter-
national system in year t. As a robustness check, I ran all statistical tests without the cutoff
and the results remained unchanged.
140
I also include a number of additional explanatory variables in the data
set to account for additional influences on deployment likelihood and the
number of troops deployed. Because overall capabilities such as military ex-
penditures and number of military personnel are important in understand-
ing deployment tendencies, I include the Composite Index of National Ca-
pabilities (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972), CINCit, to measure state i’s
capabilities in year t, as well as a measure for the proportion of i’s capabil-
ities compared to the total dyadic capabilities, CINCit/(CINCit+CINCjt),
which captures relative military imbalance and possible dependence within
the dyad.7 Similarly, because greater trade dependence may influence al-
liance commitments, I measure total dyadic trade as a proportion of i’s total
trade with TRADEijt/TOTAL TRADEit (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins, 2008). I
also include a measure for political regime type to control for differences
in domestic preferences with POLITY SCOREit (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers,
2014). To account for recent historical events that may influence deploy-
ments, I include three variables: TERRORIST FATALITIES LAST 2 YEARSjt, the
total number of fatalities due to terrorist attacks in state j during the pre-
vious two years (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Re-
sponses to Terrorism (START), 2018); COMMON THREATS LAST 2 YEARSijt,
the total number of militarized disputes in which states i and j were on the
same side in the previous two years, and HOSTILE MILITARIZED DISPUTES
LAST 2 YEARSijt,8 the total number of hostile militarized disputes in which
states i and j were on opposing sides in the previous two years (Palmer,
D’Orazio, Kenwick et al., 2020).9 Differences in foreign policy preferences
are included via Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017)’s measure of absolute
distance between state i’s and j’s ideal point estimates from UN General
7Including state i’s CINC score and the dyadic proportion of CINC does not create
collinearity in the model, because the former is a monadic measure and the latter is dyadic.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two variables in the full dataset is 0.27, and
in the alliance-only subset is 0.29. For further comparison between MOBILITY INDEX and
CINC, see the appendix.
8A MID is considered “hostile” if there is a use of force or it leads to war.
9Common threats and hostile MIDs are entirely uncorrelated in the data: the Pearson
correlation coefficient for both the full and dataset and for alliances only is 0.00.
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Assembly voting, FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt.
To code whether states have a defense agreement, where an alliance
member promises active military support if the other alliance member’s
sovereignty or territory is attacked, I include DEFENSE ALLIANCEijt from
Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell et al. (2002). Defensive alliances include multilateral
treaties such as NATO, the Rio Pact, and the Warsaw Pact, and bilateral
treaties such as between China and North Korea, Kenya and Ethiopia, and
France and Gabon. I exclude non-defensive alliances, such as those that
are primarily either offensive or non-aggression pacts, because they do not
relate to signaling commitments to deter threats. Examples of excluded al-
liance treaties are the Paris Charter and the non-aggression pact between
India and the Philippines.
I also measure geographic distance between states, DISTANCEij, as the
great circle distance between their capital cities (Gleditsch, 2008), because
greater distance may increase the need for deployments to signal alliance
commitments. Finally, to control for the effects of dyadic colonial history
and the Cold War, I add indicators COLONIAL HISTORYij (Hensel, 2018),
which equals 1 if both states in a dyad were previously part of a colonial
relationship and 0 otherwise, and COLD WARt, which equals 1 if the year is
prior to 1990, and 0 otherwise.
A summary of the data used in the analysis is provided in Table 4.1.
Although I collected mobility and deployment data starting in 1970, due to
gaps in reporting annual data in The Military Balance prior to 1984, I exclude
these years from my analysis.10 Additionally, since the current MID dataset
runs through 2010, I limit my focus in the empirical analysis to the period
from 1985 to 2010.11
10For example, The Military Balance does not list many Soviet Union, U.K., or U.S. troop
levels deployed to other countries until 1984.
11Since missing data in the interior of a period under study can cause problems in time-
series-cross-section data (Beck and Katz, 2011), my strategy for missing data was the fol-
lowing: first, I interpolated missing values for MOBILITY INDEXit and DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt,
and carried forward the last observed value for POLITY SCOREit and POLITY SCOREjt. Then,
for any states where either MOBILITY INDEXit, DEPLOYMENTijt, or POLITY SCOREit was
missing, I removed any directed dyad in which they were the potential force projector
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Variable Mean SD Median Min Max
DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt 78.90 3, 118.08 0 0 541,400
DEPLOYMENTijt 0.01 0.11 0 0 1
MOBILITY INDEXit 0.03 0.12 0.003 0.0001 0.95
CINCit 0.02 0.03 0.007 0.0003 0.21
POLITY SCOREit 2.89 7.39 7 -10 10
CINCit/(CINCit+CINCjt) 0.76 0.28 0.89 0.001 1
TRADEijt/TOTAL TRADEit 0.006 0.03 0.0001 0 0.96
TERRORIST FATALITIES LAST 2 YEARSjt 37.74 212.30 0 0 6,667
COMMON THREATS LAST 2 YEARSijt 0.03 0.27 0 0 7
HOSTILE MILITARIZED DISPUTES LAST 2 YEARSijt 0.005 0.10 0 0 4
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt 1.14 0.87 0.97 0 4.89
MILITARIZED DISPUTEijt 0.006 0.08 0 0 1
ALLY j MILITARIZED DISPUTE TARGETijt 0.19 0.39 0 0 1
DEFENSE ALLIANCEijt 0.09 0.28 0 0 1
DISTANCEij 4,882.62 2,758.52 4,721 0 12,420
COLONIAL HISTORYij 0.02 0.15 0 0 1
COLD WARt 0.17 0.37 0 0 1
YEAR 1997.91 7.38 1998 1985 2010
Note: N = 242,422 directed dyads.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Additionally, since the U.S. was the dominant global military power
throughout the time period analyzed in the data, it is possible that the data
is primarily observing U.S. behavior, which could skew the results. To ad-
dress concerns about the uneven distribution of states observed in the data,
I provide a summary of State A observations for the U.S. in Table 4.2. This
table shows that U.S. deployments do account for a relatively large propor-
tion of the overall deployments both within alliances and throughout the
international system. This is not surprising: we would expect the U.S. to de-
ploy more because greater military power tends to increase force projection
behavior. More importantly, however, in both instances these proportions
are less than half of the total deployments. Therefore, it does not appear
that the data is predominantly accounting for U.S. behavior, as over half
of the deployments in alliances—and nearly three quarters of deployments
(state i) from the data. For any states where DISTANCEij data was missing, I completely
removed them from the data. Finally, I imputed remaining missing values—on POLITY
SCOREjt, TRADEijt/TOTAL TRADEit, and FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt—using Amelia II
(Honaker, King, and Blackwell, 2015).
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Prop. U.S. Observations Prop. U.S. Deployments
Alliances only 0.08 0.46
All observations 0.02 0.27
Table 4.2: Proportion of U.S. Observations and Deployments
overall—are from non-U.S. states. As an additional robustness check, I con-
ducted all of the main empirical models in the following section without the
U.S. and show that the results do not change substantially. These results are
available in the appendix.
4.4 Data Analysis
I model the determinants of alliance deployment levels with an autoregres-
sive distributed lag model (ADL) as follows:
Yijt = θYijt−1 + β0Xit + β1Xit−1 + β2Xit−2 + γZijt + ηij + τt + εijt (4.1)
Because the model in Eq. 4.1 focuses on alliance deployment levels, I
focus strictly on those directed dyads for which an alliance exists in year t
in the data. The lagged dependent variable is included on the right-hand
side of the equation to account for the fact that deployment levels from i to
j in year t are likely influenced by past deployment levels in the same direc-
tion. Furthermore, the main explanatory variable Xit (MOBILITY INDEXit)
is lagged twice for both theoretical and data-driven reasons: theoretically,
an increase in force projection capacity might not have a contemporaneous
effect on deployment levels, but will instead be lagged over time. Further-
more, based on the data, I lag the variable by two years in order to remove
serial correlation from the data, which I tested for with a Lagrange Multi-
plier test.
In addition to the main explanatory variable, I include a number of ad-
ditional covariates Zijt to account for other influences on deployment lev-
els, including state i’s CINC score, polity score, dyadic CINC dependence,
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and dyadic trade dependence; state j’s deployment levels to state i; dyadic
foreign policy differences; the number of common threats in the past two
years within the dyad; dyadic distance; dyadic colonial history; a Cold War
indicator; and a yearly time trend to account for technological changes over
time. In the fixed effects version of the model, I include fixed effects for di-
rected dyad ηij and time τt to control for unobserved directed-dyad-specific
and year-specific heterogeneity, respectively.12 Finally, I also include an
i.i.d. error term, εijt.
To test the second hypothesis, I consider the determinants of deploy-
ment likelihood for all directed dyads, and not just those within defensive
alliances. To do so, I use a logistic regression model to test the probability
of a new deployment in year t, using the same modeling structure as in Eq.
4.1 for logistic regression, except dropping the lagged independent vari-
ables and adding time splines for years since last deployment.13 In order
to remove the contaminating effects of long deployment spells, I limit my
analysis to the onset of a new deployment (Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 1998),
with repeats possible for directed dyads in non-consecutive years.
For the third hypothesis, I evaluate the determinants of MID likelihood
for all directed dyads, and for those only within defensive alliances. I again
use a logistic regression model and test the probability of a MID in year t.
With the defense alliance data, I evaluate the probability that state j will be
the target of a MID by a state other than i. With the full data, I evaluate the
probability that state i and j will be in an opposing MID in year t. As with
the deployment likelihood model, I use time splines for years since last MID
for the respective dependent variable.
12Although including fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable is known to create
“Nickell bias” of order 1/T in the parameter estimates (Nickell, 1981), this is not a major
concern for my data because the time period is relatively long (T = 26), and thus the bias
will be small. I follow the recommendation of Beck and Katz (2011) in modeling the ADL
model with fixed effects given T > 20.
13I exclude distributed lags in this model because I already account for time dependence
with the cubic time spline.
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4.4.1 Results
Table 4.3 reports the determinants of alliance deployment levels. The first
two models report the estimated effect of force projection capacity on de-
ployment size, without fixed effects (Model 1) and with fixed effects (Model
2). Models 3 and 4 incorporate additional covariates in the same fashion. In
each of the models, the long-term effect of MOBILITY INDEX on DEPLOY-
MENT SIZE can be calculated by (∑ β)/(1− θ) where the β values are the
coefficients for MOBILITY INDEXit and its lags, and θ is the coefficient for
DEPLOYMENT SIZEit−1, as defined in Eq. 4.1. For ease of interpretation, I
also report the calculated values of these long-term effects in Table 4.3.
In all but the first model of Table 4.3, the long-run effect of MOBILITY
INDEX is negative, indicating that an increase in force projection capacity
is associated with a decrease in deployment levels to allies. However, the
magnitude of this effect differs according to whether or not fixed effects are
included. Yet because the models without fixed effects contain a substan-
tial amount of serial correlation as indicated by the results of the LM test
statistic—which is compared to a χ2 statistic with 1 d.f.—whereas the mod-
els with fixed effects do not, Models 2 and 4 provide more reliable estimates
for the estimate of the long-run effect.
The coefficients’ signs switch from positive to negative in the second-
year lag for each of the models in Table 4.3, which can be cause for con-
cern that the distributed lags have high multicollinearity. While I deter-
mined the ADL model’s lag length according to a Lagrange Multiplier test
in order to remove serial correlation in the error term, this does not resolve
multicollinearity concerns. However, additional diagnostic checks using
Bayesian Model Averaging, and available in the appendix, support the con-
clusion that the opposite signs are genuine and not due to multicollinearity.
While it is unclear why the trend is not persistently negative, one possible
explanation is that within the first year following an increase in force pro-
jection capacity, the increase has an upward pressure on a state’s tendency




(1) (2) (3) (4)
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt−1) 0.94∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
SIDE i COVARIATES
MOBILITY INDEXit 0.98∗∗∗ 0.30 0.90∗∗∗ 0.17
(0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29)
MOBILITY INDEXit−1 3.42∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 3.38∗∗∗ 3.14∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33)
MOBILITY INDEXit−2 −4.33∗∗∗ −3.73∗∗∗ −4.31∗∗∗ −3.81∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.33) (0.31) (0.33)
CINCit 0.94∗∗∗ 7.31∗∗∗
(0.30) (1.17)




TRADEijt/TOTAL TRADEit 0.20∗∗∗ −0.07
(0.07) (0.21)
SIDE j COVARIATE
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZE)jit 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.003) (0.009)
DYADIC COVARIATES
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt −0.02∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.007) (0.02)











MOBILITY INDEX (LONG RUN EFFECT) 1.17 −0.94 −0.51 −1.84
Year fixed effects X X
Directed dyad fixed effects X X
Observations 19,605 19,605 19,605 19,605
Clusters 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079
Years 26 26 26 26
LM autocorrelation test statistic 139.55 2.58 133.60 2.48
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.3: Determinants of Alliance Deployment Levels, 1985–2010
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tial upward pressure is reversed by the overall tendency to deploy fewer
troops, where the magnitude of the long-term negative coefficient exceeds
and counteracts the short-term increase.
An additional modeling challenge to Eq. 4.1 is possible endogeneity be-
tween deployment levels in alliances and force projection capacity: in par-
ticular, technological investments and force posture policy decisions might
predict force projection capacity, rather than (or in addition to) the other
way around. To deal with this threat to causal inference, I employ instru-
mental variable estimation, using state i’s past ruling party political ideol-
ogy in the government as instruments for MOBILITY INDEXit. The appendix
discusses the IV estimation strategy in detail, and shows that the results in
Table 4.3 still hold when accounting for the possibility of endogeneity.
Next, to test the second hypothesis, Table 4.4 reports the determinants
of deployment onset probability for all directed dyads. I include several
additional covariates that might explain deployment probability: state j’s
domestic regime type, the logged number of terrorist fatalities in j during
the last two years, and the number of hostile militarized disputes between
i and j in the last two years. I also include a binary indicator for whether
the states share an alliance commitment to control for deployments within
alliances, and I add a cubic spline for the time since i’s last deployment to j.
The model in Table 4.4 offer clear empirical evidence for the second hy-
pothesis. As MOBILITY INDEX increases, the likelihood of deployment onset
also increases. Furthermore, because the unit of analysis is a directed-dyad-
year, an increase in the likelihood of deployment onset means that either
states are deploying to new locations, or new states are deploying troops, or
both. Consequently, when the results from the first hypothesis are also con-
sidered, we can conclude that as force projection capacity increases, states
are deploying fewer troops, but to more countries.
What effect does a global force posture have on deterrence? To evaluate
my third hypothesis, I test three models with different dependent variables.
Table 4.5 reports the results of these tests. In the first model in Table 4.5,




















LOG(TERRORIST FATALITIES LAST 2 YEARSjt) 0.23∗∗∗
(0.02)
DYADIC COVARIATES
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt −0.22∗∗∗
(0.05)
COMMON THREATS LAST 2 YEARSijt 0.42∗∗∗
(0.08)











TIME SINCE LAST DEPLOYMENT SPLINEijt 0.01∗∗
(0.008)
Observations 236,274
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by directed dyad. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.4: Determinants of Deployment Onset Probability, 1985–2010
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model is the probability that state j will be the target of a MID from a state
other than i. In the second model, I use the full dataset, and the dependent
variable is the probability that state i will initiate a MID with state j. Finally,
the third model is the reverse of the second, so that the dependent variable
is the probability that state i will be the target of a MID with state j. I also
include most of the same covariates as in Table 4.4, though I leave out trade,
deployment, terrorist fatalities, colonial history, and Cold War covariates, as
there is no theoretical reason for these variables to be associated with MID
likelihood.
Dependent variable:
PR(ALLY j MID TARGETijt) PR(MIDijt) PR(MIDjit)
(1) (2) (3)
SIDE i COVARIATES
MOBILITY INDEXit −2.21∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.08
(0.31) (0.20) (0.28)
CINCit 11.90∗∗∗ 19.62∗∗∗ 23.05∗∗∗
(1.59) (0.80) (1.04)
POLITY SCOREit −0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
CINCit/(CINCit+CINCjt) −2.29∗∗∗ −2.70∗∗∗ −3.53∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.14)
SIDE j COVARIATES
POLITY SCOREjt 0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
DYADIC COVARIATES
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt 0.44∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
DEFENSE ALLIANCEijt −0.97∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.14)
LOG(DISTANCEij) −0.02 −1.53∗∗∗ −1.45∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
TIME COVARIATES
TIME SINCE j LAST MID TARGET SPLINEijt −0.05∗∗∗
(0.003)
TIME SINCE LAST DYADIC MID SPLINEijt 0.002 −0.02∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Observations 19,605 242,422 242,422
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by directed dyad. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.5: Determinants of Militarized Dispute Probability, 1985–2010
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The models in Table 4.5 provide strong empirical support for the third
hypothesis. First, states with higher force projection capacity can still ef-
fectively deter disputes against their allies. Additionally, it is worth noting
that for the first model, DISTANCEij has no measurable effect on i’s ability to
deter disputes against allied j. Therefore it appears that with the capacity to
project force overseas, allies that are geographically distant are still credible
from the view of potentially hostile actors.
However, states with higher force projection capacity are also more
likely to initiate disputes overall. Although according to Model 3 in Table
4.5 there is no significant effect of force projection capacity on the likelihood
of being targeted for a dispute, in the appendix I show that this is likely
a feature of an uneven distribution of power between the U.S. and other
states. Instead, the U.S. appears to more likely to be the target of a dispute
as its force projection capacity increases, whereas other states appear less
likely to be the target of a dispute. While these results are driven by the U.S.
in the data, it is may simply be the effect of major power status rather than
a feature that is unique to the U.S. as an actor.
4.5 Alliance burden sharing and network autocorrelation
A potential limitation to the model in Eq. 4.1 is that it assumes each directed
dyad is independent of other directed dyads. However, each state has po-
tentially dozens of directed dyads within its alliance network, all of which
can have an effect on each other through their network connectivity. Thus,
for example, state i’s deployment levels to j depend on i’s deployment lev-
els to all of its other connections since it has a finite number of troops it can
deploy. U.S. troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, for example, affect
on the number of troops the U.S. can deploy to the Middle East. Likewise,
alliance burden sharing can affect states’ decisions on how to posture their
forces: i’s deployment levels to j can also depend on other states’ deploy-
ment levels to j, especially if they are part of the same alliance agreement.
For example, when the U.S. deployed troops to West Germany during the
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Cold War, it meant that other NATO states did not have to deploy as many
troops to the same area in order to signal NATO credibility. Although I ac-
count for spatial dependence in the first set of models for Eq. 4.1 by using
panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995), I also explore a spa-
tial error model (SEM) that explicitly takes these relationships into account
as follows (Anselin, 1988; Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley, 2006):
Yijt = θYijt−1 + β0Xit + β1Xit−1 + β2Xit−2 + γZijt + ηij + τt + εijt + λwitε
(4.2)
When λ = 0, the model in Eq. 4.2 is identical to the OLS model in Eq.
4.1. Thus, the SEM explicitly accounts for unobserved spatial dependence
among directed dyads by parameterizing the spatial correlation, λ, in the
error term.14 Additionally, wit is the ith row of connectivity matrix W for
year t, where wijt > 0 when i and j are connected in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Thus W is an NT × NT block-diagonal matrix, with connectivity for each
year blocked along the diagonal and zeroes elsewhere.
To construct W, I converted the alliance network structure for all defense
alliances in the ATOP dataset (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell et al., 2002) from a
binary graph to a binary edge graph, in order to accommodate the data’s
directed-dyadic structure. An edge graph, E(G), takes the edges from G
and treats them as nodes in E(G). Two nodes in E(G) are then joined if they
share a common node in G (Bondy and Murty, 1976). Using the edge graph
as the connectivity matrix, I then row standardized W with equal weights
for all non-zero values in wit.
To account for alliance network autocorrelation, I model a spatial error
model incorporating connectivity matrix W. Table 4.6 reports the results
of this model. Comparing the results in Table 4.6 to Model 4 in Table 4.3,
it is clear from the coefficient and standard error for λ that although posi-
tive spatial correlation exists, it does not substantially change the estimates
14I also consider a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) in the appendix. However, diag-
nostic tests also available in the appendix indicate that the SEM is a better model for my

























FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt 0.006
(0.02)





MOBILITY INDEX (LONG RUN EFFECT) −2.16
Year fixed effects X
Directed dyad fixed effects X
Observations 19,605
LM autocorrelation test statistic 5.78
Notes: Asymptotic adjusted standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.6: Spatial Error Model of Alliance Deployment Levels, 1985–2010
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for the long-run effect of MOBILITY INDEX on DEPLOYMENT SIZE. Conse-
quently, spatial dependence does not appear to bias the estimates for the
main variables of interest from the original OLS regression. However, the
SEM does reduce the magnitude of CINCit without substantially changing
the magnitude of the long-run effect for MOBILITY INDEX, further demon-
strating that CINC is measuring a different aspect of capabilities than force
projection capacity.15
4.6 Conclusion
The empirical evidence in this paper demonstrates that an increase in force
projection capacity has a depressing effect on deployment levels. States
tend to rely less on costly signaling in their alliance commitments as their
force projection capacity increases, instead relying more on tying hands sig-
naling in order underwrite the credibility of their alliances. As Fearon (1997)
notes, states would prefer to rely on audience costs since they are only paid
if a crisis occurs. My results provide evidence of this tendency. However,
audience costs alone are generally not sufficient in demonstrating credible
commitments. Instead, audience costs signals are supported by the capacity
to project force with high speed and volume.
Therefore, the primary theoretical contribution that this study makes is
that tying-hands signaling in alliances without significant sunk-cost signal-
ing does not operate purely through audience costs. Instead, credibility is
also signaled by the specific capabilities that states develop, which allows
states to quickly respond to a crisis situation. One of the key capabilities in
this regard is the level of mobility speed and capacity, which I measure by
creating an annual index for airlift and aircraft carrier capabilities.
More broadly, this paper also adds to our understanding of states’ se-
15The Lagrange Multiplier test for the SEM indicates that some spatial correlation re-
mains in the error term, and therefore the spatial weights matrix did not fully capture spa-
tial dependence. However, based on the value for the test statistic in Table 4.6, the amount
of remaining spatial correlation is small and therefore should not have a substantial impact
on the reported results.
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curity pursuits. The arms-versus-allies—or equivalently, internal-versus-
external balancing—tradeoff expressed in the literature is useful for under-
standing the extent to which states prefer autonomy versus relying on other
states for security (Morrow, 1993). However, rather than being substitutes
for each other, I show that force projection capabilities can increase auton-
omy while also complementing alliances through a shift in signaling strate-
gies. Furthermore, these dynamics apply to both symmetric and asymmet-
ric alliance relationships (Morrow, 1991). Additionally, the more flexible,
smaller deployments also give a weaker partner an opportunity to engage
in security cooperating while preserving a high degree of autonomy.
Moreover, the results in this paper have important implications for the
changing nature of deterrence. With increased force projection capacity,
the distinction between immediate deterrence and general deterrence blurs:
both occur through flexible force projection, which is more prevalent when
there is a high capacity to project force. This increased level of flexibility to
respond to crises has an additional effect on states’ force projection behav-
ior: the cost savings from fewer deployments to allies create new oppor-
tunities to pursue foreign policy interests in other areas without needing
to generate strong commitment signals. Consequently, increased force pro-
jection capacity increases the propensity for states to generate new deploy-
ments into other countries. These can occur through both crisis responses
and limited security partnerships, such as training foreign military forces or
conducting combined antiterrorism operations. At the same time, however,
as states deploy to more non-allied locations globally, they are more likely to
use military capabilities for coercive diplomacy. Thus, increased force pro-
jection capacity acts a double-edged sword: it helps deter disputes against
allies, but it increases the likelihood a state will initiate disputes elsewhere.
The findings in this paper suggest a number of areas for future research.
For example, while I control for regime type in my analysis, I do not explic-
itly evaluate the differences in signaling across political systems. Instead,
the models I use assume there is no difference in motivations for signal-
ing based on regime type. However, since a lack of sunk-cost signaling
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in alliances indicates that audience cost signals are therefore more impor-
tant in signaling credibility, are democratic regimes more likely to use rapid
mobility as a substitute for troop deployments? Conversely, are autocratic
regimes more likely to continue to rely on deployments to signal credibil-
ity? Similarly, do autocracies that develop rapid mobility capabilities tend
to have fewer defense alliances, and if so, given their tendency to initiate
more militarized disputes, do they therefore use such capabilities in a more
offensive manner, or are such capabilities used primarily for immediate de-
terrence?
This paper also has several important policy implications for the chang-
ing international security environment. For example, it helps explain what
policymakers can expect from China as it expands its force projection ca-
pacity, both in terms of airlift capabilities and aircraft carriers. Over the
last two decades, China has expanded its force projection capacity, which
is now greater than that of both France and the U.K., as Figure 4.3 shows.
China launched its first aircraft carrier in 2011, followed by a second car-
rier in 2017 that will soon be fully commissioned for missions (Buckley,
2017). China has also announced plans to construct four additional carriers
by 2035 (Chan and Rui, 2019). With such a swift expansion, rather than es-
tablish defensive alliances, China is more likely to pursue limited security
partnerships with like-minded states. Thus as China continues to increase
its capacity to project force, policymakers can expect further Chinese in-
volvement in foreign security partnerships where its interests lie. Doing so
will provide China with greater flexibility in pursuit of its foreign policy
interests, but will also limit its ability to deter or compel other states from
meddling in its interests in the long run, thereby increasing the chance that
China will become involved in militarized disputes.
Additionally, there are important policy implications for the NATO al-
liance, which has recently faced challenges to its long-run sustainability and
legitimacy. For example, the U.S. has been evaluating the costs of maintain-
ing the current 35,000 troops deployed to Germany (Hudson, Sonne, DeY-
oung et al., 2018). These challenges have raised alarms in Europe about the
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Figure 4.3: China, France, and U.K. MOBILITY INDEX, 1985–2018
strength of NATO credibility if the U.S. were to withdraw some its troops
from the region. However, this paper provides reassurance that the alliance
can still remain credible so long as U.S. political leaders maintain both their
public commitment to the alliance and the military’s force projection capac-
ity, even if troops were to withdraw from Germany or other parts of the
European continent.
There are also cautionary implications for policymakers based on the
findings presented here. While developing greater force projection capa-
bilities may reduce infrastructure costs of overseas bases, there is a risk of
over-promising within alliances when too many of them are underwritten
by force projection capacity without any substantial sunk costs. Force
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projection is a limited resource, and being spread too thin can come at great
cost to alliance credibility, and ultimately reputation, if the likelihood of
threats increases and not enough resources are available to respond to them
all. Thus policymakers must still consider the expected costs of stationing
troops versus the expected threat likelihood and the cost of responding to
crises with ad hoc, flexible deployments.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Mobility Index vs. CINC Comparison
One might suspect that as a state’s overall capabilities increase, its force pro-
jection capabilities will also increase. The Pearson correlation coefficient for
mobility capacity and the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC)
(Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972), often used by political scientists to mea-
sure national power, is 0.65, indicating moderately strong positive correla-
tion between the two measures. However, a closer evaluation reveals some
striking differences between the two indices. For example, Figure 4.4 plots
CINC and MOBILITY INDEX values over time for several of the most capa-
ble states according to these indices. While the two measures have different
scales,16 the plots are lined up in relative terms to each other for easier com-
parison.
Several items are worth briefly noting about the plots in Figure 4.4. First,
whereas some states such as China and India have seen large increases in
relative capabilities over time according to CINC, neither of these states’
force projection capabilities have experienced any apparent increase, rela-
tive or absolute, according to MOBILITY INDEX. Moreover, because both
states have relatively high CINC capabilities even in 1985, one might as-
sume they each have some relatively high force projection capacity. How-
ever, MOBILITY INDEX suggests that this is a poor assumption. Thus, CINC
may overestimate force projection capacity. In contrast, the U.S. has re-
mained steady in relative capabilities by CINC standards, but has increased
in both relative and overall force projection capacity according to MOBILITY
INDEX measures. This suggests that CINC underestimates force projection
capacity in other cases. In total, all of these differences indicate that MOBIL-
ITY INDEX is capturing a different aspect of national capabilities than CINC.
16CINC represents an annual proportion of world total capabilities, so that relative na-
tional power is time independent, whereas MOBILITY INDEX is scaled relative to its max-
imum value. I do not use an annual proportion because this removes the time-trending
effect of improvements in force projection capacity, whereas I want to explicitly measure
the effects of these changes over time.
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Figure 4.4: Sample Comparison of CINC vs. MOBILITY INDEX, 1985–2018
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4.7.2 Autoregressive distributed lag model diagnostics
Because distributed lags can be highly correlated in a regression model, I
ran diagnostics on the results in Table 4.3 to evaluate whether the alternat-
ing signs on the lag coefficients might indicate multicollinearity. To do so,
I used Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), which checks variable selection
across models and accounts for uncertainty by averaging over the best mod-
els.
BMA is useful for identifying which variables are the most relevant pre-
dictors for the model. Using this technique, the variables with high pos-
terior probabilities are most likely useful predictors in the model. While I
am less concerned with which variables to select in the model, I am con-
cerned with whether BMA suggests that the distributed lags for MOBILITY
INDEX are useful predictors or not. In Tables 4.7 through 4.10, I report the
best BMA-based model selected for each of the four models in Table 4.3. In
all four tables, the best models all indicate that the distributed lags are use-
ful predictors, and moreover, that the coefficient on the second lag switches
from positive to negative. This provides support for the conclusion that
these lags are meaningfully explaining the outcome, and are not providing
spurious coefficients due to multicollinearity.
p!=0 EV SD Best Model
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt−1) 100.0 0.94 0.002 0.94
MOBILITY INDEXit 80.8 0.79 0.46 0.98
MOBILITY INDEXit−1 100.0 3.56 0.43 3.42
MOBILITY INDEXit−2 100.0 -4.28 0.30 -4.33
Posterior probability 0.81
Table 4.7: Bayesian Model Averaging for Model 1, Table 4.3
4.7.3 Network autocorrelation diagnostics
The following diagnostic tests were performed to evaluate spatial depen-
dence in the data using network connectivity matrix W, as described in the
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p!=0 EV SD Best Model
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt−1) 100 0.73 0.005 0.73
MOBILITY INDEXit 0 0.00 0.00 .
MOBILITY INDEXit−1 100 3.39 0.27 3.39
MOBILITY INDEXit−2 100 -3.64 0.26 -3.64
Posterior probability 1
Table 4.8: Bayesian Model Averaging for Model 2, Table 4.3
p!=0 EV SD Best Model
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt−1) 100.0 0.93 0.002 0.93
MOBILITY INDEXit 67.7 0.64 0.50 0.86
MOBILITY INDEXit−1 100.0 3.58 0.42 3.37
MOBILITY INDEXit−2 100.0 -4.25 0.31 -4.31
Additional covariates . . . . . . . . . . . .
Posterior probability 0.34
Table 4.9: Bayesian Model Averaging for Model 3, Table 4.3
p!=0 EV SD Best Model
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt−1) 100.0 0.73 0.005 0.73
MOBILITY INDEXit 0.0 0.00 0.00 .
MOBILITY INDEXit−1 100.0 3.26 0.27 3.26
MOBILITY INDEXit−2 100.0 -3.73 0.26 -3.73
Additional covariates . . . . . . . . . . . .
Posterior probability 0.73
Table 4.10: Bayesian Model Averaging for Model 4, Table 4.3
main body of the paper.
In Table 4.11, I conducted a Moran’s I diagnostic test (Moran, 1950),
which provides a coefficient to evaluate the global level of spatial autocor-
relation in the residuals of the estimated model. The observed Moran’s I is
compared to the expected value of Moran’s I under the null hypothesis of
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no spatial autocorrelation, which is computed as − 1N−1 . As indicated in Ta-
ble 4.11, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is spatial
autocorrelation in the model.
Diagnostic Test Test Statistic p-value
Moran’s I 32.88 < 2.2−16
Observed Moran’s I Expectation p-value
0.05 −0.002 2−6
Table 4.11: Moran’s I Test for Spatial Dependence
Table 4.12 reports the results of Lagrange Multiplier (LM) diagnostics for
spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of the estimated model, comparing
the spatial error model (SEM, “ERR”) and the spatial autoregression model
(SAR, “LAG”). LMERR is the simple test statistic for the LM test for error
dependence, LMLAG is the same but for the LM test for a missing spatially
lagged dependent variable, RLMERR and RLMLAG are variants of these
two tests that are robust to the possible presence of the other, and SARMA
is a portmanteau test that is equivalent to LMERR + RLMLAG. In Table
4.12, all of the tests are statistically significant, meaning that there is spatial
autocorrelation and both the SAR and SEM may each be viable models.
However, looking at their robust counterparts, RLMLAG, has a smaller test
statistic, suggesting that the SEM may likely be the better model to capture
the spatial autocorrelation.
Next, Table 4.13 reports the results of the SAR, in case it is actually the
better model to capture spatial autocorrelation. Substantively, these results
are not markedly different from the SEM model: the long-run effect for MO-
BILITY INDEX is −1.63, and the spatial lag covariate indicates positive spa-
tial autocorrelation. However, with the spatial lag covariate and the spatial
weights matrix modeled explicitly in the model, the marginal effects of each
covariate are somewhat less clear than a standard OLS model: not only are
there direct effects, which are reflected in the values of the covariates in
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Diagnostic Test Test Statistic p-value
LMERR 992.50 < 2.2−16
LMLAG 228.08 < 2.2−16
RLMERR 777.74 < 2.2−16
RLMLAG 13.33 0.0003
SARMA 1005.80 < 2.2−16
Table 4.12: Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence
Table 4.13, but there are indirect network effects as well. To explore these
effects in more detail, Table 4.14 provides direct, indirect, and total impact
measures for each of the covariates.
Finally, Table 4.15 compares the post-regression LM tests for both the
SAR and SEM models, as well as each of these models’ values for the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) estimator (Akaike, 1973). The LM test for the
SAR model indicates that there is still a large amount of spatial autocorre-
lation in the model’s residuals, whereas the LM test for the SEM indicates
that nearly all spatial autocorrelation is accounted for. Additionally, the
AIC for the SEM is lower than for the SAR, which is preferred. These two
post-regression diagnostics provide further support for the conclusion that
the SEM is the more appropriate model for spatial autoregression with the
data.
4.7.4 Instrumental variable regression diagnostics
The following diagnostic tests were performed to evaluate instrumental
variable regression (IV) as described in section 4.7.6 below.
In Table 4.16, I report the results of the Wu-Hausman test (Nakamura
and Nakamura, 1981). This test evaluates whether IV is as consistent as
OLS, where the null hypothesis is that IV is equally consistent to OLS. If we
fail to reject the null, then OLS is preferable to IV. However, rejecting the

























FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt 0.02
(0.01)








Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.13: Spatial Autoregression Model
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Variable Direct Indirect Total
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt−1) 0.73 0.23 0.96
MOBILITY INDEXit 0.24 0.07 0.31
MOBILITY INDEXit−1 2.77 0.88 3.65
MOBILITY INDEXit−2 −3.46 −1.09 −4.55
CINCit 4.45 1.41 5.86
POLITY SCOREit −0.0005 −0.0002 −0.0007
CINCit/(CINCit+CINCjt) −0.11 −0.03 −0.14
TRADEijt/TOTAL TRADEit 0.05 0.01 0.06
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZE)jit 0.001 0.0005 0.002
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt 0.02 0.005 0.02
COMMON THREATS LAST 2 YEARSijt 0.006 0.002 0.008
Table 4.14: SAR impact measures
Diagnostic Test Test Statistic p-value
LMERRSAR 320.99 2.2−16
LMERRSEM 5.78 0.02
Model AIC Log likelihood
SAR 24,513 −11,139.57
SEM 24,186 −10,976.15
Table 4.15: Comparisons between SAR and SEM models
therefore that IV is more consistent than OLS.
Finally, the Sargan test evaluates overidentifying restrictions, thereby in-
dicating whether or not the instruments are exogenous (Sargan, 1958). The
null hypothesis for this test is that the instruments are exogeneous. Based
on the results in Table 4.16, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and can
conclude that the instruments are valid.
4.7.5 Is U.S. behavior driving the results?
Because the U.S. was the dominant global military power throughout the
time period analyzed in the data, it is possible that U.S. behavior is driv-
ing the results. To address this possibility, I re-ran each of the main models
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Diagnostic Test df1 df2 Test Statistic p-value
WU-HAUSMAN 3 11,799 3.87 0.009
SARGAN 3 1.21 0.75
Table 4.16: Diagnostics for Instrumental Variables
for the three hypotheses in the main text with the U.S. excluded from the
dataset. The results are listed in Tables 4.17, 4.18, and 4.19, respectively.
The substantive results for the first two hypotheses remain the same as the
results in the main text, supporting the argument that U.S. behavior is not
driving the results in a unique way. For the third hypothesis in Table 4.19,
the results are slightly different but should be interpreted carefully. Based
on this table, it appears that for states other than the U.S., increased force
projection capacity still decreases the probability that an ally will be the tar-
get of a militarized dispute and increases the probability that the state will
initiate militarized disputes overall. However, increased force projection
lowers the probability of being the target of a militarized dispute overall,
which is different from the main results that include the U.S. Therefore, at
most, we can conclude that increased force projection increases the like-
lihood that the U.S. will be the target of militarized disputes overall—if
we believe that the U.S. is an outlier case. However, this is also a biased
sample because it systematically excludes all the observations for the most
powerful force projecting state, which has played a meaningful role in de-
terring threats and maintaining stability in the international system. Con-
sequently, a more conservative (and generalizable) conclusion from these
results would be that increased force projection capacity may increase the
likelihood that the dominant power will be the target of militarized dis-
putes, while it decreases the likelihood of being the target of militarized
disputes for less powerful states.
167
4.7.6 Tests for endogeneity
An additional modeling challenge to Eq. 4.1 is possible endogeneity be-
tween deployment levels in alliances and force projection capacity: in par-
ticular, technological investments and force posture policy decisions might
predict force projection capacity, rather than (or in addition to) the other
way around. To deal with this threat to causal inference, I employ instru-
mental variable estimation, using state i’s past ruling party political ideol-
ogy in the government as instruments for MOBILITY INDEXit. To code polit-
ical ideology, I use the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz, Keefer, and
Scartascini, 2018), which provides a categorical coding (left, center, right)
for the executive and opposition parties’ ideological orientation.17 I expect
past ruling party ideology, conditional on other covariates, to be a strong
predictor of military spending and thus force projection capacity, with right-
leaning parties likely to spend more on the military than left-leaning parties.
To illustrate this relationship, Table 4.20 reports the results of a first-stage
regression with MOBILITY INDEXit regressed on PARTY IDEOLOGYit−2, and
likewise for each of the other lagged instruments, which I explain in more
detail below. Because PARTY IDEOLOGY is a categorical variable, the results
are reported relative to the baseline, which is a right-leaning government.
The results in Table 4.20 illustrate that, as ideology moves from right to left,
there is a negative relationship between party ideology and force projection
capacity.
I address the possibility that MOBILITY INDEX is endogenous through
instrumental variable estimation, using past domestic political ideology as
an instrument. Table 4.21 reports the results of this estimation. About one-
third of the observations from the original results are no longer available
because of missing data for domestic political regime ideology. Addition-
ally, the standard errors are larger, though this can occur due to weaker in-
17I used the following rules to code state i’s ruling party political ideology: 1) if the
executive is not competitively elected, then use the executive’s ideology; otherwise, if the
executive is competitively elected and 2a) the opposition’s vote share in the legislature is
less than or equal to 50%, then use the executive’s ideology; 2b) the opposition’s vote share
in the legislature is greater than 50%, then use the opposition’s ideology.
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struments. However, even with fewer observations and potentially weaker
instruments, the results in Table 4.21 are similar to those in Models 4 and
5 in Table 4.3, including the estimate for the long-run effect of MOBILITY
INDEX, providing further empirical support for the first hypothesis.
According to the first-stage F-statistics reported in Table 4.21, the instru-
ments appear strong enough to obtain the expected outcome. Additionally,
because the coding for domestic political ideology is categorical, the en-
dogenous variables are over-identified, which allows me to test instrument
exogeneity. Based on diagnostic checks (available in the appendix), the re-
sults of the Sargan test for instrument exogeneity indicate that all of the
instruments are valid and exogenous. Therefore, if we are willing to accept
that the instrumental variable assumptions are valid, the instruments sat-
isfy the exclusion restriction and we can conclude that the results in Table
4.21 provide consistent estimates.
Another possibility is that the instruments are not perfectly exogenous,
but are “plausibly exogenous” to the extent that the exclusion restriction
is not perfectly met, but is close enough that we can still infer causality.
To evaluate whether the instruments are plausibly exogenous, I use Conley,
Hansen, and Rossi (2012)’s technique of relaxing the IV exclusion restriction
by defining a parameter, γ, that reflects the degree to which the instruments
may diverge from true exogeneity. By removing the direct effect of the in-
strument on the dependent variable at different values for γ and then eval-
uating the coefficients for the endogenous parameters in an IV regression, I
can determine how large γ would need to be for the coefficient estimates to
be insignificant.
Figure 4.5 plots the range of possible coefficient values across γ for the
instantaneous effect of MOBILITY INDEX in the IV regression. If we have
a prior belief that the direct effect of the instrument on deployment levels
is negative—i.e., that left-leaning ruling parties have a depressing effect on
troop deployment levels, compared to right-leaning parties—then only the
range of values where γ is negative are relevant. Given this belief, Figure 4.5
therefore shows that the direct (negative) effect of the instrument, γ, must
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be approximately −0.027 in order for the instantaneous effect of MOBILITY
INDEX on deployment levels to be zero. Substantively, this means that the
direct effect of left-leaning governments must decrease deployment levels
by 2.7% in order for the instantaneous effect of force projection capacity to
be removed.
Furthermore, in Figure 4.6 I plot the range of possible values across γ
for the long-run effect of MOBILITY INDEX. The long-run effect becomes
stronger as we relax the exclusion restriction by making γ more negative.
This result provides strong evidence that I have identified the correct causal
direction for the main argument that force projection capacity will tend to
decrease deployment levels. The long-run effect is removed only when γ is
equal to approximately 0.04, meaning that left-leaning governments would
need to increase deployment levels by 4% in order for the long-run effect of
force projection capacity to be removed.
Figure 4.5: Range of possible coefficient values across γ for MOBILITY IN-
DEX in the IV regression with 95% confidence interval.
I also explored other approaches to causal inference in case political
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Figure 4.6: Range of possible long-run effect values of MOBILITY INDEX
across γ in the IV regression.
party ideology is not a valid instrument. One approach I considered was
to use commodity shocks as an instrument, in line with previous research
that has also explored commodity shocks as an identification strategy (e.g.,
Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Carreri and Dube, 2017). A key difficulty in us-
ing commodity shocks as an instrument for MOBILITY INDEX, however, is
that cross-nationally, states respond to shocks in different ways. Depending
on the domestic economy, political preferences about how a government
budget is allocated, and other domestic variables that I do not measure,
states will vary in the way they respond to shocks. Moreover, I considered
only looking at specific commodities such as steel, iron, and other metals
that might affect production costs for aircraft and naval capabilities. How-
ever, this distinction poses separate challenges because these shocks would
only correlate with the production of new capabilities, but it would have
no measurable impact on capabilities that have already been built or pur-
chased and are operational. Separately, I also considered using covariate
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balancing generalized propensity score (CBGPS) matching (Fong, Hazlett,
and Imai, 2018). However, this method has separate limitations that make
estimating causal effects in my model particularly challenging. In partic-
ular, due to the time-series-cross-section data structure, matching methods
such as CBGPS do not account for the large number of repeated measure-
ments on the same units. While other methods are being developed to deal
with this issue (e.g., Imai, Kim, and Wang, 2019), currently they only allow
for a binary treatment variable, whereas MOBILITY INDEX is continuous,




(1) (2) (3) (4)
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZEijt−1) 0.93∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
MOBILITY INDEXit 6.42∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗ 5.72∗∗∗ 1.08
(0.60) (0.71) (0.63) (0.70)
MOBILITY INDEXit−1 −7.45∗∗∗ −5.60∗∗∗ −7.08∗∗∗ −5.25∗∗∗
(0.82) (0.73) (0.81) (0.71)
MOBILITY INDEXit−2 0.71∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.36 0.36
(0.47) (0.54) (0.48) (0.56)
CINCit 1.70∗∗∗ 4.83∗∗∗
(0.32) (1.33)




TRADEijt/TOTAL TRADEit 0.25∗∗ 0.08
(0.10) (0.21)
LOG(DEPLOYMENT SIZE)jit 0.004 −0.002
(0.004) (0.009)
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.008) (0.01)










MOBILITY INDEX (LONG RUN EFFECT) −4.56 −14.45 −12.18 −13.42
Year fixed effects X X
Directed dyad fixed effects X X
Observations 17,584 17,584 17,584 17,584
Clusters 987 987 987 987
Years 26 26 26 26
LM autocorrelation test statistic 49.52 4.73 47.34 6.32
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01



















LOG(TERRORIST FATALITIES LAST 2 YEARSjt) 0.31∗∗∗
(0.02)
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt −0.17∗∗
(0.07)
COMMON THREATS LAST 2 YEARSijt 0.62∗∗∗
(0.09)










TIME SINCE LAST DEPLOYMENT SPLINEijt −0.01
(0.008)
Observations 231,026
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by directed dyad. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01




PR(ALLY j MID TARGETijt) PR(MIDijt)
(1) (2) (3)
MOBILITY INDEXit −4.75∗∗∗ 0.89∗ −3.55∗∗∗
(1.18) (0.47) (0.97)
CINCit 14.19∗∗∗ 18.67∗∗∗ 23.87∗∗∗
(2.19) (0.83) (1.11)
POLITY SCOREit −0.04∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
CINCit/(CINCit+CINCjt) −1.82∗∗∗ −2.47∗∗∗ −3.27∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14)
POLITY SCOREjt 0.02∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt 0.31∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.05
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
DEFENSE ALLIANCEijt −1.10∗∗∗ −1.14∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.16)
LOG(DISTANCEij) −0.17∗∗∗ −1.62∗∗∗ −1.57∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
TIME SINCE j LAST MID TARGET SPLINEijt −0.04∗∗∗
(0.003)
TIME SINCE LAST DYADIC MID SPLINEijt 0.001 −0.02∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Observations 17,584 236,446 236,446
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by directed dyad. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01




MOBILITY INDEXit MOBILITY INDEXit−1 MOBILITY INDEXit−2
(1) (2) (3)
PARTY IDEOLOGY (CENTER)it−2 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002)
PARTY IDEOLOGY (LEFT)it−2 −0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
PARTY IDEOLOGY (CENTER)it−3 0.003
(0.002)
PARTY IDEOLOGY (LEFT)it−3 −0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
PARTY IDEOLOGY (CENTER)it−4 −0.0002
(0.002)
PARTY IDEOLOGY (LEFT)it−4 −0.015∗∗∗
(0.002)
Additional covariates X X X
Year fixed effects X X X
Directed dyad fixed effects X X X
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01

























FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCEijt 0.04
(0.03)
COMMON THREATS LAST 2 YEARSijt 0.02∗∗∗
(0.008)
MOBILITY INDEX (LONG RUN EFFECT) −1.96
Year fixed effects X




PARTY IDEOLOGYit−2 F-statistic 103.63
PARTY IDEOLOGYit−3 F-statistic 126.00
PARTY IDEOLOGYit−4 F-statistic 154.91
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01




We stood all alone a year ago,
and to many countries it seemed
that our account was closed, we
were finished . . . But instead our
country stood in the gap. There
was no flinching and no thought
of giving in; and by what
seemed almost a miracle to those
outside these Islands, though we
ourselves never doubted it, we
now find ourselves in a position
where I say that we can be sure
that we have only to persevere
to conquer.
—Winston Churchill
London, UK, October 29, 1941
(Churchill, 1941)
This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of military com-
mitment problems in order to answer the following question: in dynamic
environments where conditions can change quickly and substantially over
time, why do military commitment problems arise, how do they impact
states’ ability to deter threats and fight wars, and how can states overcome
them? To answer this question, I investigate three factors that are neces-
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sary for military organizations to be effective in dynamic situations: resolve,
adaptation, and flexibility.
In Chapters 2 through 4, I focus on a particular factor within a given
context to evaluate military effectiveness. These chapters provide a demon-
stration of how resolve, adaptation, and flexibility contribute to military ef-
fectiveness in the context of conventional conflict, unconventional conflict,
and international security, respectively.
Each of these three factors is related to a different commitment prob-
lem that military forces often have to confront. First, high signals of re-
solve within an army can make the commitment to fight credible, such that
commanders and soldiers believe fighting in combat is their best option,
rather than fleeing or surrendering. Second, a high level of commitment
to a conflict by political leaders can create better conditions for the mili-
tary to adapt to novel situations and improve their doctrines. Finally, high
flexibility through improved force projection capabilities can make security
commitments to other states credible, as it allows military forces to respond
to crises more quickly and efficiently.
5.1 Summary of findings
Chapter 2: “Until the Bitter End? The Diffusion of Surrender Across Battles”
Why do some armies fight until the bitter end, but others collapse and sur-
render? Existing research has highlighted the importance of battlefield re-
solve for the onset, conduct, and outcome of war, but has left these life-and-
death decisions mostly unexplained. We know little about why battle-level
surrender occurs, and why it stops.
In this chapter, I argue that surrender emerges from a collective-action
problem: success in battle requires that soldiers choose to fight as a unit
rather than flee, but individual decisions to fight depend on whether sol-
diers expect their comrades to do the same, all else equal. As a result, sur-
render becomes contagious across battles because soldiers take cues from
what other soldiers did when they were in a similar position. Conversely,
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where no recent precedent exists, mass surrender is unlikely.1
I find empirical support for this claim using a new data set of conven-
tional battles in all interstate wars from 1939 to 2011. The results offer sev-
eral contributions to research on interstate conflict. I demonstrate that bat-
tlefield surrender can be contagious because of a collective-action problem
within military organizations. Success in battle requires that soldiers fight
as a cohesive unit, but individual decisions to fight depend on whether sol-
diers expect their comrades to do the same. As troops learn of past decisions
to surrender within their own army, they lose confidence in their unit’s re-
solve, and decide to flee rather than fight. This pattern is particularly acute
if the expected costs of surrender are also low—either because troops be-
lieve the opponent will treat prisoners well, or because senior officers have
recently surrendered, shaking the credibility of threats to punish desertion
and surrender by the rank and file.
In addition to diffusion, I examined several alternative explanations of
surrender. I found tentative, if mixed, support for a few factors that might
affect the parameters of the collective action model—like international law,
principal-agent problems, and offensive advantages. However, I found
no evidence that surrender depends on political regime type, recruitment
methods, or relative national power. Although data limitations prevent us
from directly testing several other explanations—mutual surveillance, dis-
cipline, and ideology—I sought to at least account for them econometrically,
through combatant and war fixed effects. I also demonstrated that it is in-
formation specifically on past surrender, rather than military effectiveness
generally, that drives soldiers’ decisions.
The determinants of surrender are theoretically important because these
life-and-death choices tend to resonate well beyond individual battles. Al-
though previous research suggests that combatants acquire information
1Military organizations can devise ways to try to manipulate soldiers’ incentives, which
can create some variation in the way collective action is observed empirically. The Soviet
use of “blocking detachments” (Lyall and Zhukov, 2020), for example, may have helped
prevent more soldiers from surrendering in the Winter of 1941/2 even though many Soviet
soldiers had surrendered a few months before.
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about war-fighting resolve through battle outcomes, scholars often treat re-
solve as an exogenous cause of war termination. In the approach taken in
this chapter, by contrast, battlefield resolve is of primary theoretical inter-
est. If wars are a continuation of political bargaining, reconciling informa-
tional asymmetries through the use of force, then understanding the mecha-
nisms and processes influencing battlefield resolve is crucial for explaining
and predicting bargaining outcomes. This chapter’s results illustrate that
wartime resolve does not depend solely on political leaders’ assessment of
probabilistic battlefield outcomes. Instead, military officers and their troops
are the primary actors mutually influencing each other’s behavior. Because
soldiers’ choices in future battles depend on precedents set by others in the
past, it is these cascading battlefield decisions that ultimately shape and
constrain leaders’ choices. South Vietnam’s final rout in 1975 illustrates how
surrender can cascade across an army; likewise, German resolve to fight un-
til the bitter end in 1945 illustrates how the decision to continue fighting also
has its own “cascading” effect by signaling a decision to continue fighting.
Chapter 3: “Adapting Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the Shadow of the
Future”
Modern insurgencies create significant evolutionary pressures on conven-
tional militaries to improve their doctrines and overall military effective-
ness. Why are some militaries more effective at evolving their counterin-
surgency doctrine than others?
This chapter develops a theory which argues that complex local condi-
tions force militaries to optimize their organizations for the commitment
horizon they possess in a conflict. The commitment horizon is the extent
to which the future matters for the present—i.e., how much the “shadow of
the future” (Axelrod, 1984) weighs on a military’s decision-making—and is
related to the concept of resolve, i.e., the “firmness or steadfastness of pur-
pose” (Kertzer, 2017). The optimization based upon commitment horizon
drives militaries to take on particular organizational characteristics, such
as the amount of delegation and the tolerance for experimenting with new
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tactics, which affect their performance in systematic ways as a result.
Using an agent-based model, I evaluate the theory by simulating differ-
ent organizational characteristics and evaluating how doctrinal effective-
ness changes based on different commitment horizons. Results from the
simulations suggest a typology of counterinsurgent militaries according to
their commitment horizon. Contrary to existing arguments that counterin-
surgency effectiveness is determined by a particular set of strategies or by a
fixed, preexisting military culture, the results also suggest that doctrinal ef-
fectiveness follows a U-shaped curve as the commitment horizon increases.
To illustrate the logic of the model, I operationalize commitment horizon
and describe the typology and its implications in several historical coun-
terinsurgency cases: the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan; the British in Malaya
and Iraq; and the French in Indochina and Algeria.
This chapter contributes to our understanding of the determinants of
military doctrine and battlefield effectiveness in counterinsurgency opera-
tions by providing a novel approach to explaining military adaptation dur-
ing wartime. I have shown that militaries waging counterinsurgencies can
be categorized according to a typology defined by their commitment hori-
zons. Depending on how large the shadow of the future looms, militaries
will adopt certain organizational features to optimize their performance in
a complex environment. These features—the level of military autonomy
and the tolerance for political and military experimentation—directly affect
the extent to which learning and doctrinal adaptation will occur, and thus
overall performance. As the results of my model indicate, overall coun-
terinsurgency effectiveness follows a U-shaped curve as the commitment
horizon increases. Those militaries with a moderate commitment horizon
tend to perform most poorly, as they lack both the urgency to adapt and the
drive to persist and search for better solutions over time. On the other hand,
the militaries that experience the greatest overall effectiveness are those that
have the highest commitment level, because the organizational characteris-
tics adopted allow the political and military levels to work in conjunction to
find improvements over time. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates that
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military culture—as manifested in the level of military autonomy, and the
tolerance for political and military experimentation—can develop through
processes within the organization itself in response to a state’s commitment
horizon.
Chapter 4: “Projecting Credibility: Alliance Commitments and Foreign Pol-
icy Pursuits”
How does the ability to quickly project large-scale military force—such
as with transport aircraft and naval aircraft carriers—affect states’ alliance
commitments and the likelihood of militarized disputes with other states?
In this chapter, I argue that states with greater capacity to project force
can deploy fewer troops to allies for deterrent purposes, instead combining
their capacity to respond swiftly in a crisis with public words and actions—
such as statements by political leaders—to demonstrate their commitment
to allies. However, greater force projection capacity is a double-edged
sword: although it helps deter threats against allies, it also increases a state’s
likelihood of initiating militarized disputes in other parts of the world.
I evaluate the effect of force projection capacity on troop deployments
using a new index for force projection capacity from 1985 to 2018. The em-
pirical evidence in this chapter demonstrates that an increase in force pro-
jection capacity has a depressing effect on deployment levels. States tend to
rely less on costly signaling in their alliance commitments as their force pro-
jection capacity increases, instead relying more on tying hands signaling in
order underwrite the credibility of their alliances. However, audience costs
alone are generally not sufficient in demonstrating credible commitments.
Instead, audience costs signals are supported by the capacity to project force
with high speed and volume.
Moreover, the results in this chapter have important implications for
the changing nature of deterrence. With increased force projection capac-
ity, the distinction between immediate deterrence and general deterrence
blurs: both occur through flexible force projection, which is more preva-
lent when there is a high capacity to project force. This increased level of
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flexibility to respond to crises has an additional effect on states’ force pro-
jection behavior: the cost savings from fewer deployments to allies create
new opportunities to pursue foreign policy interests in other areas without
needing to generate strong commitment signals. Consequently, increased
force projection capacity increases the propensity for states to generate new
deployments into other countries. These can occur through both crisis re-
sponses and limited security partnerships, such as training foreign military
forces or conducting combined antiterrorism operations. Furthermore, an
increased capacity to project force increases the likelihood of initiating mili-
tarized disputes with other states, but it also works to effectively deter mil-
itarized disputes against allies.
5.2 Directions for future research
This dissertation opens several future research avenues. For example, al-
though I have demonstrated that surrender can have a contagion effect
across battles, we do not analyze how this process begins within battles,
and what critical events must occur to jump-start surrender and its subse-
quent diffusion. While my focus in Chapter 2 is on inter-battle dynamics,
a more explicit focus on intra-battle behavior is needed to understand the
conditions leading to initial organizational breakdown.
Further research is also needed to understand how different political-
military institutions affect whether the diffusion process occurs, or whether
it can be reversed. We know little about why some military organizations
can absorb losses and adapt to changing circumstances, while others are
unable to recover from battles in which soldiers surrendered en masse. By
disaggregating wars into battles and stepping away from the classical ap-
proach of treating the military as a unitary actor, we can better understand
how collective action dynamics affect battlefield outcomes and, ultimately,
decisions to initiate, continue or terminate war.
Chapter 3 opens up at least two avenues for future research. First, I do
not model varying organizational structures, such as one with an uneven
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number of agents between vertical or horizontal levels, or one that is more
networked in its connectivity between agents. Future research could extend
the model to explicitly evaluate how changes in organizational design and
structure affect doctrinal consensus. Second, while I focus on the role of
the commitment horizon in determining counterinsurgency effectiveness,
there are also implications for civil-military relations that I do not systemat-
ically explore. For example, the varying levels of military autonomy and the
tolerance for political and military experimentation each have implications
about the relative distribution of decision-making power between civil and
military authorities and the relative openness to change, respectively. Fu-
ture research could more explicitly evaluate the implications arising from
different organizational arrangements, and how democratic and autocratic
regimes might vary in this regard.
Additionally, the findings in Chapter 4 suggest a number of other areas
for future research. For example, while I control for regime type in my anal-
ysis, I do not explicitly evaluate the differences in signaling across political
systems. Instead, the models I use assume there is no difference in motiva-
tions for signaling based on regime type. However, since a lack of sunk-cost
signaling in alliances indicates that audience cost signals are therefore more
important in signaling credibility, are democratic regimes more likely to use
rapid mobility as a substitute for troop deployments? Conversely, are au-
tocratic regimes more likely to continue to rely on deployments to signal
credibility? Similarly, do autocracies that develop rapid mobility capabil-
ities tend to have fewer defense alliances, and if so, given their tendency
to initiate more militarized disputes, do they therefore use such capabili-
ties in a more offensive manner, or are such capabilities used primarily for
immediate deterrence?
5.3 Policy implications
In addition to opening up new research avenues, this dissertation also pro-
vides several important policy implications. For example, in Chapter 2,
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we showed that if political authorities wish to maintain the resolve of their
armies in battle, they should worry less about how dangerous a combat en-
vironment is likely to be, and more about how to address recent precedents
for mass surrender.
Additionally, the results in Chapter 3 suggest that only a certain type
of organization is likely to perform most effectively at counterinsurgency:
namely, one which has the highest commitment level in a conflict. This
suggests that political and military leaders evaluating whether to engage in
counterinsurgency operations would be well served in carefully examining
how committed they are, to include the commitment of the selectorate—i.e.,
the individuals who can choose the political leader (Bueno de Mesquita,
Smith, Siverson et al., 2003). If policymakers identify less than the utmost
level of commitment, they may find that avoiding such a conflict may be
better in the long run. Instead, if they do have a very high commitment
horizon, then adopting the organizational features that encourage the mili-
tary and political leaders to work in a dialectic approach to adaptation as a
coordinated organization will help them achieve the greatest overall effec-
tiveness in a counterinsurgency.
Furthermore, Chapter 4 has several important policy implications for the
changing international security environment. For example, it helps explain
what policymakers can expect from China as it expands its force projection
capacity. China launched its first aircraft carrier in 2011, followed by a sec-
ond carrier in 2017 and plans to construct four additional carriers by 2035
(Chan and Rui, 2019). As China continues to increase its capacity to project
force, policymakers can expect further Chinese involvement in foreign secu-
rity partnerships where its interests lie. However, China will likely pursue
these interests without making many, if any, strong commitments to new
defensive alliances. Doing so will provide China with greater flexibility in
pursuit of its foreign policy interests, but will also limit its ability to deter or
compel other states from meddling in its interests in the long run, thereby
increasing the chance that China will become involved in militarized dis-
putes.
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Additionally, there are important policy implications for the NATO al-
liance, which has recently faced challenges to its long-run sustainability and
legitimacy. For example, the U.S. has been evaluating the costs of maintain-
ing the current 35,000 troops deployed to Germany. These challenges have
raised alarms in Europe about the strength of NATO credibility if the U.S.
were to withdraw some its troops from the region. However, Chapter 4
provides reassurance that the alliance can still remain credible so long as
U.S. political leaders maintain both their public commitment to the alliance
and the military’s force projection capacity, even if troops were to withdraw
from Germany or other parts of the European continent (assuming the se-
curity situation with Russia does not change significantly).
Finally, there are also cautionary implications for policymakers based on
the findings presented in Chapter 4. While developing greater force projec-
tion capabilities may reduce infrastructure costs of overseas bases, there is
a risk of over-promising within alliances when too many of them are un-
derwritten by force projection capacity without any substantial sunk costs.
Force projection is a limited resource, and being spread too thin can come at
great cost to alliance credibility, and ultimately reputation, if the likelihood
of threats increases and not enough resources are available to respond to
them all. Thus policymakers must still consider the expects costs of station-
ing troops versus the expected threat likelihood and the cost of responding
to crises with ad hoc, flexible deployments.
In summary, the organizational solutions to commitment problems I
consider—resolve, adaptation, and flexibility—directly influence military
effectiveness, and along with other types of commitment solutions, pro-
vide a better framework for understanding military effectiveness than exist-
ing approaches. For both scholars and practitioners alike, this dissertation
demonstrates that a careful study of military commitment problems can im-
prove our evaluation of military effectiveness as well as our understanding
of how states build and sustain effective military organizations.
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